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Chapter 1: Introduction
What is a “law of nature”? We might understand this question to be asking
“What is on the list of the things that are called ‘laws of nature’?”. The history
of science is replete with things that might belong on that list. Some are helpfully
named as laws, like Kepler’s laws of planetary motion, Newton’s laws of (general)
motion, or the Laws of Thermodynamics. Other likely candidates, even if they are
not standardly referred to as “laws”, are things like each of Maxwell’s Equations,
or the symmetry principles that play a central role in much of modern physics. All
of these candidate laws are physical laws, but not everything that gets called a law
comes from the field of physics. There is the Weber-Fechner law in psychology that
is concerned with perceptual sensitivity to changes in physical stimuli, there are
the laws of supply and demand in economics, Malthus’ law of population growth
in ecology, and many more. Which of these are rightly called laws of nature? I
don’t know. That question is primarily the concern of scientists. It is the business
of physicists to pick out the laws physics. Psychologists will identify the laws of
psychology, economists the laws of economics, ecologists those of ecology, and so on.
But there is another way to understand the question “What is a ‘law of na-
ture’?”. We might take it to be asking “What is it to be a ‘law of nature’?”. If all
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the things named above are laws, what are the traits they share that make them
such? If some of them aren’t laws, what traits do those failed candidate laws posses
or lack that distinguish them from the successful candidates? Some candidate laws,
like Newton’s, we now know to not be true universally, but they are still perfectly
useful in suitably restricted circumstances. Are Newton’s Laws not really laws be-
cause they aren’t universally true, or might they still deserve the name as long as
they are suitably qualified? These are questions that are amenable to philosophical
analysis. Whatever the laws of nature may be, it is the business of scientists to say
what they are. But it is the business of philosophers—and the overarching concern
of this dissertation—to say what the laws may be.
So what is it to be a law of nature? One of the leading answers to that ques-
tion is due to David Lewis and called the Best Systems Analysis (BSA). According
to [Lewis, 1973], the laws of nature are the axioms and theorems of the true sys-
tematization of the world that is simpler and stronger than all other such systems.
There are lots of ways that scientists might formally express—that is, systematize—
what they know about the world. The preferred systematizations, the ones that end
up in textbooks and whose first principles are dubbed the laws, tend to be simpler
and stronger or more informative than their competitors. Such is the very rough
sketch of the epistemology of the search for laws in scientific practice that inspires
the BSA. What the BSA aims at is a metaphysical analysis of laws that parallels
that epistemological picture.
Drawing so closely on the epistemology of laws for their metaphysics creates
a special sort of challenge for the BSA. It is a mantra of contemporary analytic
2
philosophy that “you should not confuse your metaphysics and epistemology”. If
the BSA is to succeed, it must walk a fine line between confusing and exploiting the
epistemology of laws. Going too far in the ‘confusing’ direction will make the BSA
dependent on the actual practice of science in a way that violates an expectation
that the laws of nature are objective. But too far in the other direction will lead
the BSA to describe laws that are ill prepared to play the right role in scientific
practice.
The BSA has two significant virtues that make it worth developing despite
the complications just described. Indeed, the view’s virtues are inseparable from
the delicate balancing act that must be performed between metaphysics and episte-
mology. On the metaphysics side, the BSA is appealing for being a thoroughly realist
and reductive analysis. Competing views of laws give up—too soon, I think—the
search for such an analysis. Other realist views take as primitive laws (e.g. [Maudlin,
2007]), or things one might have hoped to analyze in terms of laws (e.g. [Armstrong,
1983]). Anti-realists deny that there is an account of laws to be had at all (e.g. [van
Fraassen, 1989]). On the epistemology side, the BSA’s paralleling of scientific prac-
tice should make it that its laws are especially well prepared to play the role that
laws play in scientific practice.
Extant formulations of the BSA have all recognized the balancing act that the
view must perform, but they nevertheless direct their attention to just one side or the
other. The BSA as described in [Lewis, 1983] requires that laws be expressed in the
language of the metaphysically “natural properties”, and thus has been rightly crit-
icized for rendering the laws inaccessible and potentially uninteresting to scientists.
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Post-Lewis variants of the BSA (e.g. [Loewer, 2007], [Schrenk, 2008], and [Cohen
and Callender, 2009]) have typically chosen to ensure accessibility and relevance to
science by embracing anthropocentrism—they take “the best system” to mean the
best system for us—and so their good work is achieved at the cost of improving the
position of those who object to the BSA on the basis of its apparent subjectivity.
The goal of this dissertation is to help resolve for the BSA the tension between,
on the one side, the presumption that the laws of nature should be objective, and,
on the other side, the appeal of an analysis of laws that closely parallels scientific
practice.
This introductory chapter will be dedicated to reviewing the challenges to the
BSA in which the tension is realized and deploying a novel characterization of the
BSA to illuminate the reviewed challenges and the variety of routes that may be
taken to answer them. In Section 1.1, I go through the first formulations of the
BSA that appear in [Mill, 1882], [Ramsey, 1928], and finally the modern standard
in [Lewis, 1973, Lewis, 1983, Lewis, 1994]. In Section 1.2, I look at some responses
to the BSA. Some of these are negative, like Armstrong’s objection to the BSA’s
apparent subjectivity, Lewis’ realization that how good a system is will depend
on the language in which it is expressed, and van Fraassen’s complaints about the
laws’ accessibility and interest to scientists. I also consider positive responses in the
form of variants of the BSA developed by [Loewer, 2007], [Cohen and Callender,
2009], and others, that improve upon Lewis’ original formulation. In Section 1.3,
I introduce “the four-part model” of a BSA-style analysis of laws that identifies
what elements all the BSA variants have in common, and makes clear how those
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elements may vary to yield different versions of the view. The four-part model is
then employed to expand upon the responses to the BSA discussed in Section 1.2.
I conclude in Sections 1.4 and 1.5 with, respectively, a discussion of what motivates
the structure of this dissertation and a summary of the coming chapters.
1.1 The Mill-Ramsey-Lewis View
At the heart of any Best Systems style analysis of the laws of nature is a
nearly ubiquitous procedure: With some goal to be achieved, the path actually
taken to that goal should be the best from among the candidate paths. To choose
the best path is a matter of running a competition among the candidates with
rules to determine each candidate’s score, and then choosing the highest scoring
candidate. A simple pros and cons list does this, with the candidates of “do X” and
“do not do X” being evaluated by the count of considerations that may be made
in favor or against the doing of X. This picture, though, is clearly not enough to
provide an analysis of anything, much less laws. What matters is how we fill in the
details. Saying that the goal is to identify the laws of nature is still not enough.
Suppose that I enter extant bread baking recipes into a competition in which recipes
are evaluated based on the quality of the bread produced, flexibility with respect
to small errors on the part of the baker, and how easily they may be adjusted to
make a wide variety of breads. It doesn’t matter what my goal is—it may be to
identify the laws of nature—what I get out of such a competition is the best recipe
to recommend to an aspiring bread baker.
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What must be provided in order for this sort of procedure to be the centerpiece
of an analysis of the laws of nature is a description of the competitors and competi-
tion that would yield a victor that may plausibly be interpreted as (providing) the
laws. Filling in these details (though not explicitly as such) is done first by Mill,
who, concerned with induction and the uniformity of nature, notes that
the uniformity in question is not properly uniformity, but uniformities
[...] These various uniformities, when ascertained by what is regarded as
a sufficient induction, we call, in common parlance, Laws of Nature. Sci-
entifically speaking, that title is employed in a more restricted sense, to
designate the uniformities when reduced to their most simple expression.
[Mill, 1882, p. 229]
We are provided with an example just after this passage in which there is a collection
of seven uniformities and, since four are derivative of the other three, we are told it
is just the three that should be considered laws. Mill’s version of the view is more
or less apparent: Candidates are sets of uniformities, and the competition evaluates
the candidate sets according to the simplicity of their expression. To be a law of
nature is to be an element of the most simply expressed set of uniformities of nature.
Ramsey, concerned with distinguishing the laws of nature from mere “univer-
sals of fact”, presents a view in [Ramsey, 1928] of laws similar to Mill’s that he later
summarizes (and rejects1) as being a view according to which laws are the
1 Why? I suspect a better understanding than my own of the practice of philosophy in Cam-
bridge in the late 1920s is required to properly answer this question. My best guess is that the
rejection has to do with a shift from trying to identify the laws themselves to, as it is put in [Ram-
sey, 1929], “trying to explain the meaning of asserting the existence” of a law. [Lewis, 1973, p.
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consequences of those propositions which we should take as axioms if we
knew everything and organized it as simply as possible in a deductive
system.
[Ramsey, 1929]
As in Mill, the competition is concerned with the simplicity of the competitors.
Competitors are full deductive systems from which the laws may be extracted.2 This
marks a slight shift from Mill in two ways. First, laws for Ramsey are the theorems
of a deductive system, whereas Mill, as evidenced by the example mentioned earlier,
would reject on grounds of simplicity the full set of theorems of a deductive system
in favor of just the axioms. Ramsey does distinguish between the axioms as being
“ultimate laws” and the non-axiom theorems as being “derivative laws”, but takes
the unqualified laws of nature to be the full set of theorems since, while the choice
of axiomatization might be somewhat arbitrary, the set of theorems “is less likely
to be arbitrary if any simplicity is to be preserved” [Ramsey, 1928].
The views on laws of Mill and Ramsey may appear problematic as precursors
to the modern BSA since, as presented, they seem more concerned with epistemology
than metaphysics (and, I claimed, the BSA is a metaphysical analysis of the laws of
nature). Mill writes of how “the title [of Law of Nature] is employed”, but nothing in
the immediate discussion denies that the uniformities (deserving the title of law) are
73, fn. *] suggests the rejection has to do with Ramsey saying that we can’t know everything,
but I think that is not enough to reject the view without also considering the change in Ramsey’s
interests.
2 In Mill the laws had to be “extracted” from the best competitor as well, but there it was
just a matter of picking out each of the elements of the competing set. In Ramsey it is the more
complicated procedure of finding all the theorems of the deductive system. In general I will say of
any view that it “extracts the laws from the victor of the competition” since that is true of all of
them while the method of extraction varies depending on the nature of the competitors.
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present in nature independent of anyone employing the title. While the summary
in [Ramsey, 1929] is concerned with, as [Lewis, 1973] puts it “a counterfactual
about omniscience”, Ramsey was sensitive to this issue. He writes there that the
counterfactual “is only a spurious one” (emphasis in original) since being a law is a
matter of “the facts that form the system in virtue of internal relations, not people’s
beliefs in them”; furthermore, he says of the competition’s valuing simplicity that
“this is another vague formal property, not a causal one” that makes the laws a
matter of our conception of simplicity [Ramsey, 1928].
The balance between metaphysics and epistemology in the BSA is something
about which we must be very careful. Any presentation of a BSA-style view will
benefit greatly in spirit by including epistemological analogies, but we must be
careful in the proper statement of a view to make clear the distinction between
the metaphysical analysis of laws and any analogous epistemology of law discovery.
Lewis writes (when he is concerned with extending the BSA into an analysis of laws
and chance) that
Despite appearances and the odd metaphor, this is not epistemology!
You’re welcome to spot an analogy, but I insist that I am not talking
about how evidence determines what’s reasonable to believe about laws
and chances. Rather I am talking about how nature [...] determines
what’s true about the laws and chances. Whether there are any believers
living in the lawful and chancy world has nothing to do with it.
[Lewis, 1994, pp. 481–482]
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The fact that Lewis worked out his analysis of laws as much as he did while always
being sensitive to this issue is, I think, an important part of why he is (and should be)
considered to have provided the first real statement of the BSA. So let us consider
that first real statement of the BSA from Lewis.
In [Lewis, 1973] we are provided with a “restatement” of Ramsey’s view, for-
mulated to avoid any dependence on epistemology or (since Lewis is preparing to use
laws as an element of his analysis of counterfactuals) counterfactuals (all emphasis
in the original):
Whatever we may or may not come to know, there exist (as abstract
objects) innumerable true deductive systems: deductively closed, axiom-
atizable sets of true sentences. Of these true deductive systems, some
can be axiomatized more simply than others. Also, some of them have
more strength, or information content, than others. [...] a contingent
generalization is a law of nature if and only if it appears as a theorem
(or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that achieves a best
combination of simplicity and strength.
[Lewis, 1973, p. 75]
Two major additions are made by Lewis to the view in his subsequent writing on
the subject. In [Lewis, 1983] a requirement is introduced that the axioms of each
competing system must be expressed in a language with basic predicates for only
the “perfectly natural properties” in the world. Then, in [Lewis, 1994], the BSA is
expanded to provide an analysis of chances according to which, very roughly, chances
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are whatever the laws of nature say they are. This expansion comes with changes
to both the competition and competitors. The set of competitors is, of course, now
allowed to include systems that describe chancy regularities (which will, in the victor
of the competition, be named as the laws that define the chances of the world). To
deal with the growth in the set of competitors, a consideration of fit is added to the
competition—where a better fitting system is one that makes the actual history of
the world more probable—such that the victor will be the system striking a best
balance of simplicity, strength, and fit.
Another feature of Lewis’ BSA that does a lot to distinguish it from Mill and
Ramsey is the work dedicated to describing what it is exactly that is being sys-
tematized. [Ramsey, 1929] suggests that what is being systematized is the set of
propositions known to us were we omniscient. [Ramsey, 1928], when trying to deal
with the problem of epistemology infecting the metaphysics of laws, speaks of “the
facts” as being what is systematized, as opposed to “people’s beliefs in [the facts]”.
For Lewis, what is systematized is the Humean Mosaic (HM), the fundamental facts
of the world, which are concerned entirely with basic spatiotemporal relations and
what properties obtain locally at each space-time point. With only the spatiotem-
poral relations and local properties, there are no fundamental facts about causes,
or chances, or necessity, or laws. This specificity comes as a part of Lewis’ larger
metaphysical project of “Humean Supervenience”, according to which anything not
in the HM (like laws or chances) “supervenes on the spatiotemporal arrangement of
local qualities throughout all of history, past and present and future” [Lewis, 1994].
Going forward it will be helpful to distinguish between the BSA and Lewis’
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BSA. Lewis’ BSA, as described above, says (roughly) that something is a law just in
case it is a theorem in all of the systems which strike the best balance between being
simple and strong/informative and fitting with respect to the Humean Mosaic, and
whose axioms are expressed in the language of perfectly natural properties. A proper
statement of the BSA—which I take to be the core of the view that is shared between
Lewis’ BSA and any (actual or potential) post-Lewis variant of Lewis’ BSA—will
not appear until Section 1.3, but for now let the following formulation of the BSA
suffice: A regularity is a law just in case it appears in the best systematization of
all the fundamental matters of fact.
1.2 Reactions to the BSA
I am concerned in this section with reviewing the literature that has developed
following Lewis’ modern formulation of the BSA. Dialectically, responses to Lewis
fall into two broad categories: (1) objections to the view, and (2) adaptations of the
view to answer questions found elsewhere in philosophy of science and metaphysics.
Responses of the second variety often do double duty by both extending the BSA
and answering objections to it. Topically, I have picked out three groups of responses
to the BSA that are important to the tension between objective laws and paralleling
practice that is the concern running through this dissertation:
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1.2.0.1 Armstrong’s Objection
Armstrong’s objection3 challenges the BSA on the grounds that laws of nature
should be objective, but the BSA makes laws subjective due to their dependence on
what particular, and presumably subjective, answer is given to the question of what
makes a system “best”. Armstrong’s objection receives only a few brief responses
despite a trend in post-Lewis variants of the BSA towards making the view more
dependent on the subjective interests of scientists.4 I discuss Armstrong’s objection
and reactions to it in Sections 1.2.1 and 1.3.1 below, and at length in Chapter 2.
1.2.0.2 Special Science Laws
A distinction is often made between fundamental laws and special science laws,
and a well developed account of laws should say something about this distinction.
Unlike Armstrong’s objection, distinguishing between these two types of laws does
not pose a unique challenge to the BSA, but a general challenge to accounts of
laws for which the BSA appears to offer good answers. Precise characterizations
of what makes a scientific field “fundamental” or “special” can vary, but often the
matter turns on the fundamentality of the matters of interest to the field. Physics—
being concerned with the fundamental nature of reality—is the fundamental sci-
ence. Chemistry, biology, psychology, and pretty much any scientific field other
3 So named for its place as first in the list of complaints against the BSA in [Armstrong, 1983].
4 I use “scientists” here and throughout the dissertation loosely to refer to those who seek out
the laws of nature and those who employ the laws (or their best estimates of the laws) to achieve
some end (e.g. provide an explanation, engineer some device,...). I write as though the search for,
and usage of, laws of nature is ubiquitous in science, but recognize that this is contentious at best.
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than physics—being concerned with phenomena presumed to be not fundamental—
are special sciences. The matter of accommodating special science laws in the BSA
is taken up by a number of authors but it’s most significant treatment comes in the
Better Best Systems Analysis (BBSA), a view developed independently in [Schrenk,
2008] and [Cohen and Callender, 2009]. While Cohen and Callender focus on the
relevance of kinds to the special science laws, Schrenk’s concern is directed primarily
at the issue of ceteris paribus (CP) laws, whose defining feature of having exceptions
is sometimes taken to also be the defining feature of special science laws. I discuss
the work of accommodating special science laws in the BSA in Sections 1.2.2 and
1.3.2 below, and at length in Chapter 3.
1.2.0.3 The Trivial Systems Problem
The Trivial Systems Problem (TSP) is concerned with the existence of certain
systems that, when expressed in certain languages, are overwhelmingly the best sys-
tems, but offer only trivial or deeply problematic laws that do not seem to deserve
the title. The problem is first introduced in [Lewis, 1983], who responds immedi-
ately by adding a language requirement to his version of the BSA. Lewis’ language
requirement is criticized by [van Fraassen, 1989]. Answers to the TSP that are also
sensitive to van Fraassen’s criticisms are provided by [Loewer, 2007] and [Cohen and




Variations on the following story often accompany summaries of the BSA. A
scientist dies and appears before God, who asks if there is anything the scientist
would like. The scientist replies “I would like to know how the world works”.
God accepts the request and begins “At time and position 〈t1, p1〉 such-and-such
properties obtained, and at 〈t1, p2〉 such-and-such other properties obtained, and—
” at which point the scientist interrupts and says “Sorry, if that is how things actually
work that is all well and good, but is there a pithy version?”. God’s reply to that
question is to provide the scientist with the (BSA-style) laws of nature.
When the scientist asks for the “pithy version” of all the fundamental matters
of fact, what is being asked for is something that the scientist would find more acces-
sible but still informative, and what it means to be more accessible and informative
to the scientist will of course depend on the abilities and interests of the scientist.
The ability and interest relativity apparently inherent in the BSA is the source of a
standard critique of the view:
“The first objection which may be made to the [BSA] is that an element
of subjectivism remains... May there not be irresoluble conflicts about
the exact point of balance [between simplicity and strength]?”
[Armstrong, 1983, p. 67]
What it is to be the “best system” looks to be a subjective matter. Some systems
may be better for some than for others, and if there is disagreement about which
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system is best, then there will likely be disagreement about which regularities are
the laws of nature. Our intuition that the laws of nature should be objective make
this look like very bad news for the BSA.
Lewis calls this “the worst problem” for the BSA, and then offers a less than
satisfying response: “If nature is kind to us, the problem needn’t arise” [Lewis,
1994, p. 479]. The best system, he hopes, will be “robustly best” such that no
defensible change in what makes a system the best will actually change which sys-
tem is the best. If nature is unkind, then Lewis would sooner see there be no laws
than non-BSA laws. Presumably this is due to his commitment to Humean Super-
venience, which is incompatible with most realist accounts of laws other than the
BSA. Proponents of the BSA who are not committed to Humean Supervenience—a
group which includes, at least explicitly, [Loewer, 2007] and [Cohen and Callender,
2009]—should be less pessimistic about laws even if the BSA fails, and so a better
response must be found.
A more common response than Lewis’ “nature is kind”, though not obviously
more satisfying, is a sort of acceptance. The laws come from the system that is best
for us, whoever we are. This attitude is apparent among a number of authors: “we
understand the notion of a Best System flexibly according to our needs” [Cohen
and Callender, 2009, p. 21]; the Package Deal Analysis (PDA), a variant of the
BSA, “goes farther in the direction of anthropo[centrism]... in that what counts as
a final theory depends on the tradition of fundamental physics” [Loewer, 2007, p.
325]; and, in a version of the BSA concerned with probabilities instead of laws,
“the ‘best’ in my use of ‘Best System’ means best for us” [Hoefer, 2007, p. 571,
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emphasis in original]. These authors present the flexibility, the anthropocentricity,
the subjectivity, of their views as a virtue—not, as Armstrong would have it, a
failure—on the grounds that it makes their variants of the BSA better at respecting
scientific practice.
The best response to Armstrong’s objection has been to attack the claim about
subjectivity (as opposed to the previous two responses that were concerned with the
possibility of disagreement amongst scientists) directly by pointing out that that
the BSA is a strictly metaphysical view into which the epistemology of law seekers
does not actually enter. This “brute metaphysics” response is already implicit in
the earlier quotations from Lewis and Ramsey. It is made explicit by Cohen and
Callender when they write that “relativized MRL”, which is their variant of the
BSA5,
does not make the laws subjective in the sense that they depend for their
existence on subjects. This is because the laws (relative to basic kinds
K) that hold of a world w would satisfy relativized MRL’s criterion for
lawhood... whether or not there are subjects in w (or any other world).
[Cohen and Callender, 2009, p. 30]
If there are disagreements amongst scientists, so what? The laws are what they
are according to some standard of “best” and any law seekers not employing that
standard will fail in their search.
This is right, but may still be unsatisfying because it misses the spirit of
5 In [Callender and Cohen, 2010] the same view is titled “the Better Best System analysis”, or
BBSA, and I will typically refer to their view as such.
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Armstrong’s objection. A big part of the appeal and motivation of the BSA is the
competition’s ability to parallel the epistemic practices of scientists and Armstrong’s
objection is meant to cause trouble as a consequence of that aspect of the BSA.
Suppose that one of the disagreeing scientists will be wrong. Why is that one wrong
and the other right? Cohen and Callender adopt a permissive approach according
to which both scientists can be right and what the laws are doesn’t depend on the
scientists themselves. The cost of this is a glut of laws. There are enough to be the
target for a scientist of any persuasion, so there are far more than will ever plausibly
be needed or wanted by any real scientist. The laws may not be subjective in the
technical sense, but technically speaking Armstrong only wrote that “an element
of subjectivism remains”. That vagueness in the original statement of the problem
suggests that there may be a different, albeit nearby, concern related to the sorts
of disagreements that give rise to the problem. The existence of such an additional
concern is an open question, and, if it does exist, it will be important to check if it
is successfully addressed by the brute metaphysics response.
While Armstrong’s objection is compelling, it is in need of a better statement.
In Section 1.3.1 below, I will show how Armstrong’s objection evolves in response
to a proper characterization of the BSA. In Chapter 2, I will be concerned with
defending the possibility of giving a response to Armstrong’s objection and arguing
that such a response will have certain features. Specifically, proponents of the BSA
must pursue a balance of relativity and objectivity, with the former motivated by
what is necessary to accommodate variety in scientific practice, and the latter by
what is universal in scientific practice. The entirety of this dissertation is, more
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or less explicitly, devoted to exploring the balance of relativity (in Part I) and
objectivity (in Part II) that should exist in the BSA.
1.2.2 Special Science Laws
Psychology, biology, and economics are paradigmatic special sciences. Fun-
damental physics is decidedly not a special science. Perhaps the most important
feature of the distinction between special and, for lack of a more general term, non-
special sciences in the context of a discussion of laws is that it is assumed that
non-special sciences have laws (pace anti-realists about laws), while special sciences
may or may not have laws. If there are special science laws, they may or may not
be reducible to the laws of non-special sciences. The kinds that are the concern of
non-special science laws are the fundamental kinds, and the kinds that are the con-
cern of special science laws are not (all) fundamental. Laws of non-special sciences
are assumed to be exceptionless—E = mc2 everywhere—whereas laws of the spe-
cial sciences are typically thought to have exceptions indicated by an “all else being
equal” or “ceteris paribus” clause—as in “all else being equal, taking acetaminophen
relieves a headache”.
The above is all said in the name of intuition-pumping. Particular views
coupled with particular interests will tend to prefer one way of characterizing the
distinction over, or to the exclusion of, others. For our present purposes it is okay
to leave the details of the distinction unspecified, but follow Cohen and Callen-
der in loosely basing it on whether the interests of a field are directed towards
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non-fundamental kinds—in which case what is sought are special science laws—or
towards fundamental kinds exclusively—in which case what is sought are fundamen-
tal laws. (This question of how to properly distinguish between special science and
fundamental laws in the BSA will be taken up in Chapter 3.)
One strategy for accommodating special science laws in the BSA is to make
them derivative of the fundamental laws. [Loewer, 2012] and [Albert, 2000] pursue
such a strategy, and offer a version of the BSA that I will refer to as “the Mentac-
ulus view”.6 The defining feature of the Mentaculus view is (not surprisingly) the
Mentaculus, which has three parts:
(i) The fundamental dynamical laws.
(ii) The claim that the initial macro state of the universe is M(0) and that the
entropy of M(0) is very tiny.
(iii) A law specifying a uniform probability over the micro states that realize M(0).
These are not devoid of reference to non-fundamental properties or kinds, but still
the Mentaculus is taken to be “the fundamental theory of the world” and special
science laws are merely consequences of it in conjunction with further propositions
that connect the fundamental laws to the higher level kinds of the special sciences
[Loewer, 2012]. [Frisch, 2011] rightly argues that the derivative status conferred on
special science laws by Albert and Loewer is at odds with the presence of non-
fundamental properties/kinds in the Mentaculus and the “pragmatic dimension” of
the view in which the laws are connected to the practice and interests of scientists.
6 The Mentaculus view is distinct from, but compatible with, the PDA of [Loewer, 2007].
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A need to accommodate special science laws in the BSA becomes greater as
proponents of the BSA increasingly emphasize pragmatic considerations that tie
the laws to the needs and interests of practicing scientists. The need becomes
greater when evaluating the success of the BSA because, insofar as we think special
scientists do, can, or should, seek laws, it is harder to discount the needs and interests
of special scientists over those of fundamentally inclined scientists. The need also
becomes greater internal to the BSA if features of the view motivated by pragmatic
considerations may make it such that distinctly special science laws are part of the
best system whether we like it or not (as Frisch argued with respect to the willingness
of Albert and Loewer to let the laws refer to non-fundamental kinds). Helpfully, the
greater need to accommodate special science laws in the BSA comes hand in hand
with greater ease in making such accommodations, as it is precisely the pragmatic
considerations requiring the accommodation that provide the tools to do it.
What I take to be the best strategy for accommodating special science laws in
the BSA is found the BBSA, developed independently by [Schrenk, 2008] and [Cohen
and Callender, 2009] (and endorsed by [Frisch, 2011]). The BBSA—specifically, the
version found in [Cohen and Callender, 2009] and [Callender and Cohen, 2010]—
works roughly as follows. There are true fundamental kinds Kfund and, built from
that, there is the set of all supervenient and fundamental kinds K (i.e. the set of
kinds that supervene on the fundamental kinds in union with Kfund). Each subset
Ki of the set of supervenient kinds corresponds to a language Li that renders the
kinds of Ki as its basic predicates.
7 For every such Li, a separate best system
7 Cohen and Callender tend to speak of kinds and predicates, and not languages, but use the
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competition is run in which every competing system is expressed in the language
Li. To be a law is to be a law relative to a language. The laws relative to Li are
extracted from the victor of the competition in which all competing systems were
expressed in Li; there are no laws of nature simpliciter. Finally, the interests of a
special science field are identified with the set of kinds that the field treats as basic.
So, if field X treats as basic the set of kinds KX , and LX is the language of the kinds
KX , then the laws determined relative to LX are the laws of the field X. Assuming,
as Cohen and Callender do, that subsets of the supervenient kinds are exhaustive of
the interests of scientific fields, then this strategy guarantees that for any scientific
field there exists a set of laws that is the field’s target.
The version of the BBSA introduced in [Schrenk, 2008] is less concerned with
choices of kinds distinguishing special science laws from each other and the fun-
damental laws than it is with the possibility of there being exceptions in the laws
(typically assumed to be special science laws, but also, possibly, fundamental laws).
Building on [Braddon-Mitchell, 2001], [Schrenk, 2008] rightly argues that the BSA
is well suited to accommodating exception having CP-laws, because (in short) such
exceptions may contribute more to the simplicity of a system than they cost in
strength. To the extent that special science laws are characterized by the presence
of CP exceptions, [Schrenk, 2008] clearly demonstrates how they may be accommo-
dated in the BSA.
terms more or less interchangeably when discussing others who speak of languages; e.g. “written
in the language of the [...] fundamental kinds” [Cohen and Callender, 2009, p. 10]. I will try to
speak of languages as the things in which candidate systems are expressed, and reserve talk of
kinds for when it is kinds as such that are at issue (e.g. when a scientist treats a set of kinds as
basic, and not the language that corresponds to those kinds).
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1.2.3 The Trivial Systems Problem
[Lewis, 1983] identifies a problem—which I have called the “Trivial Systems
Problem” (TSP)—with his BSA. How simple a system is depends on how the system
is expressed. For any system S, one could always identify as primitive a predicate F
that is true of everything in just those worlds where S holds, and then axiomatize
S with just the sentence ∀xFx. This is, presumably, about as simple as a system
can get. And, since we could do this for any system, let S be the strongest system.
S, then, is the best system, since all systems have equally maximal simplicity and
S is the strongest. The problem is this: We expect that there should be a way to
distinguish between accidental regularities and the lawful regularities. For example,
it may be true of the world that nowhere is there a solid sphere of gold one mile
in diameter and that nowhere is there a solid sphere of uranium-235 one mile in
diameter. The absence of such a gold sphere is accidental; one could exist, it just so
happens that none do. The absence of such a uranium sphere seems lawful; physics
tells us that a solid uranium-235 sphere would blow up long before it could reach a
mile in diameter. Moving back to the trivial system problem, since S is the strongest
system, the theorems of S will include every regularity that holds in the world, every
true regularity will be a law, and so we will fail to distinguish between the lawful
and accidental regularities. To avoid this outcome we must find a way to rule out
the possibility of there being a system like S.
Lewis’ solution is to require that the axioms of a system be expressed in the
language of perfectly natural properties. Since F is presumably not a perfectly
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natural property, “∀xFx” cannot be the axiomatization of any candidate system,
and thus S, so axiomatized, could not be chosen as the best. This strategy is
supposed to have the added virtue of explaining why “laws and natural properties
get discovered together” [Lewis, 1983, p. 368].
[van Fraassen, 1989] identifies two problems with Lewis’ natural language
requirement (I will call them “van Fraassen’s problems”, following [Loewer, 2007])
that have to do with the prospect of actually discovering the laws and natural
properties together.
The first of van Fraassen’s problems is concerned with the accessibly of the
laws. Suppose Sbest, Lnat provides us with the true BSA laws; Lnat is the language
of the perfectly natural properties, and Sbest is the best system when all competing
systems are expressed in Lnat. Because Sbest is only guaranteed to be the best when
competing systems are expressed in Lnat, there is the possibility of a competing
system, Svf, that, when expressed in some language Lvf (that is not Lnat), is better
than Sbest expressed in Lnat. We already think such a system exists in the form of
the trivial system, but suppose further that there is nothing so problematic with Svf
as there is with the trivial system. In such a situation, there is no way that scientists
could ever pick out Lnat over Lvf as the proper language with which to identify
Sbest as the source of the laws. If Svf, Lvf is the overall best system-language pair
(setting aside problematic pairs like those of the trivial system problem), Lvf will be
the source of scientist’s best estimate of the perfectly natural properties, and that
best estimate will be wrong. Even if nature is kind in that there is no pair better
than the best system as expressed in the language of perfectly natural properties,
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any sensibly skeptical scientists will know that they can never be sure about the
laws.
The second of van Fraassen’s problems is concerned with how deserving Lewis’
laws are of their title. If Svf, Lvf really is the best (unproblematic) system-language
pair, then why is it not the source of the laws? If scientists somehow know that Lnat
is the language of the perfectly natural properties, then van Fraassen’s accessibility
problem goes away. But Svf, Lvf is still the better system-language pair. The only
reason to stick with Lnat and Sbest in these circumstances is a question-begging
desire to have the laws expressed in the language of perfectly natural properties.
van Fraassen is right about all of this, and, together, these problems are a
serious blow to Lewis’ BSA and its requirement that the language of the compet-
ing systems be the language of the perfectly natural properties. If the perfectly
natural properties are not discoverable independent of the laws, then the laws are
inaccessible. And, even if the perfectly natural properties are discoverable indepen-
dent of the laws, there may be law-like regularities (but not actual laws) available
that are, strictly speaking, better than the actual laws. In the end, Lewis’ language
requirement “has produced unchartable distances between Lewis’s best theories—
and hence laws—and the theories we could reasonably hope for at the ideal end of
science” [van Fraassen, 1989, p. 55].
The responses to the TSP after Lewis are in agreement with Lewis that the
problem requires the privileging of an unproblematic language prior to the best
system competition. The differences between them come in how they privilege a
language.
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We have already seen the sort of language privileging that exists in the BBSA,
so let us consider that view’s treatment of the TSP first. Recall of the BBSA that,
for every subset K of the set of all fundamental and supervenient kinds, there is a set
of K-relative laws. Because F is a supervenient kind, there are actually many sets
of laws in the world that succumb to the TSP. If F ∈ K, then ∀xFx will be among
the competing systems, and, as per the TSP, on track to be the problematically best
system. We are assured, however, that this is not actually a problem. The laws of a
scientific field are the laws determined relative to the set of kinds that are of interest
to the field. As along as no field is interested in the kind F , then no sets of laws
of interest will be troubled by the TSP. There are still sets of laws that succumb
to the TSP, and fail to distinguish between lawful and accidental regularities, but
such laws were already deemed to be uninteresting. “Properties like F and the
ensuing threatened trivialization [...] are ruled out for lack of interest rather than
any intrinsic deficiency” [Cohen and Callender, 2009, p. 23]. This also addresses
van Fraassen’s problems, since it binds the laws to predetermined—and, necessarily,
accessible—kinds, and makes the laws quite intimately a matter of scientific interest.
The other major variant of the BSA to address the TSP is Loewer’s PDA,
the “Package Deal Analysis”. The titular “package deal” comes from the best sys-
tem competition evaluating systems and languages together (as a system-language
pair/package). Doing that suggests that all we need to do to block the TSP is block
any languages that contain the predicate F , and let all the other languages compete,
but this is not quite Loewer’s strategy. “Lewis’s argument does show that [...] the
BSA requires a preferred language” [Loewer, 2007, p. 325]. “Language”, singular.
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What Loewer proposes for the preferred language is that it be the language of an
“optimal final theory” that would be arrived at through a succession of rational
developments on the present theory of fundamental physics. Because the present
theory of fundamental physics does not include F , and, presumably, no rational de-
velopment of it would introduce F , the trivial system problem is overcome. Loewer
has also avoided van Fraassen’s problems, since the accessibility and interest of the
laws to scientists (or, at least, physicists) is ensured by the laws being what they
are as a consequence of the tradition of fundamental physics being carried out to
its ideal end. But these successes come with the apparent cost of strengthening
Armstrong’s objection by tying the laws so closely to the actual practice of physics.
Overall, Lewis, Loewer, and Cohen and Callender each offer language privileg-
ing solutions to the TSP. What language(s) is (are) privileged varies greatly between
the three, but the general strategy is the same. In Section 1.3.3, I will argue that a
proper characterization of the BSA presents us with possible alternative strategies
for answering the TSP. In Chapter 4, I argue that the TSP may be overcome without
language privileging, but rather by carefully constructing the BSA’s competition.
1.3 The Four-Part Model
I suggested at the start of this chapter that the BSA may be summarized
tentatively as saying that laws are drawn from the best systematization of all the
fundamental matters of fact. That doesn’t say much about the facts being system-
atized. That doesn’t say much about the candidate systematizations. That doesn’t
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say much about the language(s) in which competing systems are to be expressed.
And that doesn’t say much about what it means to be best. These are details that
were to be filled in by any BSA variants, of which we now have three. Lewis’ BSA
says laws are drawn from the simplest, strongest, and most fitting (on balance)
systematization of the HM expressed in the language of the perfectly natural prop-
erties. The PDA says laws are drawn from the system-language pair that is the best
final theory of the world according to the practices of fundamental physics. The
BBSA says that the laws of a language are drawn from the best systematization of
the facts of the world where all competing systems are expressed in that language,
and that there is such a set of laws for every language corresponding to a subset of
the set of kinds that supervene on the true fundamental kinds.
What would be nice is a way of stating the BSA that makes these particular
views clearly special cases of a general view, and which makes salient the ways that
details may be added to the BSA to yield any possible variant. For this I recommend
what I will call the four-part model according to which the BSA says that there are
the facts (part 1) to be systematized, the candidate systems (part 2) from which
the laws will be drawn, the languages (part 3) in which the candidate systems and
facts may be expressed, and the competition (part 4) which determines the best
system-language pair.
I will often use the following symbols when discussing the the BSA and its
parts: There is the set F of all the facts of the actual world wactual; we will
sometimes be concerned with particular sets of facts F ⊆ F . There is the set S of
all the systematizations S that compete to be the best. There is the set L of all
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languages L that may be used to express the facts of F and systems of S; we will
sometimes be concerned with a set of all kinds K and assume there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the sets of kinds K ⊆ K and languages L ∈ L. Finally,
there is the competition function C(−), which (typically) takes F , S, and L, as
arguments and outputs a system-language pair Sbest, Lbest ∈ S × L. The laws R,
then, are the regularities that appear in Sbest and are to be expressed in Lbest.
We can summarize our three major BSA variants again with little change but
for a new emphasis on the four parts. Lewis says (1) the facts are those of the HM,
(2) the candidate systems must be true of the facts, (3) the language in which the
systems and facts must be expressed is that of the perfectly natural properties, and
(4) the competition picks a winner that maximizes a balance of simplicity, strength,
and fit. The PDA keeps with Lewis in that (1) the facts are those of the HM, but
(2) the candidate systems and (3) language is that of the final theory of physics, and
(4) the competition picks a winner that best satisfies the demands on laws made by
fundamental physicists. According to the BBSA there are, again, (1) the facts of the
HM, and (2) the systematizations of those facts, but (3) the set of viable languages
includes one for every subset of the set of all supervenient and fundamental kinds,
and (4) the competition(s) will output a best system for every language, with the
laws of each such system being the laws relative to the language for which the system
is best.
Being able to make sense of extant BSA variants is a necessary feature of the
four-part model, but whether or not it is worthwhile as a general characterization of
the BSA will be decided by its ability to illuminate the challenges that face the BSA.
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I begin to show how it does so below for Armstrong’s objection (Section 1.3.1), the
accommodation of special science laws (Section 1.3.2), and the TSP (Section 1.3.3),
in anticipation of putting the model to work throughout the dissertation.
1.3.1 Armstrong’s Objection, Expanded
Armstrong complains about the BSA’s possessing “an element of subjectivism”
on account of the possibility of “irresoluble conflicts about the exact point of bal-
ance” between simplicity and strength [Armstrong, 1983, p. 67]. In the more general
language of the four-part model, Armstrong’s objection is about the possibility of
disagreement about the details of the competition. But, as the four-part model
makes clear, there is a lot more about which there could be disagreement. Beside
the competition there are the facts, the set of candidate systematizations, and the
set of viable languages. Just as Armstrong imagined rationalists and empiricists
arguing over the primacy of simplicity and strength, we can imagine reductionists
and anti-reductionists arguing over the facts to be systematized since, for example,
if you’re an anti-reductionist about psychological states, the facts that would be
systematized to yield the laws of psychology can’t just be the fundamental facts ap-
propriately expressed (as they are in the reduction friendly BBSA). Different views
about the structure of scientific theories will likely yield disagreement about the set
of candidate systems, and different views about natural kinds will likely yield dis-
agreements about the set of viable languages. The weight of Armstrong’s objection
presumably grows with the number of points of disagreement that could give rise to
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“an element of subjectivism”.
As we saw earlier (in Section 1.2.1), the brute metaphysical response thwarts
accusations of subjectivism. But what about relativism? For every variant of the
BSA the laws are what they are relative to how the four parts are specified. And,
more than that, a single variant of the BSA (like the BBSA) can allow for multiple
ways of filling in the details such that there is a multitude of things rightly called the
laws relative, explicitly, to what in the four parts was allowed to vary. A minimally
relative BSA variant (like Lewis’) will say that there is exactly one acceptable way
of filling in the details of the four-part model. But not all BSA variants need be (or
are) minimally relative. The BBSA holds the facts, systems, and competition fixed,
but says that laws may be yielded for any language of supervenient or fundamental
kinds.8 There could similarly be variants of the BSA that hold all but the facts to
be systematized fixed, yielding laws for every possible set of facts. Or which hold all
but the competition fixed, yielding laws for every way of determining which system
is the best. Or which hold all but the systems fixed, yielding laws for every way
of characterizing the space of possible systematizations. And of course these could
be combined to hold only one or two parts of the BSA fixed, yielding laws that are
relative to, say, language and facts. Continuing in this way, there are maximally9
8 Cohen and Callender (2009) actually leave open the possibility that the rules of the competi-
tion might vary from one special science to another, but do not develop the possibility as strongly
as they do their language relativity.
9 One very quickly gets infinitely many sets of laws even when the laws are relative to a single
part. The “minimally relative” variants are supposed to yield a single set of laws, but their sense
of minimality has to do with the fact that, internal to the particular variant, the actual laws are
relative to nothing. The “maximally relative” are maximal in the sense that they make the laws
relative to the greatest number of kinds of things (namely, all of the parts of the view that can
vary). Within these grades of relativity are more or less permissive variants of the BSA in the
sense that they are less or more (respectively) committed on ancillary philosophical issues. And,
presumably, the more permissive variants are also, in a sense, more relative, but saying exactly
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relative variants of the BSA according to which there are actual laws for every way
of filling in all the details of the four-part model.
A more interesting version of Armstrong’s objection is worried about relativity
instead of, or in addition to, subjectivity. Considering relativity, Armstrong’s point
about disagreement becomes an argument against the possibility of a minimally
relative variant of the BSA. If there are “irresoluble conflicts about the exact point
of balance” between simplicity and strength, then, one might imagine, we must
make the BSA at least competition-relative. If there is a good argument for the one
acceptable way of filling in the details of a minimally relative variant of the BSA,
that seems like the kind of thing that might have satisfied Armstrong. But if there is
intractable disagreement among philosophers and scientists about any details in the
BSA, then Armstrong cannot be wholly satisfied, and will fault the BSA proponent
for either relativity or the unjustified endorsement of a minimally relative BSA.
Subjective laws are clearly problematic. Relative laws are less clearly problem-
atic. Some relativity (so long as it can avoid descending into subjectivity) might be
a good thing, as when it allows the BBSA to accommodate special science laws by
making that to which the laws are relative parallel the particular interests of special
sciences. However, in the extreme of a maximally relative variant of the BSA, it
is not hard to sympathize with the relativity concerned Armstrong, and think that
there is too much relativity. There may be laws suitable for any particular interests
on such a view, but that isn’t obviously a good thing. If anything, it’s rather ob-
how (if that can be done at all) strikes me as more trouble than it’s worth (certainly, at least, at
this point).
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viously a bad thing. Pick any true regularity and it will be a law in a system that
is best relative to some choice of facts, systems, languages, and competition. As in
the TSP, it has become impossible (albeit in a slightly different way) to distinguish
accidentally true regularities from lawful regularities. Cohen and Callender argued
that this isn’t an issue in the BBSA since the problem only appears in those sys-
tems for which there is no interest, and we might accept this response since what
relativity the laws have in the BBSA is clearly motivated. It’s not enough, though,
to motivate the relativity in a view. We must also argue for what specificity there
is in a view. And the relativity and specificity should meet in the middle, with all
relativity and specificity properly motivated and defended, and no part of the view
left untouched after doing that.
This is, in brief, the claim argued for in Chapter 2. There I offer a more
thorough development of these ideas, starting with the expansion and reconstruction
of Armstrong’s objection, running through the challenges posed by that new version
of Armstrong’s objection, and concluding with strategies for providing an answer.
Importantly, the strategies discussed there are realized in part by the work done
later in the dissertation.
1.3.2 Special Science Interests
It must be that what makes a set of laws the laws of a particular special
science is the existence of a connection between those laws and what makes the
special science the particular one that it is. What makes a special science (or any
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scientific field) what it is is a variety of factors, mostly intellectual (we would hope),
but also social, political, financial, and so on. Thankfully for our purposes we need
not be concerned with everything that makes a special science, but rather just what
matters for the purposes of determining the laws of the special science. While non-
intellectual factors may be distally responsible for making some set of laws the laws
of a particular special science, it seems safe to assume that the proximal causes
of a special science having what laws it has are the intellectual interests of the
practitioners of that special science.
The four-part model of the BSA tells us that what makes laws laws is the par-
ticular way that facts, systems, languages, and competition come together to yield a
best systematization of the facts from which the laws may be extracted. So let there
be the set of laws R determined relative to the quadruple (FR, SR, LR, CR). And let
there be some special science X whose practitioners have interests IX . The laws R
are the laws of X just in case the right relation holds between (FR, SR, LR, CR) and
IX . I take this to be the generalized form of the BBSA’s strategy for accommodating
special science laws in the BSA in the terms of the four-part model.
In the BBSA, the right relation has almost everything to do with the lan-
guage(s) used to determine the best system. The interests of a field X are char-
acterizable by the set of kinds KX that are treated as basic in the field, and the
laws R are the laws of X just in case LR is the language whose basic predicates
correspond to the kinds KX . The possibility is left open in [Cohen and Callender,
2009] that different scientific fields may have different competitions, but it is not
deeply explored there. Nor will it be here, except, in a fashion, in Chapters 4 and 5,
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where I argue for constraints on any competition relativity that there might be. I
am even less concerned with system relativity, except in Chapter 5, where I discuss
how different constraints on the class of competing systems will influence the details
of the best system competition.
I think the most interesting way to relativize laws is to facts. Implicit in
the language relativity is a sort of fact relativity since a field can only systematize
those facts that are expressible in the language it employs. But the fact relativity
that comes with language relativity is incomplete; once a kind is admitted into our
privileged language, all of its associated facts become subject to systematization. In
Chapter 3, I argue that this incomplete fact relativity causes trouble when fields are
interested in only a subset of the facts associated with a kind. Specifically, I develop
in Section 3.3 an example based on the work of [Barlow, 1952] in which biology
is concerned with photons, but must constrain its interests to only those photons
interacting with biological systems. Fact relativity in the laws has the additional
benefit, which I argue for in Section 3.4, that it makes better sense of the distinction
between special and fundamental sciences that turns on universality.
1.3.3 Avoiding Trivial Systems
Recall the issue that gives rise to the TSP: There can be system-language
pairs that are far and away the best according to the best system competition, but
which yield laws that fail to distinguish between accidental and lawful regularities.
Solutions to the problem have all focused on privileging a language (or languages,
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as in the BBSA) that are assumed to not be in the group that would give rise
to overwhelmingly best but problematic (i.e. trivial) systems. The challenge of
answering the TSP was made greater by van Fraassen, who plausibly insisted that
the laws of nature should be accessible and of interest to scientists, and noted that
privileging the language of the perfectly natural properties, as Lewis had done to
avoid trivial systems, renders the laws inaccessible and potentially uninteresting.
The language privileging of the PDA and BBSA seems to succeed in answering
both the TSP and van Fraassen’s problems, but that success comes at the cost of
subjectivity in the PDA and a glut of relative laws—and an imperfect solution to
the TSP—in the BBSA.
The four-part model of the BSA suggests that language privileging might not
be the only solution to the TSP (and van Fraassen’s problems). Perhaps, by looking
to our choice of facts, systems, or competition (or some combination of those possibly
in conjunction with language privileging), an answer may be found that does not
entail the less appealing consequences of Lewis’ BSA, the PDA, or BBSA.
Right away we can rule out considering facts, for it is with respect to those
that the distinction between accidental and lawful regularities must be made. To
privilege some subset of the facts, or some altogether distinct set of facts, would
just serve to change the set of true regularities that needs to be divided between the
accidental and the lawful.
Considering systems on their own could be a promising endeavor. One solution
to the TSP would be to simply exclude any system from competing that fails to
distinguish between lawful and accidental regularities. This has a dubious ad-hoc
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feel to it, though. It might be that such a distinction, being essential to laws, is
permissibly built into an analysis of laws from the start. But, while it’s seems true
of the actual world that this distinction exists, we might think that there can be
possible worlds where there is no such distinction. It may also be that this strategy
makes the laws subjective insofar as its defense may depend on an appeal to our
interests in the laws making the accidental-lawful distinction. Depending on one’s
leanings, directly constraining the set of competing systems might be less appealing
than the bad making features of the extant language privileging solutions to the
TSP.
Consider, then, the competition. Note that any pre-competition privileging,
like that found in all the extant solutions to the trivial system problem, can be
realized, often in more nuanced ways, by enriching the rules of the competition.
Lewis’ natural language requirement could be realized precisely by a rule in the
competition that sets the score of any system-language pair in which the language
is not that of the perfectly natural properties to zero. A rule that weights a system-
language pair by the degree of naturalness of the language might be more interesting,
at least if one’s metaphysics allows for such a measure. Either way, these rules would
be as troubled by van Fraassen’s problems as Lewis’ original approach, because they
still depend on a sort of language privileging.
Central to the TSP is that it seems to have found a way of violating the need
for a tradeoff between simplicity and strength through nothing more than a change
in language. A purely competition based strategy, then, would be to give a more
careful account of simplicity and strength, or other measures factoring into the best
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system competition, that does not allow for such a violation of the tradeoff. I pursue
such a strategy in Chapter 4. There I argue that taking seriously the PDA’s idea
of evaluating systems and languages together as a “package” can block the TSP by
replacing strict language privileging with relativity (as needed) to the best system
competition.
1.4 Dissertation Overview
In this chapter I have reviewed three challenges to the BSA—Arm-strong’s
objection, the accommodation of special science laws, and the TSP—each of which
would be worthy of extensive individual treatment. But to offer truly individual
treatment would be impossible, as these challenges are intimately related. Arm-
strong’s objection, being concerned with a lack of objectivity in the laws of the
BSA, is strongest only when proponents of the BSA try to accommodate the variety
of interests found in scientific practice. The accommodation of special science laws
seems sure to strengthen Armstrong’s objection by tying laws to a deeply heteroge-
neous array of scientific interests. And the TSP, being concerned with the languages
in which competing systems are expressed, may have a straightforward solution in
language privileging, but, depending on what language is privileged, that solution
either breaks the connection between laws in the BSA and laws in scientific practice
or strengthens that connection at the cost of strengthening Armstrong’s objection.
The consequence of these interrelations is that no one of these challenges to
the BSA may be treated in full without eventually coming to the others. It is thus
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largely a matter of preference that decides where one begins and how one progresses
through these challenges. If your primary concern is the accommodation of special
science laws, then you might begin there, solve the TSP along the way, and then
upon encountering Armstrong’s objection argue that resolving the two challenges is
worth making the third worse. If you are taken with the TSP, then van Fraassen’s
problems will require you to grapple Armstrong’s objection and the BBSA raises
the bar for what we may expect a solution to the TSP to accomplish.
My primary concern is neither special science laws nor the TSP. Both are very
interesting, but I think they are most interesting when approached in contexts adja-
cent to the one where we are concerned with the metaphysics of laws. What we say
about special science laws should influence and be influenced by what we say about,
for example, physicalism, reductionism, and philosophy of mind. From the TSP,
analogies can and should be made to problems that appear in the epistemology of
theory choice. Armstrong’s objection, in contrast, appears only when we are con-
cerned with the BSA. And in it is the basis for the tension that is exquisitely realized
in the BSA between a presumption that the laws of nature should be objective and
the appeal of an analysis of laws that parallels scientific practice. Whatever inter-
ests compel us to look at the BSA—from questions about consciousness to curve
fitting—that tension will always be encountered, and so addressing it serves as the
overarching goal of this dissertation.
Viewed in terms of the tension between objectivity and scientific practice in the
BSA, the topic of this dissertation is quite open ended. We can move from one part
of, or problem for, the BSA to another, and examine each in light of that tension.
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Some of the parts or problems will be more interesting than others to examine in
that light, and I hope that I have picked out some of the more interesting ones.
There is, however, a particular interest that has led me to look at the BSA, and
pick out what subjects I have, that is separate from the tension that will be my
focus. That interest is in information theory, and it plays a significant, if somewhat
quiet, role in determining the structure of this dissertation. It might be helpful
before moving on to say a bit about how examining the relationship between the
information theory and the BSA is where I hope this dissertation will lead.
To start, I will just say that information theory and the BSA seem like they
were made for each other. The BSA is concerned with finding simple and strong
or informative systematizations of the world. Information theory is, very roughly,
a bit of mathematics that has two primary interpretations. The first takes it to be
a theory of the limits to how efficiently communication can be carried out—it tells
us how many sounds or symbols we need at a minimum to exchange our ideas, how
much space it will take on computers or in the media of telecommunications to store
and transfer images, audio, and any other data. The second interpretation takes it to
be a theory of how to quantify information—relating it to the first interpretation,10
it says that carrying out more informative communication will require more space
(or sounds or symbols, etc.) at a minimum, and less informative communication will
require less space. These two interpretations cry out to be used in an attempt to
formalize what we mean in the BSA by simple and strong/informative, respectively.
10 Strictly speaking, the ‘information’ interpretation does not depend on the ‘efficient commu-
nication’ interpretation, but relating the former to the latter is the quickest way to get at what is
going on without digging in to the formal details of the theory.
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But, of course, it’s not that simple. How we address the issues surrounding
the BSA that I consider in this dissertation will inform how how we put information
theory to use in the BSA. The possibility of the disagreements that give rise to
Armstrong’s objection makes it look like there won’t just be one answer to how
information theory and the BSA connect. The language privileging that does so
much good work for accommodating special science laws and dealing with the TSP
seems to render as irrelevant information theory’s great ability to compare different
ways of expressing the same content. As already discussed, these issues are a part
of basic work that needs to be done in support of the BSA. Dealing with them has
the added benefit of setting the stage for work on information theory’s possible role
in the analysis of laws.
Such is the secondary motive for considering the topics that I will in this disser-
tation. It will not be until Chapter 5 that information theory makes an appearance,
and even then its connection to the BSA will not be definite. The primary motive
of this dissertation is—as the title suggest—to pursue a balance between the need
for objective laws and the relativity in the laws that might be needed to preserve a
parallel with scientific practice. It may, however, be helpful to the reader who has
some familiarity with information theory (and especially the various places it has
been discussed in philosophy) to keep this secondary motive in mind. To the reader
unfamiliar or uninterested in information theory, I say: “No worries.” Nothing of
what is about to happen depends on such familiarity or interest.
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1.5 Summary of Chapters
To conclude, let me offer a brief summary of what is to come.
Part I of this dissertation is concerned with the appearance of relativity in the
BSA.
In Chapter 2, I take up Armstrong’s objection from it’s first expression through
the responses given by BSA proponents, and distinguish two compatible versions of
the objection: one opposed to mind or subject dependence and the other opposed to
relativity. The BSA, I argue, can answer both. Answering the anti-relative version
of Armstrong’s objection poses the more interesting challenge because it requires
that the BSA be no more or less relative than is required by scientific practice.
A spectrum of relativity is introduced with extremes of minimally and maximally
relative variants of the BSA, and extant variants of the BSA are located on it. I
then sketch what work remains to be done with respect to Armstrong’s objection
for BSA proponents depending on where in the spectrum of relativity they hope to
locate their view.
Chapter 3 contributes to the project of motivating relativity in the BSA. Start-
ing with the BBSA and its language relativity, I argue that the view suffers from
two significant problems: (1) it will run afoul of cases of interfield interactions that
blur the boundary between the basic kinds of individual fields (e.g. when photons
are of interest to biology), and (2) it is unable to capture the distinction between
fundamental and special science laws. I introduce an extension of the BBSA, the
Kind and Fact Relative Analysis (KFRA), according to which laws are relativized
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to kinds and the matters of fact that are being systematized. I go on to show how
the KFRA can do all the same good work as the BBSA and answer the interfield
interaction and fundamental/special distinction problems raised in the chapter.
Part II of this dissertation is concerned with the objectivity of the BSA, partic-
ularly how it might be achieved through constraints on the best system competition.
Chapter 4 examines the TSP and the language privileging that is the standard
solution to it in [Lewis, 1983] and successive variants of the BSA. I offer a way of mea-
suring strength that attends to both the competing system and its paired language
that blocks the TSP. A related problem, the Problem of Immanent Comparisons
(PIC) of [Cohen and Callender, 2009], is concerned with the commensurability be-
tween competing system-language pairs. The PIC, as it happens, has the overly
strong conclusion that systems cannot be compared at all unless they are expressed
in the same language. I argue that this is not right, citing the Akaike Information
Criterion as a prime example (among others) of a measure that can (and plausibly
might) be used to compare systems expressed in different languages. However, TSP
and PIC both are based in the problems of language sensitivity that are well known
throughout philosophy. These problems cannot be overcome, but, because the lan-
guage sensitivity lies in the measures to be used in the best system competition,
I argue that the language relativity of the BBSA can and should be replaced with
competition relativity.
Chapter 5 steps away from explicitly addressing the three challenges to the
BSA discussed in this chapter. Instead, the chapter focuses on the question of what,
beyond simplicity and strength, might matter for making a system(-language pair)
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the best. I argue that the best system(s) will be one(s) that make the actual world
the one that scientists would most like to be in, and motivate this requirement by
looking at the “induction friendliness” of a world given a particular system-language
pair as the output of science’s best inductive practices. I propose quantifying in-
duction friendliness with the information theoretic measure of mutual information,
and then highlight a number of ways that the BSA might benefit from introduc-
ing mutual information into it. Appendix A further develops the idea of induction
friendliness through the reconstruction of a classic theorem of information theory
from [Shannon, 1948] in the context of a toy model of the BSA.
The dissertation concludes in Chapter 6. There I offer a summary of the
dissertation in the course of describing the variant of the BSA—which I call the
Relative and Objective, on Balance Analysis (ROBA)—that emerges from the work





Chapter 2: Interest Relativity
The BSA has it, roughly, that a regularity is a law just in case it appears in the
best systematization of all the particular fundamental matters of fact, where “best”
means the simplest and strongest on balance. A standard critique of the view—
which I call Armstrong’s objection after its appearance as the first objection to the
BSA in [Armstrong, 1983]—is that what makes a system best is only determinable
relative to a subject’s conception of “best”. So, in conflict with strong intuitions that
laws of nature should be objective, the laws as described by the BSA are subjective.
Despite Armstrong’s objection, recent proponents of the BSA (or variations of it)
have tended to embrace versions of the idea that the best system is the best for us
(e.g.: [Loewer, 2007,Cohen and Callender, 2009,Frisch, 2011]).
I argue that Armstrong’s objection read as being concerned with the subject
independence of the laws is deficient, since BSA laws need not depend on the ex-
istence of subjects. The specifics of Armstrong’s objection as it is first presented
suggest an alternative, and more threatening, reading according to which the con-
cern is with the possibility of profligate laws determined relative to the variety of
ways of filling in the details of the BSA. The two readings of Armstrong’s objection
are compatible and, taken together, pose a substantial challenge to the BSA with
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a range of possible responses. On one end of that range is the maximally relative
BSA, where there are sets of laws for every possible way of filling in the details of
the view. On the other end are minimally relative variants of the BSA, where limits
on permissible ways of filling in the details of the view are sufficient to pick out a
unique set of laws. I advocate a compromise.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.1, I review the standard subject
(in)dependence reading of Armstrong’s objection and the case against it. In Section
2.2, I introduce the anti-relativity reading of Armstrong’s objection and argue that
a proper response depends on making the laws of the BSA relative exactly as much
as is required by paying due respect to scientific practice. Section 2.3 is concerned
with how the relativity of the laws of the BSA can come in degrees, and how those
degrees of relativity correspond to a range of responses to the combination of the
subject independence and relativity versions of Armstrong’s objection. In Section
2.4, I look at how one might motivate relativity in the laws by appeal to scientific
practice. In Section 2.5, I briefly develop three general strategies for identifying
limits on the relativity of the BSA.
2.1 Armstrong’s Objection Against Subjectivity
Let us begin by looking at Armstrong’s full statement:
The first objection that may be made to the Systematic solution [i.e.
the BSA] is that an element of subjectivism remains. We have already
noticed that it has to involve our standards of simplicity, which, even
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granted that they are shared by all rational mankind, may not be shared
by other rational creatures. The same point seems to hold for standards
of strength. Lewis also refers to ‘our way of balancing’ simplicity and
strength. May there not be irresoluble conflicts about the exact point of
balance?
[Armstrong, 1983, p. 67]
We are told at the outset that the problem is the subjectivity of the BSA laws, so
let us make that part of the argument explicit:
SBL: The laws of the BSA are subjective.
NSL: Laws cannot be subjective. [unstated premise]
Conclusion: (From SBL and NSL.) The BSA cannot be a correct analysis of laws.
The argument is certainly valid. How to read “subjective” is unclear in the
reconstructed argument just as it is in the passage from Armstrong. For the moment
we will assume that the relevant reading of “subjective” is the one concerned with
the dependence of the laws for their content and existence on the presence of minds
or subjects.
The unstated premise NSL seems plausible. Proponents of the BSA might try
to reject NSL from the start. One strategy for this may be to argue that it is an
intuition that does not apply to laws of the BSA, in the style of the rejection in [Bee-
bee, 2000] of “governing” as necessary to a conception of laws. But simply rejecting
NSL weakens the standing of the view in comparison with competing accounts of
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laws that can accommodate the intuition. Most notably, proponents of the BSA do
not reject NSL: [Lewis, 1994], [Loewer, 1996], and [Cohen and Callender, 2009] all
(to be discussed at greater length below) direct their attention towards rebuffing the
claim that the relation between the BSA and the standards of simplicity, strength,
and their balance, makes the laws mind or subject dependent in a problematic way.
The main challenge for an employer of this objection to the BSA is to de-
fend SBL. And, indeed, the remainder of the passage from Armstrong is dedicated
to explaining just how the laws of the BSA are subjective. The matter turns on
the potential for “irresoluble conflicts” between rational seekers of laws. These
conflicts—call them real disagreements—are ones that persist through some ideal
end of the progress of science, where nothing new could happen to decide the ques-
tion and to suspend judgement would be to leave that corner of science incomplete.
Armstrong suggests that a source of real disagreement may be found in the choice
of measures for simplicity, strength, and their balance. The exact source of a real
disagreement does not matter for our present purposes; it is enough if they occur at
all. So let us grant Armstrong that there is such a real disagreement in the form of
Scientist 1, who says that the BSA laws are R1, and Scientist 2, who says that the
BSA laws are R2, where R1 and R2 are not equivalent.
1 From this we are supposed
to extract the claim that the laws of the BSA are subjective.
S1R Scientist 1 says that the BSA laws are R1.
S2R Scientist 2 says that the BSA laws are R2.
1 I use “R” here to stand for a set of (possible) laws because later on “L” will be used for the
language(s) used to express systems, and sets of laws and merely candidate sets of laws share the
quality of being sets of Regularities.
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I12 The laws R1 and R2 are not equivalent.
SBL (From S1R, S2R, and I12.) The laws of the BSA are subjective.
This argument is invalid. They each say that the BSA laws are one way or
another, but that does not make them so. The BSA is, despite the inspiration it
draws very directly from the epistemology of science, a realist metaphysical analysis
of laws of nature. There are no variables in the BSA (like the balance between
simplicity and strength) that are metaphysically free to be set at will by some
subject, and so the laws of the BSA are not subjective in the sense that they depend
on subjects.
I will refer to this point about the BSA as the brute metaphysics response to
Armstrong’s objection. Employing it is to put one’s foot down and insist that there
just is some metaphysical fact of the matter about what the laws are according to
the BSA. It does not matter what anyone says or thinks about the laws, nor does it
matter if anyone exists to say or think anything about the laws. Lewis adopts this
position when he writes
I am talking about how nature [...] determines what’s true about the
laws and chances. Whether there are any believers living in the lawful
and chancy world has nothing to do with it.
[Lewis, 1994, pp. 481–482]
Cohen and Callender similarly insist in their discussion of their variant of the
BSA, “relativized MRL”, that
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relativized MRL does not make the laws subjective in the sense that they
depend for their existence on subjects. This is because the laws (relative
to basic kinds K) that hold of a world w would satisfy relativized MRL’s
criterion for lawhood... whether or not there are subjects in w (or any
other world).
[Cohen and Callender, 2009, p. 30]
Even Ramsey, whose view is summarized in [Lewis, 1973] as “a counterfactual about
omniscience”, writes that what matters to the laws are “the facts that form the
system in virtue of internal relations, not people’s beliefs in them” [Ramsey, 1928, p.
132].
It is possible to formulate a version of the BSA that is thoroughly subjective,
but it is by no means necessary. It is certainly not the case for the version of the
BSA that was Armstrong’s target that its laws were subjective in the sense that they
depend on minds/subjects. As long as we read Armstrong’s objection this way, it is
less an objection than a stern reminder that we should be careful in our statements
of the BSA and its variants.
2.2 Armstrong’s Objection Against Relativity
Taking a second, sympathetic, look at Armstrong and Lewis tells against inter-
preting Armstrong’s objection as being exclusively about mind/subject (in)dependence.
Armstrong never accused the BSA of being subjective, but only that, on account
of (real) disagreements in scientific practice, “an element of subjectivism remains”
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(emphasis added). In light of this and what was said in the preceding section, it
may be worth giving Armstrong the benefit of the doubt by not assuming he was
objecting simply to a subject dependence in the laws.
Consider next how Lewis responds to Armstrong. Lewis’ expression of the
brute metaphysics sentiment is not presented as a response to Armstrong, but only
as a general remark about the BSA. He does, however, write
The worst problem about the best-system analysis is that when we ask
where the standards of simplicity and strength and balance come from,
the answer may seem to be that they come from us. [...] Maybe some of
the exchange rates between simplicity, etc., are a psychological matter,
but not just anything goes. If nature is kind, the best system will be
robustly best—so far ahead of its rivals that it will come out first under
any standard of simplicity and strength and balance.
[Lewis, 1994, p. 479]
This nature is kind response to Armstrong’s objection stops just short of denying
that there will ever be the problematic sort of disagreement with which Armstrong
is concerned. If nature is kind, we can deny the conjunction of S1R, S2R, and I12.
But what if nature is unkind? Lewis says just down the page: “in this unfortunate
case there would be no very good deservers of the name of laws”. This may be true
if nature is wildly unkind, such that no account of laws can make sense of what is
going on. The real threat to Lewis is that nature is unkind in just the right sort of
way to make the BSA laws untenable but the laws as described by some other view
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acceptable; e.g. stochastic governing laws might allow for quite misleading/unkind
runs of events in nature without undermining how deserving its laws are to be
so called, and similarly for the impoverished possible worlds of [Tooley, 1977] and
others. Such a particular threat must be warded off with more than wishful thinking.
What is most telling against the subjectivity reading of Armstrong’s objection
in this response from Lewis is the suggestion that the laws of the BSA may depend
in principle on law seeking subjects. No amount of kindness in nature will break
the subject dependence of the laws if it is there. The same issue arises with the
rigidification response, considered briefly in [Lewis, 1986], according to which the
standards of simplicity, strength, and balance employed in the BSA are fixed to “our
actual standards” [Lewis, 1986, p. 123]. Giving Lewis the benefit of the doubt, there
must be something other than subject dependence addressed by these responses.
What Armstrong and Lewis share is a concern with the presence of multiple
different sets of laws, not subject dependence. The intuition underwriting Arm-
strong’s objection is less the unstated premise (NSL) that the laws cannot be sub-
jective (i.e. dependent on subjects), and more that the laws must be objective, which
may also be interpreted as a requirement that the BSA pick out a unique set of laws.
Armstrong’s objection, then, is
S1R Scientist 1 says that the BSA laws are R1.
S2R Scientist 2 says that the BSA laws are R2.
I12 The laws R1 and R2 are not equivalent.
DBL (From S1R, S2R, and I12.) The BSA yields multiple sets of laws.
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USL There must be a unique set of laws.
Conclusion (From DBL and USL.) The BSA cannot be a correct analysis of laws.
But this is still invalid. Now, as before, we can appeal to a version of the brute
metaphysics response to block any concern about extra sets of laws: The BSA will
say that there is exactly one real set of laws, and so at least one of Scientist 1 and
Scientist 2 is wrong.
The remainder of this section is broken up into three parts. The first is con-
cerned with salvaging what one may from (and for) this version of Armstrong’s
objection by forcing the BSA to accommodate through relativity the disagreement
between Scientists 1 and 2. In the second part it is shown how the BSA can be
simultaneously relative and non-subjective. The third part is concerned with what
would count as a response to Armstrong’s objection.
2.2.1 Respecting Scientific Practice
It is easy to be unhappy with the version of the brute metaphysics response
that was just employed. Proponents of the BSA should be unhappy because, in
requiring that one of the two scientists be wrong, the response risks abandoning
the close connection between the metaphysics of laws and the epistemology of the
search for laws that is such an appealing feature of the BSA. The close connection
between the BSA and scientific practice is, in fact, reliably treated as a virtue. But
that virtue is in conflict with the brute metaphysics response as it has just been
used: to dismiss some part of the practice of science (namely, the part associated
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with at least of one Scientists 1 and 2).
Opponents of the BSA should also be unhappy with this version of the brute
metaphysics response because it denies that the claims about laws made by the
two scientists are the sort of thing that could count against the BSA. Suppose, for
example, that a petulant employer of the brute metaphysics response just insists
that the details of the BSA—e.g. the preferred balance between simplicity and
strength, and what measures are used to determine the simplicity and strength of
a system—are such that the laws are R1. An employer of Armstrong’s objection
would like to be able to object: Why aren’t the laws R2? Nothing has been said,
and, by assumption, nothing can be said, in favor of Scientist 1’s settings of the
details BSA over Scientist 2’s. If BSA proponents are as interested as it seems in
a close connection between the details of the BSA and the particulars of scientific
practice, on what grounds could the position of Scientist 2 be dismissed as they have
been? Some other petulant proponent of the BSA may decide to favor the details
that accord with Scientist 2 over Scientist 1, or endorse some third option that is
incompatible with anything in scientific practice. In any of these cases, the brute
metaphysics response as just presented will ward off any criticism.
So proponents of the BSA and employers of Armstrong’s objection share an
interest in thwarting this version of the brute metaphysics response. Its arbitrari-
ness and apparent disinterest in scientific practice is anathema to the methods of
philosophy of science. The solution is clear: Everyone should (and should be will-
ing to) endorse the principle that the consequences of the BSA (or any account of
laws) fit, parallel, conform to, answer to, (or, to just pick a word and stick with it)
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respect scientific practice. Thus we add to the argument of Armstrong’s objection
the premise
RSP An account of laws must respect scientific practice.
What does RSP actually require? Saying exactly is difficult. van Fraas-sen
explains that an account of laws
should make it plausible that laws of nature are the truths which science
aims to discover. My phrasing should not be too strictly or prejudicially
construed. If the account makes it plausible that the laws, as defined,
are part of the theoretical description of the world provided by science
in the long run, if all goes ideally well—that is enough.
[van Fraassen, 1989, p. 55]
For our purposes it should be emphasized that RSP requires that, whenever scientists
say X about laws, the BSA is in a position to agree that X, or at least illuminate
why X was said. For example, we may not have yet discovered the true BSA laws
of the world, but if the BSA were run given just what we know, then it should say
pretty much what we already think. Another example: The premise USL that there
can only be one set of laws might be essential to the conception of laws found in
scientific practice. In that case, USL follows directly from RSP, and the BSA should
not generate multiple sets of laws.
Unlike in the case of the petulant employer of the brute metaphysics response,
the BSA is now able to fail by its own lights if satisfying RSP leads to contradictory
commitments. Of particular interest to the discussion of Armstrong’s objection
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is what RSP requires of the BSA in the event of real disagreements in scientific
practice—recall from the previous section that those are ones that persist through
some ideal end of the progress of science—like in our example of Scientists 1 and
2 and their not equivalent sets of laws R1 and R2. Satisfying RSP will require the
BSA to say that the laws of R1 are real (not just possible/candidate) laws and the
laws of R2 are real laws; that is how the inference from S1R, S2R, and I12 to DBL is
properly made. But, on pain of contradiction (since R1 and R2 are not equivalent),
it must be qualified that each set of laws are the laws relative to something.
2.2.2 Relativity and Subjectivity
The first reading of Armstrong’s objection was opposed to laws that were
dependent on subjects, but was overcome by way of the brute metaphysics response.
But after adding RSP and requiring the the laws be relative, it is possible that the
first reading of the objection becomes a problem again. If the laws of the BSA
are determined explicitly relative to the peculiarities of particular scientists, then
it seems that they do actually depend on subjects. Before moving on with the
discussion of this second reading of Armstrong’s objection, it is important to ensure
that the BSA has not already succumbed to the first reading. To do that we must
answer the question “To what are the BSA laws relative?”.
Scientists 1 and 2 presumably don’t just disagree about the laws for no rea-
son. In Armstrong’s example three points of disagreement are suggested: They
might disagree on the meaning of “simple”, on the meaning of “strong”, and on the
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weighting between them that determines the overall goodness of a system. Since
we have denied the possibility that there is a correct side in these disagreements
(supposing that any one, or some combination, of them is the reason for the real
disagreement about the laws between Scientists 1 and 2), I will say that the reasons
for real disagreements are differences in interests. Scientist 1 may be interested in
simple laws, while Scientist 2 is interested in strong laws. Scientist 1 may be inter-
ested in what the laws are when using one measure of simplicity, while Scientist 2
is interested in the laws when using some other measure. Since their disagreement
is real, neither could ever convince the other to change their interests. But that’s
okay at least because each can appreciate that, were their interests to coincide, they
would agree on the laws.
We thus want the laws to be interest relative. Interest relative laws guarantee
satisfying RSP as long as any differences of interest may be reflected in how the
details of the BSA are filled in. But the laws of the BSA cannot be explicitly
interest relative since interests are had by subjects and that would make the laws
of the BSA subjective in conflict with the first reading of Armstrong’s objection.
Suppose that the BSA run with details D1 yields the laws R1. And, if run with
details D2, the BSA yields the laws R2. Nothing about these relations realized by
the BSA, between the details Di and corresponding laws Li, result in laws that are
subject dependent. The Ri are out there just as the non-relative BSA laws were
when we first considered how the brute metaphysics response blocks the first reading
of Armstrong’s objection. What has changed is this: There are not just the laws.
There are the laws of Scientist 1, and the laws of Scientist 2, and so on if need be.
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To say that the laws R1 are the laws of Scientist 1 certainly makes it sound
like the laws depend on Scientist 1, but the dependence need not be present. The
laws R1 are those relative to the details D1, whether there are any subjects or
not. When Scientist 1 comes along with interests I1, those interests point to the
already present laws R1—determined relative to details D1 that correspond to the
interests I1—as the laws of interest to Scientist 1. This is a generalized version of
the picture I assume one must have in order to reconcile the relative laws of [Cohen
and Callender, 2009] (to be discussed further in Section 2.4) with their claims to
subject independence.
We can say that the laws are interest relative insofar as there are different
ways of filling in the details of the BSA (to which the laws are actually relative)
corresponding to the different interests of scientists. In this way the laws of the BSA
can be interest relative to satisfy RSP without succumbing to subjectivity.
2.2.3 Responding to Armstrong
Now we may return to addressing the second reading of Armstrong’s objection.
Can the laws of the BSA be relative and guarantee a unique set of laws (as required
by USL)? Yes, in two possible ways. The first way is something like what was
suggested by Lewis in the “nature is kind” response. It may be, if nature is kind,
that all the sets of laws (each relative to the different ways of fixing the free variables
of the BSA) turn out to be equivalent, and thus there is effectively just one set of
laws yielded by the BSA. But we have already set aside this possibility as too much
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wishful thinking. The second way is if, in fact, there are no real disagreements or
differences of interest in scientific practice. However plausible this may or may not
be, it amounts to a denial of the conjunction of S1R, S2R, and I12, and so simply
asserting it is not a satisfying response to Armstrong’s objection.
If there are real disagreements in scientific practice, then the BSA will fail to
satisfy USL when it tries to satisfy RSP by admitting relative laws that accommo-
date those disagreements. But, at the same time, the justification for USL will be
undermined by RSP since it is scientific practice itself that is requiring that there
be multiple sets of laws. In light of asserting that there is real disagreement among
scientists (premises S1R, S2R, and I12) and that the BSA must respect scientific
practice (RSP), one cannot insist on there being a unique set of laws (USL). It is
not that there can only be one set of laws, but rather that there should be only be as
many sets of laws as is required by respecting scientific practice. Since multiple sets
of laws are yielded by allowing the laws of the BSA to be relative to corresponding
details, we may say that the BSA is more or less relative when it admits more or
fewer sets of laws (we’ll see, though, that this connection comes apart a bit in 2.3).
One would need to introduce (and defend) principles that supersede RSP in order
to request or endorse any more or less relativity (or more or fewer sets of laws) than
what is required to satisfy RSP.
Before moving on, let us pause to take stock of what has been said and see
where it may take us. There are two (related) intuitions underlying Armstrong’s
objection, each a version of the intuition that laws should be objective. The first is
that the laws cannot be subject dependent, and is satisfied by the BSA with little
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issue. The second is that there should be just one set of laws. Making the second in-
tuition problematic for the BSA requires endorsing the claim that an analysis of laws
must respect scientific practice and guaranteeing that there are real disagreements
in scientific practice that would force (on account of respecting scientific practice)
the BSA to allow for the existence of more than one set of laws. If the two intuitions
are to be defended, it is presumably by examination of scientific practice. Therefore,
insofar as scientific practice requires more than one set of laws, the second intuition
must be weakened. It is not that there must be just one set of laws. Rather, there
should be only as much relativity in the laws as is required by respecting scientific
practice. Responding to Armstrong’s objection is thus a matter of finding just the
right amount of relativity in the laws of the BSA. Determining how relative the
laws of the BSA should be is a project beyond the scope of this chapter, but in the
remaining two sections I address how the BSA can be more or less relative, and
what that means for present and future variants of the view.
2.3 Degrees of Relativity
The BSA may be illuminated by a story in which a scientist dies and appears
before God, who asks if there is anything the scientist would like. The scientist
replies “I would like to know how the world works”. God accepts the request and
begins “At time and position 〈t1, p1〉 such-and-such properties obtained, and at
〈t1, p2〉 such-and-such other properties obtained, and—” at which point the scientist
interrupts and says “Sorry, if that is how things actually work that is all well and
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good, but is there a pithy version?”. God’s reply to that question is to provide the
scientist with the (BSA-style) laws of nature. [Beebee, 2000] introduces a version of
this story in order to highlight the fact that the laws of the BSA are non-governing.
It also provides a nice context for thinking about how the laws of the BSA are
relative. All the same questions are raised when the scientist asks for the “pithy
version” as when it is said that the laws are drawn from the “best system”. And
if two scientists appear before God and receive different laws, that is akin to our
earlier thinking about real disagreements between scientists at some ideal end of
science.
To emphasize the possibility of different responses, we can join Armstrong in
worrying about whether or not the standards of simplicity, strength, and balance
are the same for “other rational creatures”. Let’s call these other rational creatures
Martians, and consider a version of the story in which our (human) scientist is
joined by a Martian scientist. They both want a pithy version of how the world
works, and for each God is happy to provide it, which is to say, the laws. Thinking
of Armstrong’s objection as being concerned with relativity, the question to ask is
“How different are the respective laws?”.
Maybe the Martian’s brain is much bigger than a human’s, and thus there need
not be as great a trade off of strength in favor of simplicity. Such a scenario deprives
the human scientist of any sort of cognitive aid without good reason. Science is
conducted with many cognitive aids—computers are a stand out example—so let
the human scientist possess whatever such aids they may. The Martian will probably
have cognitive aids as well. And, if the aids of one are superior to those of the other,
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the superior aids could be reproduced and the new user could be trained to use them
(presumably they have an eternity in God’s audience, but we should also imagine
that this is what would happen in the normal course of science). If one scientist can
measure, calculate, or by some other means, have access to, or the ability to process,
some piece of information, then just one of the following will be true: (1) Any
other scientist may be trained to appreciate the measurement(/calculation/what-
have-you) (given sufficient time and resources) or (2) The measurement(/...) is not
worthy of being incorporated into scientific practice, precisely because it fails (1). If
anyone can overcome some limitation, then the means by which they did so should
be shared. In the long run, everyone should be subjected to precisely the same
limitations, augmented from their start as needed with equalizing education and
engineering. Everyone must reject anything failing (1). But if (1) holds, the only
grounds for dismissing the relevant means and resultant information is disinterest.
Despite the introduction of Martians (or any “other rational creatures”), there being
differences in the laws continues to be a matter of capturing whatever differences
there are in interests.
Differences in the laws are realized by different ways of filling in the details
of the BSA. Earlier this was likened to setting a metaphysically free variable like
the balance between simplicity and strength. Let us make that more explicit with
a toy model of the BSA that is as naive and straightforward as possible: A system
S is judged best (or not) according to its goodness Good(S) which is the sum of its
simplicity Simp(S) and strength Str(S) weighted by a balance factor b with a real
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value from 0 to 1 such that
Good(S) = b× Simp(S) + (1− b)× Str(S) (2.1)
Suppose further that the measures Simp and Str are fixed so that there is only the
one free variable b. The BSA relativized to b says that there are laws Rb=x for each
way of substituting a value x in for b.
We can ask again: How different are the respective laws? Without saying
anything about what the laws look like in detail, it will be hard to talk of the
difference between any two sets of laws Rb=x and Rb=y (with x 6= y) beyond simple
equality or inequality. We can make some progress, though, in talking about the
degree of relativity of the set of all law sets R = {Rb=x| for all x ∈ R such that
0 ≤ x ≤ 1}.
When Lewis introduces the “nature is kind” response it is meant to minimize
relativity by having R have a single member as a result of the fact that Rb=x = Rb=y
for all x, y. As soon as there is not one all encompassing equivalence class of law
sets there is an abrupt jump from there being effectively no relativity in the laws
to there being some (e.g. if there is some critical boundary value of balance v such
that Rb=x = Rb=y iff either v ≤ x, y or x, y < v).
In the limit where Rb=x 6= Rb=y for all x, y such that x 6= y, there are un-
countably many distinct law sets. Relativity goes down from that point in one of
two ways. The first is as we’ve built up to this point in reverse: If there are any
equivalent sets of laws, then it seems there is less relativity. For example, if there
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is some value of balance v such that Rb=x = Rb=y iff v ≤ x, y. Then, unless v = 0,
there will still be uncountably many nonequivalent law sets. But the claim that the
laws will come out the same as long as a weight of at least v is given to simplicity
seems to constitute a substantial reduction in relativity compared to every value of
b yielding different laws.
The second way for relativity to go down is if there are additional constraints
on the value of b. It is assumed that b has some real value ranging from 0 to 1. What
if it could be shown that the extreme values are not allowed, that b must have a real
value between 0 and 1? Again, there are still uncountably many nonequivalent law
sets—only two distinct law sets have been excluded. But, again, the claim that the
goodness of a system cannot be determined entirely by its simplicity or entirely by
its strength seems substantial as a constraint on relativity.
The implausibility of the “nature is kind” scenario is tempered by the possi-
bility of identifying equivalencies and limiting the set of permissible values b. There
will be just one set of laws as long as all of the balance relative laws are equivalent
for any permissible value of b. That is minimal relativity (at least in the limited
context of relativity to b). It is, presumably, what one has in mind when they insist
that the laws of the BSA be objective in the strong sense of being opposed to the
possibility of any disagreement.
Is there a point at which the relativity of the BSA cannot be increased? It
cannot just be that maximum relativity is achieved where there is an uncountable
infinity of nonequivalent law sets. As suggested above, it seems that there can be
qualitatively less relativity even when an infinite number of nonequivalent laws has
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been reduced a finite amount. Going in the other direction, it seems we can increase
relativity by adding additional variables to the BSA. Consider an extension of our
toy model where the goodness of a system involves a balance of simplicity, strength,
and fit. Now there are two free balance variables b1 and b2 that can take any real
value from 0 to 1 as long as (b1 + b2) ≤ 1, and
Good(S) = b1 × Simp(S) + b2 × Str(S) + (1− b1 − b2)× Fit(S) (2.2)
The laws of this BSA are more relative than the laws of the BSA without fit, since
here the laws are relative to the values of both b1 and b2. But, in the limit where
there are no equivalent law sets, there are still only uncountably many nonequivalent
sets of laws. For another example, the same thing would be true if we removed the
constraints that ensure the weights on each of simplicity, strength, and fit, have
values between 0 and 1 inclusive.
We can keep increasing the relativity of the laws by letting more and more of
the BSA be variable. One step in that direction would be to allow for many ways of
measuring each of simplicity, strength, and fit. But the potential for variability in
the details of the BSA runs much deeper than just how we measure and balance the
good-making features of a system. As noted in the Chapter 1, Lewis’ BSA and the
variants of the view introduced since all fall under a four-part model: First, there
are the matters of fact to be systematized. Second, the various candidate systems.
Third, all the languages that might be used to express the facts and candidate
systems. Fourth and finally, the best system competition itself, which serves as a
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function from the sets of facts, systems, and languages, to a system-language pair
(or set of such pairs) that is the source of the laws. When we consider laws that are
relative to the exact balance of simplicity and strength, this is a worry about the
rules of the best system competition. But there could also be relativity to how the
set of facts to be systematized is populated. And relativity to the set of systems
that will be considered as candidates in the competition. And relativity to the set
of languages in which the systems and facts may be expressed.
Maximal relativity is achieved when all four parts of the BSA—the facts, sys-
tems, languages, and competition—are wholly unconstrained beyond the loose struc-
ture that brings those four parts together. On such a view, in order for some regu-
larity r to be a law it only has to be that there exists some fact(s), some system(s),
some language(s), and some competition function(s) such that the r is made a law
relative to the specified fact(s), system(s), language(s), and competition(s). At this
point, reductions achieved through the kindness of nature—namely, through equiv-
alencies among law sets that have different settings of the BSA variables—do not
reduce relativity away from the maximum. Suppose that despite all the allowed vari-
ability it still is the case that all the sets of laws are equivalent. Then the maximally
relative BSA would also be a minimally relative BSA.
But nature is probably not as kind as that. Between the maximally relative
BSA and the minimally relative BSAs there is a wide range of BSA variants that
feature a middling amount of relativity. And hopefully among those, or among the
extreme variants if that is how things go, is a variant that captures exactly the
relativity, no more and no less, that is required by respecting scientific practice. If
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there is, then Armstrong’s objection as it has been reconstructed in this paper can
be answered.
2.4 Required Relativity
It has been left open so far whether or not there actually is any relativity
required by respecting scientific practice. A proponent of the BSA who seeks a
minimally relative variant of the view has to either identify limits on free variables
of the BSA, hope (or, preferably, show) that nature is kind, or do some combination
of both enough to ensure that whatever relative laws there are are all equivalent
to each other. There are lots of different minimally relative BSAs, and one cannot
just be picked. The starting point for any proponent of the BSA should be the
unique maximally relative BSA, and any limits on relativity will be accomplished
by arguing down from there. If the goal is minimal relativity, then there is a lot
of work to be done. But minimal relativity is not the goal if respecting scientific
practice requires that there be some relativity in the laws. In this section, I consider
the ways that relativity might be required by respecting scientific practice.
To start, return to the story of scientists appearing before God. Suppose that
it is a physicist, an economist, and a biologist that are having an audience with
God. When each asks for the pithy version of “how the world works”, they are each
asking different questions, since each is interested in different parts of the world.
Thus (barring an incredibly kind nature, and only insofar as these fields have laws)
each will receive different laws. To the physicist go the laws of physics, which are
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the laws determined relative to the setting of variables of the BSA that matches the
interests of the physicist. To the biologist the laws of biology, which are the laws
determined relative to (...) the interests of biologists. And similarly do the laws of
economics go to the economist.
Some concern should be paid to the possibility of a kind nature, or just the
confidence we have in the differences between two fields, when there are substantial
overlaps in interests. A neurobiologist and a cognitive psychologist, each operating
under the broad heading of “cognitive science”, may come at the same problem from
different directions. To the extent that it really is the same problem, it is not clear
if their respective laws will be different. At that point it might be worth it to think
about differences in the sets of laws beyond them being equivalent or not.
For our purposes it is enough to believe that there are different scientific fields
with interests different enough that they would receive different laws from each
other. Even if one doubts the autonomy of different scientific fields from fundamental
science with respect to laws2, we might expect that whatever principles bridge the
divide between the fundamental laws and the laws of some non-fundamental field
would be included in God’s reply, and thus could be counted among the BSA laws
for the field in a way that distinguishes the field’s laws from the fundamental laws.
The maximally relative BSA that was presented in the previous section is a
generalization of the [Cohen and Callender, 2009] variant of the BSA, the “Better
Best System Analysis”, or BBSA. The BBSA is a language relative variant of the
2 There are some good reasons to not have such doubts. For examples: [Lange, 2004] argues
on behalf of the autonomy of functional biology, and [Callender and Cohen, 2010] argues for the
compatibility of autonomy and a certain brand of reductionism in the context of the BSA.
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BSA: There is the set of supervenient kinds—the set of all kinds that supervene on
the true fundamental kinds—and a best system competition is run for each subset
of the set of supervenient kinds, where the facts and all competing systems are
expressed in the language that has the particular set of kinds as its basic predicates.
The interests of a field (for the purpose of picking out the field’s laws) are identified
with the kinds that are treated as basic by the field, so the laws of a field are the
laws that are determined relative to the set of kinds that happens to be the set of
interest to the field.
In the BBSA we have language relativity (though perhaps not total language
relativity, since the details of a language are not exhausted by specifying the basic
predicates of the language) on the grounds that it is required to accommodate the
differences in interests of special sciences as those interests are directed at laws.
Competition relativity is also a part of the BBSA, though less discussed than the
kind relativity It is explained that
Ecologists are not looking over their shoulders at the simplicity, strength
and balance metrics of physics. They are using their own metrics tailored
to their own field.
[Cohen and Callender, 2009, p. 24]
Similar reasoning probably extends to what counts as a candidate system; e.g.,
ecologists probably are not counting field theories among their candidate systems.
What about fact relativity, the last of the four major parts of the maximally
relative BSA? If a field cares only about certain kinds of things (say, trees) then
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there will be certain facts that will go unconsidered in determining the laws of the
field simply because the language of the field is incapable of expressing all of the
facts. But fact relativity will become important if there are two fields that cannot
distinguish their respective domains of interest except by specifying which facts they
will or will not try to systematize. This seems to happen when looking at the dif-
ferences between the relativistic and non-relativistic varieties of classical mechanics:
Classical mechanics of either variety is concerned with the same sort of basic kinds,
and so the differences in the interests that lead to their respective formulations
are unlikely to be captured by language/kind relativity. Non-relativistic classical
mechanics is concerned with just those things whose speeds are trivially small com-
pared to the speed of light. Relativistic classical mechanics is concerned with things
moving at any speed. What distinguishes them is a fact relativity. The former is
a systematization of the subset of matters of fact in which nothing is traveling at
relativistic speeds, while the latter systematizes all of those facts and facts in which
things are moving at relativistic speeds (both presumably ignore some facts that are
outside the domain of classical mechanics generally).
If respecting scientific practice requires that there be laws for every scientific
field, then it seems the BSA may be pushed quickly to maximal relativity. And
that is before we consider the possibility of real disagreements within fields (though
perhaps we have, if the relativistic v. non-relativistic classical mechanics example is
read as involving an intra-physics disagreement). So, does the maximally relative
BSA answer Armstrong’s objection? If it does, then those looking for something
closer to perfect agreement on the laws will be left to hope with Lewis that nature
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is kind. But Armstrong’s objection against relativity, with an underlying intuition
against a glut of laws, requires that the BSA capture exactly the amount of relativity
that is required by respecting scientific practice, no more and no less. As much as
relativity may have been motivated in the above, nothing said so far guarantees
that there aren’t also limits on relativity to be found in scientific practice. Maximal
relativity in the laws is maybe more plausible than minimal relativity, but there is
still room for a better BSA to be found somewhere in the middle.
2.5 Limiting Relativity
Perhaps the easiest way to limit relativity in light of the preceding discussion
is to deny that the BSA needs to accommodate laws in all fields. But to do so would
be to make two errors. The first is to miss that, even if we can point to a field and
say with confidence that laws are not a part of the practice of the field, laws may
still become a part of the practice of the field. The second is to miss that, even if
we cared only to identify laws in one field, there remains the possibility of relativity
being required to respond to real disagreements within the practice of that field.
The great challenge of limiting relativity is that what limits are imposed must
be universal ; that is, they must constrain what all law seekers do whatever their
interests may be. If someone claims to be seeking laws, but violates a universal limit,
then we should be in a position to argue that they are mistaken in claiming that it
is laws that they seek. To borrow Armstrong’s language, we must be concerned not
just with “all rational mankind”, but also with all “other rational creatures”.
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Looking for agreement in scientific practice will not, in general, be enough
to identify a universal limit on relativity, for agreement now does not guarantee
the same agreement will persist. Loewer suggests a strategy for dealing with this
by setting the details of the BSA to what they would be in a “final theory” of
physics that succeeds the present theory in a process of “developments that are
considered within the scientific community to increase the simplicity, coherence,
informativeness, explanatoriness, and other scientific virtues” that is carried out
until no such increases may be achieved [Loewer, 2007, p. 325]. Setting aside any
question of whether this strategy makes the laws subjective, we can say that it
does not guarantee universal limits to the BSA. From a given starting theory, it
may be that there are choices in the formulation of successive theories with different
responses leading to different final theories. And one must consider starting theories
other than our actual current theory to avoid subjectivity; then universality may be
undermined by a lack of convergence.
What Loewer gets right is the idea that identifying universal limits on the
relativity of the BSA will be a matter of looking at not just what is true of scientific
practice now, but also at what will to be true in the future. Such limits may be
grouped under three broad categories: (1) limits that emerge from the internal
structure of the BSA, (2) limits imposed by desiderata for an analysis of laws, and
(3) limits imposed by insurmountable practical challenges. I now consider each of
these categories in turn, and give brief examples of how they may limit relativity.
Limits that emerge from the internal structure of the BSA were actually con-
sidered already (though not as such) in the previous section. The kind relativity of
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the BBSA seemed to do the same work as some amount of fact relativity. Suppose,
for example, that a field does not care about electrons. This could be reflected
in how the details of the BSA are set by not counting electrons among the kinds
the field treats as basic, or by ignoring any specifically electron related matters of
fact. Similarly with the example of ecologists not considering field theoretic systems,
which could be ensured by system relativity or by kind relativity when “fields” are
not counted among the basic kinds of ecology. In either example one could, of
course, adopt both sorts of relativity. But in some cases two sorts of relativity will
be redundant because of how they interact in the BSA. If every time one sort of
relativity is needed it is redundant with some other already admitted sort, then the
first sort of relativity may be eliminated.
Consider now the second category: limits imposed by desiderata for an analysis
of laws. Some desiderata for an analysis of laws will not directly impose limits on the
relativity of the BSA. To use an example running throughout this paper, take the
non-subjectivity of the laws as a desideratum. That constrains how the free variables
of the BSA are set in the sense that they cannot be set directly by subjects, but
limiting relativity involves saying what variables are not free, or what values of free
variables are unacceptable.
A long standing desideratum for an analysis of laws is that it be able to
distinguish between lawful and accidental regularities. The BSA may fail to do this
if gerrymandered predicates are allowed, as in the trivial systems problem of [Lewis,
1983] where the predicate F that is true of everything in just those worlds where
the system ∀xFx is true. The kind that corresponds to F is included in the set
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of supervenient kinds over whose subsets the kind relativity of the BBSA ranges.
In that way there are sets of laws in the BBSA (any that are relative to a set of
kinds that make F a predicate) that make every regularity a law, and thus fail to
distinguish between lawful and accidental regularities.
The sets of laws that fail to distinguish between lawful and accidental regular-
ities are supposed to be unproblematic for the BBSA precisely because they include
the problematic predicate. The desideratum indicates that we are only interested
in sets of laws that distinguish between lawful and accidental regularities. If we are
uninterested in any kinds that yield a predicate like F , then the sets of laws that fail
to distinguish will not be among the sets of interest to us. And if we are interested
in such kinds, then the desideratum is not as strong as one might imagine precisely
because we are committed to an interest in laws that violate it.
Another response to the presence of these non-distinguishing law sets is avail-
able to a BSA/BBSA proponent. BBSA laws are determined relative to any subset
of the set of all kinds supervening on the true fundamental kinds. Among the
set of supervenient kinds are kinds that guarantee a violation of the distinguishing
desideratum. We can satisfy the desideratum (or at least take steps necessary for
satisfying it) by limiting relativity: Do not let just any subset of the supervenient
kinds yield a set of laws, rather only let there be laws relative to any subset of the
supervenient kinds minus any desideratum violating kinds. This is, perhaps, only a
small reduction in the relativity of the BBSA, but it is a reduction that is required
by respecting scientific practice by way of the distinguishing desideratum.
Lastly, consider the third category: limits imposed by insurmountable prac-
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tical challenges. For a first example, recall that a best system competition is a
function from facts, systems, and languages, to the best system-language pair(s).
The possibility of identifying the laws depends on the possibility of practically im-
plementing the competition function. A best system competition may simply fail
to identify a best system if there is no effective means of calculating its output. To
ensure that that does not happen, we may limit competition relativity by allowing
only computable functions to serve as the best system competition function.
Another such limit may come from a need to write things down. Every time
we do, whether it is part of figuring out what the laws are, or using the laws to
achieve some end, we incur physical space and energy costs.While in practice those
costs are determined by our current technology, in principle their minima will be
subject to physical limits characterized by the laws themselves. In the interest of
minimizing those costs, and any other practical limitations whose details depend on
the laws themselves, we may further reduce relativity by the imposition of a kind
of consistency requirement that must be included with every competition function:
A system S is a best system only if its laws impose the kinds of constraints on the
BSA that would yield S as a best system.
These particular ideas for how relativity in the BSA may be limited are an
eclectic lot. All of them, and some more than others, warrant or require more
development. And, to varying degrees, they will receive it later in this disserta-
tion. Specifically: In Chapter 3, the relationship between kind and fact relativity
is explored. In Chapter 4, the distinguishing desideratum plays a prominent role in
the discussion of the trivial systems problem. And, in Chapter 5, the matters of
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computability and writing things down become relevant to the use of information
theoretic principles in the best system competition.
2.6 Summary
My purpose in the this chapter was two-fold: First, to provide an analysis
of Armstrong’s objection to the BSA. Second, to sketch out the routes proponents
of the BSA may follow towards a solution to the objection. Armstrong’s objection
had two possible readings: The first, which objects to laws being subjective, was
found wanting because the laws of the BSA are not subject dependent in general.
The second reading, which objects to relativity in the laws, is only able to require
of the BSA that its relativity match exactly what is required by scientific practice.
There is a spectrum of variously relative BSA variants, from a single maximally
relative variant that lets sets of laws be identified relative to any way of filling in
the details of the BSA, all the way down to a host of minimally relative BSAs that
each identify only a single set of laws. First pass considerations of how to motivate
relativity suggest that the maximally relative BSA is a viable view, but the range of
available strategies for identifying limits to relativity in the BSA tells against that
extreme response to Armstrong’s objection.
If one’s goal is to find a minimally relative variant of the BSA, then a lot more
work has to be done to build on the suggestions given here for limiting relativity.
If one’s goal is to defend the maximally relative BSA, then something must be said
about why the suggested means of limiting relativity, or any means like them, are
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not required to respect scientific practice. But answering Armstrong’s objection
requires neither a deferent minimally relative variant of the BSA, or the defiant
maximally relative variant of the BSA. Something in between should be just right,
with relativity, and limits to it, properly motivated by appeals to scientific practice.
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Chapter 3: Relativizing to Kinds and Facts
A major part of what motivates the BSA is the “Humean Supervenience” the-
sis, according to which “the whole truth about a world like ours”, such as what the
laws are, “supervenes on the spatiotemporal distribution of local qualities” [Lewis,
1994, p. 473]. That supervenient base for “the whole truth” of a world is called the
Humean Mosaic (HM), and the BSA may be summarized as saying that the laws of
nature are the axioms and theorems of the best systematization—the simplest and
strongest, on balance—of the (HM. Importantly, the systems that compete to be
the best in the BSA are not systematizations of the HM directly. Rather, they are
systematizations of the facts of the HM as expressed using a privileged language.1
Recent variations on the BSA have paid special attention to the role of the privileged
language in identifying laws (e.g.: [Schrenk, 2008, Loewer, 2007, Cohen and Callen-
der, 2009]). The broad aim of this chapter is to (re-)direct some attention toward
the facts that are being systematized and their role in identifying the laws. The
more specific aim is to argue that the role for language(s) championed by [Cohen
1 Of course it cannot be that all facts about the HM are being systematized since it is presumably
a fact about the HM that particular regularities are laws, and we should not expect every competing
system to systematize those facts (on pain of trivializing the whole analysis). What is being
systematized are the basic facts of the HM, as determined by the predicates treated as basic by
the privileged language. Throughout this dissertation I have spoken and will speak of “facts” in
the sense of these basic facts.
78
and Callender, 2009] in their “Better Best Systems Analysis” (BBSA) view should
be extended to facts.2
According to the BBSA, laws are kind relative in the sense that different sets of
laws exist relative to every set of kinds that may be treated as basic in the language
used to express the laws (and competing systems and systematized facts). The
extension I am proposing, dubbed simply the “Kind and Fact Relative Analysis”
view (KFRA), has laws determined relative to the set of kinds treated as basic and
the set of facts to be systematized. The KFRA, by including the kind relativity of
the BBSA, can do all the same good work as the BBSA. Furthermore, I argue that
the fact relativity of the KFRA does a better job of answering two new desiderata.
The first desideratum calls for the regularities that appear in interfield interactions
to be accommodated as laws. This depends, at least in some cases, on there being
a shared interest in some kind(s) but not all the facts related to the shared kind(s).
The second desideratum calls for an egalitarian distinction between fundamental and
special science laws. Such a distinction provides metaphysically equal standing to
fundamental and special science laws, while also allowing for the distinction between
them that exists in scientific practice.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.1, I introduce the BBSA
and its accommodation of special science laws. In Section 3.2, I introduce the kind
and fact relative KFRA, and discuss its ability to accommodate special science
laws in the same way as the BBSA. Section 3.3 is concerned with developing the
2 Variations of the BBSA was developed independently in [Schrenk, 2008] and [Cohen and
Callender, 2009]. I generally focus on the version of the view developed by the later authors
because of their explicit efforts to reconcile the BBSA with those of non-Humeans.
79
interfield interactions desideratum, and showing how it may be met by the KFRA
but not the BBSA. Section 3.4 is concerned with developing the desideratum of
having an egalitarian distinction between fundamental and special science laws, and
arguing that the KFRA captures features of the distinction that the BBSA cannot.
I conclude in Section 3.5 that anyone who endorses the BBSA would do better by
endorsing the KFRA, and there offer a summary of the chapter.
3.1 The Better Best Systems Analysis
It is helpful to start with a closer look at Lewis’ thoughts on facts and lan-
guages in the BSA. Lewis took it to be that the privileged language of the laws was
the true fundamental language of “perfectly natural properties” [Lewis, 1983, p.
368]. Assuming classical physics to be more or less in the right when describing the
fundamental nature of the world (i.e. the HM), the facts of the HM as expressed in
the fundamental language are concerned with
spatiotemporal relations: distance relations, both spacelike and timelike,
and perhaps also occupancy relations between point-sized things and
spacetime points. And [...] local qualities: perfectly natural intrinsic
properties of points, or of point-sized occupants of points.
[Lewis, 1994, p. 474]
The Humean Supervenience thesis and Lewis’ particular characterization of the HM
have largely fallen out of favor, but that has not done much harm to the general
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standing of the BSA.3 Authors since Lewis have offered a number of BSA-style views
of laws that depart from Lewis’ version of the view in a variety of ways.
One such departure from Lewis’ BSA is the BBSA of [Cohen and Callen-
der, 2009]. According to the BBSA, a best system competition is run for every
language—as determined by the set of kinds4 treated as basic in the language—that
may be chosen to express the facts and systematizations of the world.5 In each
competition, every competing system is judged according to its expression in the
privileged language. If S is the best system when the privileged language treats the
set of kinds K as basic, then the theorems of S are the laws relative to K. This kind
relativity in the laws of the BBSA helps resolve several issues related to language
choice in the BSA.6 It also allows for the existence of laws in the special sciences that
are egalitarian primarily in the sense (to be expanded upon below) that no one set of
laws is dependent upon any other set (e.g. the laws of biology don’t depend on the
laws of physics for their existence). These egalitarian special science laws are part of
3 Of particular relevance for this chapter, [Cohen and Callender, 2009] restrict their interest in
supervenience to kinds. And, while they do use the term “Humean mosaic”, it is not the capital-H,
capital-M, Humean Mosaic of Lewis, but rather the term for the various sets of language-relative
facts of the world—e.g., in comparing physics and ecology, they speak of “two quite different
mosaics” [Callender and Cohen, 2010, p. 18]. More generally, the BSA is compatible with a
rejection of Humean Supervenience, and such a rejection has been a boon to the BSA since it
frees the view from a host of extraneous metaphysical commitments. See [Loewer, 1996] for a
discussion of the problems with Humean Supervenience and an explanation of how the BSA can
survive despite them.
4 Where the possible sets of kinds are subsets of the set of the fundamental kinds and all kinds
that supervene on the fundamental kinds.
5 Like with Humean Supervenience, the HM comes with substantial metaphysical baggage. So
speaking of “facts of the HM” is dropped in favor of the more general “facts of the world”. It is
still the language determined basic facts, but what those might be does not necessarily come with
the commitments of the HM.
6 [Cohen and Callender, 2009] are explicitly motivated by three desiderata: epistemic accessi-
bility, immanent comparisons, and supervenient kind laws. Suffice it to say that I think [Cohen and
Callender, 2009] are right that the BBSA satisfies these three desiderata. Additionally, it should
not be hard to see if one reviews the relevant arguments in that paper that they may all be run
with little to no adjustment on behalf of the view introduced in this chapter.
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an effort to reconcile “Non-Humean Pluralist” views like those of [Cartwright, 1999]
or [Dupré, 1993] with a Best Systems view of laws [Callender and Cohen, 2010].
Advancing that effort, or at least preserving what has already been done, will be a
largely backgrounded but recurring theme in this chapter.
The idea at the heart of the BBSA’s egalitarian accommodation of special
science laws is this: If the law-directed interests of a field7 are captured by what
kinds are treated as basic by the field, then the laws of the field are the laws that are
relative to the kinds treated as basic by the field. For every set of kinds Ki, there
are corresponding Ki-relative laws Ri. If biologists are interested in the kinds Kbio,
then the Kbio-relative laws Rbio are the laws of biology. Similarly, if ecologists are
interested in kinds Keco, the laws Reco are the laws of ecology. And so on, for every
scientific field. There will also be lots of sets of kinds that are not, and may never
be, of any interest to anyone. There are still laws for such sets of kinds, but they
are just as (un)interesting as the kinds to which they are relative.
That this provides egalitarian special science laws stems from two related ideas
in [Callender and Cohen, 2010]. The first is that the laws of special sciences should
have “autonomy” from the fundamental laws (or the laws of any other field). Bridge
principles (and the like) may exist incidentally because two fields are closely related;
7 By “law-directed interests” I mean just those interests that correspond to the feature(s) of
the BSA to which the laws are relative. There are a lot of things that could be counted in the
interests of a field, but not all of them have to do with identifying the laws of the field. For
example, astronomers are interested in stars and planets and moons, and insofar as those are
kinds of interest, the BBSA would say they are among the law-directed interests of astronomy.
But astronomers might also be interested in moving from a funding model dependent on a few
large government funded international collaborations to a funding model with more small projects
supported by private industry. Strictly speaking, the funding stuff might be a part of the interests
of astronomy, but it’s not a part of the law-directed interests of astronomy (at least not according
to the BBSA and KFRA).
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e.g., because of direct overlap in their basic kinds, or because of easy translation
between one set of kinds and the other. But that the laws of one set deserve the
title of “law” cannot depend on the existence of any bridge principles connecting the
one set to any others [Callender and Cohen, 2010, p. 439]. The other idea relevant
to the egalitarian nature of the special science laws in the BBSA is an “ontological
egalitarianism”, according to which no ontological level enjoys any special status.
The fundamental kinds are not, for example, more deserving of interest than any
other set of kinds from an ontological perspective. Of course, we humans may care
more about some kinds than others for any number of reasons—the kinds of biology
and economics are of great practical importance to us, and curiosity may drive us
to search for the fundamental kinds—but a truly disinterested observer should find
no reason to privilege one set over any other. [Callender and Cohen, 2010] relate
this to the “dappled world” picture of science in [Cartwright, 1999] that encourages
a preponderance of equal and more or less independent scientific enterprises, and
discourages stratification and any strained unification. However, while Cartwright is
explicitly anti-fundamentalist, Callender and Cohen are not; a thoroughgoing anti-
fundamentalism must be dropped on account of the fundamental kinds playing a
role in determining the set of all kinds for the BBSA.
The BBSA’s egalitarian special science laws are a great addition to the BSA,
but the precise implementation leaves something to be desired. The success of the
BBSA depends on a conditional: If the law-directed interests of a field are captured
by what kinds are treated as basic by the field, then the laws of the field are the
laws that are relative to the kinds treated as basic by the field. Going forward, I
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will challenge the antecedent. The law-directed interests of a field are not captured
entirely by the kinds treated as basic by the field. Systems competing to be the
best are systematizations of the facts of the world as expressed using a particular
language. Once a language is chosen—as in the BBSA by a choice of kinds—there
is still room for a field to be interested in only a subset of the facts of the world.
What is important to the individuation of fields and laws are the kinds treated as
basic and the set of matters of fact that are being systematized.
3.2 Relativity to Kinds and Facts
What kinds are treated as basic—by the members of a scientific field, or in the
language in which a set of laws is expressed—is a matter intimately related to what
facts are relevant—as being of interest to a field, or as part of what is actually being
systematized by the laws. Increasing the set of available kinds increases the set of
expressible facts, and limiting the set of available kinds limits the set of expressible
facts. To illustrate with a very toy-like example, suppose for a moment that the
fundamental level of the world is just the arrangement of atoms. The fundamental
kinds include the atomic elements: hydrogen, helium, lithium, beryllium, etc. The
fundamental matters of fact are concerned with the spatio-temporal arrangements of
the atomic elements: something like ‘there is helium at time t and position p’. There
can also be non-fundamental, supervenient, kinds: caffeine is a certain arrangement
of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen. With the non-fundamental kinds comes
the possibility of expressing non-fundamental facts that describe the same state of
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affairs as the fundamental facts, but in different terms: ‘there is caffeine at time t
occupying position(s) P = {p1, p2, ...}’, where the pi in P are the positions of the
constituent atoms of the caffeine molecule.
In the direction of constraining the set of facts, we can see that a suitably
chosen set of kinds can make some facts, even under redescription, wholly inacces-
sible. Consider a set of kinds that includes caffeine, but not carbon. With such a
set of kinds there are no strictly carbon related matters of fact. But some carbon
related matters of fact are recoverable by way of the caffeine facts and additional
principles of translation having to do with the relation between caffeine and car-
bon. However, not all carbon related matters of fact may be recoverable; e.g., if a
set of kinds doesn’t include carbon and it doesn’t include graphite (and it doesn’t
include pencils or any other kinds involving graphite), then those carbon related
matters of fact involved in graphite related matters of fact are both inexpressible
and unrecoverable.
The fact relativity provided by kind relativity is incomplete. There are all the
carbon related matters of fact, and as subsets of those there are the caffeine and
graphite related carbon facts. The kind carbon may be of interest to members of the
Department of Coffee Chemistry and the Department of Pencil Chemistry. But (pre-
sumably) coffee chemists only care about caffeine related carbon facts, and pencil
chemists only care about graphite related carbon facts. However, once committed to
having carbon as a kind, nothing short of fact relativity will allow the coffee chemists
(or pencil chemists) to ignore the carbon facts related to graphite (or caffeine). This
might be overcome somewhat by employing gerrymandered supervenient kinds—in
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our example they might be ‘coffee carbon’ and ‘pencil carbon’—but then, strictly
speaking, the respective fields are not both interested in the same kind—namely,
carbon—and that will be a problem if the two fields try to interact over their shared
interest.8
The BBSA must be extended with fact relativity if it is to accommodate the
possibility that two fields treat some of the same kinds as basic while differing in
what facts related to those shared kinds are of interest to them. That is a big
if, but it will become central to the issue of accommodating interfield interactions
in Section 3.3. And, as will be seen in Section 3.4’s discussion of distinguishing
between fundamental and special science laws, this is not the only reason to admit
fact relativity. With all that being said, let us extend the BBSA into the Kind and
Fact Relative Analysis (KFRA).
In the BBSA, there is the set of all kinds K and its subsets Ki. A best system
competition is run for every Ki, and all competing systems in the Ki competition are
expressed with the kinds of Ki as the basic kinds. A regularity is a law (according to
the BBSA) relative to Ki if it appears in the best system of the Ki competition. The
KFRA adds to this the set of all facts F (that are expressible when the available
kinds are the whole of K) and its subsets Fj. A best system competition is run
for every (Ki, Fj), where Fj provides the set of facts to be systematized and Ki is
the set of kinds treated as basic in the language in which all facts and competing
systems are expressed. For every such competition the best system provides the
8 This issue of gerrymandered kinds will come get a fuller treatment in Section 3.3.3, where the
concern is specifically with interfield interactions.
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(Ki, Fj)-relative laws Ri,j.
The KFRA allows for egalitarian special science laws in a manner structurally
the same as in the BBSA. If the interests of a field are captured by what kinds are
treated as basic and what facts are intended to be systematized by the field, then
the laws of the field are the laws that are relative to the kinds treated as basic and
the facts intended to be systematized by the field. If biologists are interested in the
kinds Kbio and systematizing the facts Fbio, then the (Kbio, Fbio)-relative laws
Rbio,bio are the laws of biology. If ecologists are are interested in kinds Keco and
systematizing the facts Feco, the laws Reco,eco are the laws of ecology. And so on.
The special science laws of the BBSA are all a special case of the KFRA where
the set of facts to be systematized is always the set of all facts F . Insofar as we were
happy with the treatment of special science laws by the BBSA, we may assume by
default that the fact set of interest is F . Thus, laws of biology are the (Kbio,F)-
relative laws Rbio,F , the laws of ecology are the (Keco,F)-relative laws Reco,F , etc.
What the KFRA allows for beyond the BBSA is the possibility that the law-directed
interests of biology, ecology, or any other field, involve being interested in only some
proper subset of all the matters of fact.
3.3 Interfield Interactions
Interfield interactions, as a group and individually, are an important test case
for the BBSA (and, by extension, the KFRA). The egalitarianism of Callender
and Cohen should require that laws resulting from interfield interactions be located
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somewhere with the same status as the laws of any one field.
Darden and Maull nicely describe interfield interactions as occurring when
fields share an interest in explaining different aspects of the same phe-
nomenon, and when questions arise about that phenomenon within a
field which cannot be answered with the techniques and concepts of that
field.
[Darden and Maull, 1977, p. 50]
The existence of such interfield interactions blurs the boundaries between fields.
With blurred boundaries come unclear interests, and with that comes unclear laws.
Something should be said to clear things up.
Callender and Cohen write:
Why do the rabbits fall down rather than up? Why do the rabbits’
speeds attain a maximum value where they do? These are questions
with answers in physics and physiology, but (we assume) no answer in
the Best System crafted from ecological kinds.
[Callender and Cohen, 2010, p. 444]
These questions are assumed to have no answer in the ecological laws because the
kinds relevant to their explanantia are not ecological kinds, but rather physical and
physiological kinds. But then we should also not assume that these questions have
answers in physics and physiology, because the kinds relevant to their explananda
(e.g., rabbits) are not physical or physiological kinds. However, these questions
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must have answers somewhere. Some field must be interested in the relevant kinds
of physics, physiology, and ecology. The field may be one of those just named, or
it may be an entirely new field that arises exclusively for capturing the particular
interfield interaction. Either way, interfield interactions (and their resultant laws)
should be accommodated by views like the BBSA and KFRA on account of their
egalitarianism. I will refer to this call for accommodation as the interfield interaction
desideratum.
Going forward in this section, I begin by offering a concrete case of interfield
interaction from [Barlow, 1952] that involves blurring the boundaries between biol-
ogy and physics on account of how the behavior of photons influences the structure
of insect eyes. Following that, I argue against the ability of the BBSA to make
sense of Barlow’s work. My argument, in brief, will be this: The best system of
physics, especially the relevant fragment of it concerned exclusively with just some
of the behavior of photons, is very strong and simple compared to the best system
of biology. The consequence of this is that when the BBSA tries to locate a field
for Barlow’s work that has interests in both physics and biology, systems containing
the physical laws will tend to outcompete systems containing the biological laws,
and the “best” system will fail to include all the laws relevant to the interfield in-
teraction. The KFRA, considered following the BBSA, need not suffer from such
an outcompeting problem. Biology, if that is where Barlow’s work is to be located,
surely is interested in photons as a kind, but it is interested in only a small subset of
photon related facts. The strength that comes with the relevant physical laws can be
greatly reduced by disregarding, by way of the KFRA’s fact relativity, the physical
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facts that are irrelevant to Barlow’s work. In this way the KFRA can succeed at
making sense of interfield interactions when the BBSA fails.
3.3.1 Barlow, Between Biology and Physics
[Barlow, 1952], “The Size of Ommatidia in Apposition Eyes”, published in
The Journal of Experimental Biology, begins not so much with biology as physics:
Think of an insect’s compound eye as a simple sphere of lenses each in front of a
single photoreceptor.9 The more lenses (and associated photoreceptors) there are,
the higher the resolution of the image that may be generated. The smaller the lenses
are, the blurrier the image becomes as a result of diffraction and as a function of
the wavelength of the incoming light.
For a given sized eye sphere, and photoreceptors sensitive to a particular wave-
length of light, there is a physical limit on the resolution of the image available to
an insect. This is because more lenses increases the resolution, but more lenses also
results in smaller lenses (since the size of the sphere is fixed) and smaller lenses
decreases resolution. Barlow calculated this limit, proceeded to the Cambridge Mu-
seum of Zoology, measured the eye sphere and lens sizes of 27 species of insect in
the collection, and found that those sizes were approximately those that would be
predicted if we supposed that the resolution of insect eyes was at the physical limit.
Barlow’s discussion of actual compound eyes concludes that
9 An ommatidium is a segment of a compound eye including the lens, photoreceptor(s), and
various support structures. Actual ommatidia typically have more than one photoreceptor, but
the number is at least on the order of one, as opposed to vertebrate eyes like our own that can
have millions behind a single lens.
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the way in which ommatidial size and inter-ommatidial angle are ad-
justed in eyes of different sizes suggests strongly that the wave structure
of light is the limiting factor in the design of the compound eye.
[Barlow, 1952, p. 672]
Underwriting this conclusion is what I will call Barlow’s regularity :
in [compound apposition] eyes of different sizes the number of ommatidia
is adjusted so that inter-ommatidial angle is just below the limiting re-
solving power of the ommatidia
[Barlow, 1952, p. 674].
Because it contributes to an explanation of the conclusion of the paper, Barlow’s
regularity deserves the status of a law in the BBSA and KFRA.
Answering the interfield interaction desideratum will require us to say in which
set of laws Barlow’s regularity should be located. Barlow’s regularity might be a
law of physics or a law biology (to focus on the two most salient extant fields).
There is also an important third possibility to consider. Regularities sourced to
interfield interactions may belong to their own field and set of laws, distinct from,
but of course related to, the interacting fields. So, not only could we locate Barlow’s
regularity among the laws of physics or biology, we could also locate it among the
laws of a new field constructed, so to speak, just for Barlow’s work.
Also, it is not just Barlow’s regularity that has to be located in a set of laws.
Barlow’s concluding remark goes beyond the regularity itself and relates “the wave
structure of light” to “the design of the compound eye”. To do justice to Barlow’s
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work will require the locating of a set of laws that contains all of (1) Barlow’s
regularity, (2) the physical laws relevant to “the wave structure of light”, and (3)
the biological laws relevant to “the design of the compound eye”.10 So, if we try
to locate Barlow’s regularity in the laws of physics, we must find some way of
introducing the biological laws of (3) into the laws of physics. If we try to locate
Barlow’s regularity in the laws of biology, we must introduce the physical laws of
(2) into the laws of biology. And, if we try to locate Barlow’s regularity in some
alternative set of laws, we must ensure that the physical laws of (2) and the biological
laws of (3) can coexist in the alternative set.
Such is the sketch of what the the BBSA and KFRA must do to satisfy the
desideratum of interfield interactions. With that done, we can now discuss in detail
how the BBSA runs into trouble with Barlow’s work and how the KFRA succeeds.
3.3.2 Interfield Interactions and the BBSA
What varies from one set of laws to the next in the BBSA is the set of kinds
that are treated as basic. The laws Rphys are the laws of physics because they are
the laws of the system that is best when all competing systems are expressed using
the language with basic kinds Kphys, and the kinds Kphys are the kinds treated as
10 As I will use the terms, being a physical (or biological) law (or kind, or fact, or what have
you) is to be a law (kind, fact, etc.) that is typically a law of physics (or of biology). (I do not want
to be saying anything about what it means to be “physical” in any broader sense.) A law (kind,
fact, etc.) is a law (...) “of physics” (or “of biology”) just in case it is actually among the laws of
the best system determined relative to kinds (and facts) of interest to physics (or biology) So, if
Barlow’s regularity is located in physics, then it will be a law of physics, but it is not a physical
law, since it is not a law that we typically think of as appearing among the laws of physics. If
the relevant biological laws are also located in the laws of physics, then those laws may be called
biological laws and laws of physics, since they are typically found in the laws of biology, but here
they are found in the laws of physics.
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basic by the field of physics. The laws Rbio and kinds Kbio of biology are similarly
related. Locating Barlow’s regularity for the BBSA will be a matter of finding one
set of kinds with the relevant physical kinds and the relevant biological kinds. And
that set of kinds must yield a set of laws that includes Barlow’s regularity, the
relevant physical laws, and the relevant biological laws.
There are three sets of kinds that are likely to do the work we need. The
kinds of physics might be expanded to include the needed biological kinds, like
‘ommatidia’. The kinds of biology might be expanded to include the needed physical
kinds, like ‘photons’. And there could be a third set of kinds that includes what is
needed, and nothing more, from both the biological and physical kinds.
Consider expanding the kinds of biology first. There are the biological kinds
Kbio. And there is the system Sbio that has as its axioms and theorems exactly the
biological laws. According to the BBSA, it should be that Sbio is the best system
relative to Kbio.
11 Assume that the only needed physical kind is ‘photon’, or kp.
Now consider the candidate systems when the kinds are Kbio ∪ {kp}. We do not
want Sbio to persist as the best system, since then the laws of biology would not
include Barlow’s regularity or the needed physical laws. And we should not expect
Sbio to persist as the best system.
I take it to be a commonsensical feature of strength that (roughly), other
things being equal between systems S1 and S2, if S2 is silent on more facts than S1,
11 Note that the subscript to a system refers to what is being successfully systematized, and need
not match, in general, the subscript on the relevant kinds. In the competition to determine the
best system relative to the kinds Kbio, Sbio is a candidate system (as well as the best). Another
candidate system might be named Sbio+X, which is a system that has all the biological laws,
plus the laws of X. If Sbio was not defined in a way that guarantees its victory, then it would be
reasonable to consider the possibility of Sbio+X being the best system relative to Kbio,
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S1 is stronger than S2. In the typical biology situation with just the basic kinds
Kbio, every system was forced to be silent on the photon related matters of fact,
and so any weakness resulting from that silence was irrelevant. But now, with kp
included in the set of basic kinds, not all systems must be silent on the photon facts.
A newly available system, Sbio+p, which covers all the facts that Sbio does plus the
photon facts, will be much stronger than Sbio (since there are a lot of photon facts).
Sbio+p should only be slightly less simple than Sbio, since, relative to the overall
complexity of biology, the complexity required to cover the photon facts should be
small.
Regarding this comparison of simplicity: I take it to be a commonsensical
feature of simplicity that (roughly), other things being equal between systems S1
and S2, if S1 requires employing fewer basic kinds than S2, then S1 is simpler than
S2. Sbio+p requires one basic kind more than Sbio, and that would be, considering
the many kinds presumably in Kbio, a pretty minimal loss of simplicity when all else
is equal. But surely not all other things are equal between Sbio and Sbio+p, so that
feature of simplicity only gets us so far. What I really have in mind when suggesting
that “relative to the overall complexity of biology, the complexity required to cover
the photon facts should be small” is something like the contrast between Maxwell’s
equations and the enormous map being developed, as in [Thiele et al., 2013], just
to cover the small slice of biology that is human metabolism.12
12 Someone might object on the grounds that the simplicity of Maxwell’s equations is an illusion
because, as Cartwright puts it, “a multitude of highly complicated unknown laws must be assumed
to save Maxwell” when applying the theory [Cartwright, 1999, p. 155]. I am not worried about
this is because, roughly speaking, Cartwright’s objection depends on trying to apply Maxwell’s
equations in many circumstances. If someone thinks that Maxwell’s equations may be applied to
any non-physics kinds (like the radiometers in Cartwright’s example), then I am inclined to join
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Now, we might assume that Sbio+p is the system we need, in that it yields as
laws the needed biological laws, the needed physical laws, and Barlow’s regularity.
But, even if that is true, the difficulty is we should not expect Sbio+p to be the
best system. Consider another system, Sp, that covers only the photon facts, and
none of the biological kind related matters of fact. Certainly this system will be
very simple compared to Sbio+p. And Sp should not be that much weaker than
Sbio+p, for, even though Sp doesn’t cover any of the biological facts, there are a
lot more photon facts than there are biological facts. Both Sbio+p and Sp are a lot
stronger than Sbio, but while Sbio+p is a bit less simple, Sp is a lot simpler. On
balance, it seems likely that Sp will be the better system relative to the set of kinds
Kbio ∪ {kp}.
One might object, or at least worry, about my claim that “there are a lot more
photon facts than there are biological facts”. I assuage the worried first: The stars in
the observable universe release on the order 1067 photons per second.13 In contrast,
there are about 1037 basepairs of DNA on Earth [Landenmark et al., 2015]. For
the number of biological facts to get close to the number of facts related to photons
originating from stars, there would need to be (assuming the DNA base-pair count
is the high end for numbers of facts concerned with any particular biological kind)
Cartwright and think that the relevant (best) system will have to be a lot more complicated than
the inclusion of Maxwell’s equations would appear to make it at first glance. However, in the BBSA
(and KFRA), relativizing means that the complex baggage that comes with Maxwell’s equations
is limited by the kinds (and facts) to which a best system competition is relative. Barlow doesn’t
employ “a multitude of highly complicated unknown laws” when applying what physics he does
to biology, which suggests that such a multitude is not required in this case.
13 The Sun has an energy output of approximately 4 × 1026 J/s, and photons in the visible
spectrum (which is most of what is released by the sun) have an energy of approximately 4×10−19
J. So, roughly, the Sun releases 1045 photons per second. The number of stars estimated to be in
the observable universe is on the order of 1022. Assuming the Sun is an average star, that makes
for 1045 × 1022 = 1067 photons per second from all the stars in the observable universe.
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1030 biological kinds each with a number of associated facts comparable to the count
of base pairs of DNA on Earth. For example, base pairs of RNA might fit the bill,
but that is just one kind of the one thousand billion billion billion that are needed.
While there are surely a lot biological facts, there are a lot more photon facts.
Now one might object, and justifiably so, that this is only one way of individ-
uating the relevant facts, and other ways—especially if they don’t involve counting
individual photons—will not result in there being vastly more photon facts than
biological facts. It’s absolutely right that there are other ways of individuating the
relevant facts, and surely among those are ones that attribute more facts to biology
than photons. But I do not think those ways of individuating will comport with
scientific practice. Our understanding of photon diffraction through a slit (which
is central to the physics relevant Barlow’s work) involves measuring the trajectory
deviations of individual photons. And, more on the side of the relevant biology, eyes
are actually sensitive to individual photons [Rieke and Baylor, 1998]. There may
be ways of individuating the facts that are problematic for my argument, but the
burden is on the objector to identify one and argue that it better matches how the
facts are individuated in practice.
To summarize: The introduction of the needed physical kinds into the set
of biological kinds leads, because of their preponderance and relative simplicity,
to the physical kinds and laws outcompeting the biological kinds and laws. The
result will be a set of laws for biology that do not at all resemble the biological
laws. Of particular significance, the needed biological laws will not appear in the
laws of biology. Nor should we expect Barlow’s regularity to appear in the laws of
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biology. Because of this outcompeting, the BBSA cannot accommodate the interfield
interaction exemplified by Barlow’s work by introducing the relevant physical kinds
into the kinds of biology.
The same problems arise for the BBSA if it tries to accommodate Barlow’s
work by introducing biological kinds into physics or by collecting all the relevant
kinds into a new field. In the latter case the problem is exactly the same as when
introducing physical kinds into biology, but with just the needed biological kinds
being weighed against the needed physical kinds. With even fewer biological kinds
being considered, the physical kinds (and related facts and laws) are even more
likely to outcompete their biological counterparts. In the former case, the biological
kinds will never get a foothold in the best system relative to the now-expanded set
of physics kinds, since the gains in strength will be small compared to the losses in
simplicity.
Ommatidia are rare and complicated, and while that shouldn’t undermine our
interest in them, it does undermine their relevance when our interests also include
every photon in the world.
3.3.3 Interfield Interactions and the KFRA
Let us consider again how we might include Barlow’s work in the laws of
biology, but this time with the KFRA as our view of laws.
Photons as a kind are undoubtedly of interest to biologists; beyond their role
in Barlow’s work, they are relevant to the study of vision more generally, photosyn-
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thesis, bioluminescence, camouflage, color-ation, and more. With the all-or-nothing
fact relativity provided by kind relativity, every photon related fact is the concern
of biology, whether it is related to anything remotely biological or not. But not all
photon facts are of interest to biologists. The photon facts of interest to biologists
are the ones that are near to biological facts. Biologists will care to systematize the
facts related to photons that interact with eyes, leaves, skin, and scales. But the
vast majority of photon related facts—whose relevant photons never interact with
anything biological, or which might only be of interest to biology for their role in
higher level processes like heat exchange—are ones biologists will want to ignore.
The KFRA, because it allows for there to be laws relativized to any subset
of the facts of the world, can exploit biology’s particular interests in facts. In the
typical biology situation, the laws of biology Rbio,bio are those taken from the best
system relative to the biological facts Fbio and biological kinds Kbio. As was tried
with the BBSA, the KFRA can add the relevant physics kinds—i.e., photons, kp—
to the set of kinds of biology. Doing that, the laws of biology are the laws relative
to (Kbio ∪ {kp}, Fbio). If we assume, as the BBSA does, that Fbio just is the set
of all facts, then the same outcompeting problem will arise for the KFRA as arises
for the BBSA.
But we need not assume that Fbio is the set of all facts. Fbio is supposed to
correspond to just those facts that are of interest to biologists. So exclude from the
set of facts Fbio any physical facts that are irrelevant to biology, while including all
those that are relevant. Since all the relevant physical facts (i.e. the photon facts)
that appear among the facts of biology will be associated with some biological fact(s),
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the strength gained by a system for covering the included photon facts should not
be enormous relative to the strength gains associated with covering the biological
facts. The system Sp, which covers all the photon facts and none of the biological
facts, was problematic for the BBSA because it was overwhelmingly strong and
simple. On the KFRA, since the set of facts being systematized includes only the
biologically relevant photon facts, Sp’s covering “all” the photons facts just means
that it covers all the biologically relevant photon facts, which are, presumably, not
large in number compared to all the biological facts. The result is that Sp does
not benefit from overwhelming strength, and so it is unlikely to be the best system
of biology. Without Sp to outcompete it, the way is clear for Sbio+p, the system
assumed to satisfy all the requirements of accommodating Barlow’s work, to be the
best system of biology according to the KFRA.
If anything, the risk of outcompeting runs the other way for the KFRA com-
pared to the BBSA. Relative to the biological facts, there might not be enough
included photon facts to make the gains in strength worth the losses in simplicity
for a system that includes the needed physical laws and Barlow’s regularity. In
the face of such a worry, looking to a third field (not biology and not physics), the
interests of which include only the biological and physical facts relevant to Barlow’s
work, seems like an attractive option. In this third field, the strength to be gained
for a system by including the needed physical laws that cover the physical facts will
be more in balance with the strength to be gained from including the biological
laws that cover the biological facts. And the relative strength gains of including
Barlow’s regularity in a system go up because the regularity covers a higher fraction
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of the facts being systematized. We can thus be more confident then before (when
Barlow’s work was being located in biology) in saying that the KFRA allows for a
set of laws—determined relative to the union of the relevant biological and physical
kinds and facts—that includes Barlow’s regularity and the biological and physical
laws relevant Barlow’s work. Locating Barlow’s work in its own field has the further
benefit of fitting better into the Cartwright-style “dappled world” view by avoiding
unification.
Given what has just been said on behalf of the KFRA, one might be inclined
towards the following defense of the BBSA’s ability to accommodate Barlow’s work
and interfield interactions in general. The problems with the all-or-nothing sort of
fact relativity provided by kind relativity can be eliminated by moving to gerry-
mandered kinds. For example, consider the kind bio-photon that is associated with
just the photon facts that are biologically interesting. If the set of basic kinds for
biology, or the particular Barlow field, includes bio-photon (instead of photon), then
there isn’t the glut of photon facts that made Sp overwhelmingly strong, and the
BBSA will succeed at accommodating Barlow’s work as well as the KFRA. This
may be correct, strictly speaking, but I will insist that Barlow and biologists are not
interested in bio-photons. Barlow and biologists are interested (at least in part) in
the same kinds as physicists, and that shared interest is essential to Barlow’s work
being an example of interfield interaction. Furthermore, if it is bio-photon that is
taken as the basic kind, then there will be no physical laws, which refer to photons,
to be had in the laws of biology or the Barlow field, but only mimics that refer to
bio-photons. So, while the BBSA may exploit gerrymandered kinds to accomplish
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something like the fine-grained fact relativity of the KFRA, it can do so only at the
cost of breaking the points of shared interest (i.e. the kinds and laws) that make
interfield interactions truly interfield.
3.4 Fundamental Laws
A distinctive feature of the BBSA’s (and by extension the KFRA’s) accommo-
dation of special science laws is that it is egalitarian; it confers equal metaphysical
status upon the laws of all fields. But being egalitarian does not require abolishing
worthwhile distinctions. For example, while Callender and Cohen are “ontological
egalitarians” about kinds, they must retain a distinction between the fundamental
and supervenient kinds. The egalitarianism comes from that fact that, while the
fundamental and supervenient kinds may be distinguishable, the fundamental kinds
(or any other set of kinds) are not treated as having any status over that of any
other set of kinds.
A similar sentiment may be directed towards laws. There are the fundamen-
tal laws and the special science laws, and while they may be distinguishable, the
fundamental laws should not be treated as having any privileged status. One might
wonder why, if fundamental laws are not to be treated as having any special sta-
tus, we should bother to even furnish some laws with the title “fundamental”. The
reason to do so is because such a distinction is present in scientific practice.
Part of what motivates the development of an analysis of laws of nature is
the desire for a better understanding of scientific practice. As discussed in the
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preceding chapters, this is especially true among proponents of the BSA (and its
variants) who—despite regular admonishment for having a view of laws that is too
beholden to the peculiarities of actual human science (as in: [Armstrong, 1983,van
Fraassen, 1989, Carroll, 1990])—celebrate each opportunity to have their view par-
allel actual human science (as in: [Lewis, 1983,Loewer, 2007,Cohen and Callender,
2009]). There clearly are scientists looking for fundamental laws (e.g., in their own
ways: [Anderson, 1972, Weinberg, 1992]). Even a staunch anti-fundamentalist like
Cartwright recognizes that “there is a tendency to think that all facts must belong
to one grand scheme” [Cartwright, 1999, p. 25]. The existence of such a tendency,
and a desire to parallel scientific practice, should be enough to make any proponent
of the BSA (or its variants) interested in distinguishing fundamental laws from spe-
cial science laws. To that end I propose a desideratum for an egalitarian distinction
between fundamental and special science laws: No more or less respect should be
paid to either fundamental or special science laws, but respect should be paid to
their being distinct.
To illustrate the challenge that this poses, recall that part of the egalitarianism
of the BBSA was that no set of laws depends for its existence on the existence of
any other laws. The standard way to violate this requirement is to have special
science laws be derivative of fundamental laws. It is easy to avoid this if there
simply are no laws marked as fundamental for other laws to depend upon. But as
soon as one makes the distinction between fundamental and special science laws, it
is compelling to think that the fundamental laws are somehow more important, be
that metaphysically, or in the practice of science, or both. Maybe that presumed
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importance has to do with the existential dependence already mentioned. Maybe it’s
that an explanation that appeals to fundamental laws is better than one that appeals
to non-fundamental laws. Or maybe fundamental laws are more important when it
comes to thinking about scientific realism. I say that we should pay equal respect
to fundamental and special science laws primarily in the sense that we should resist
the compulsion to equate the fundamentality of some laws with their importance. In
some contexts it may turn out that the fundamental laws are more important than
special science laws—and vice versa in other contexts—but that inequality should
be a consequence of considerations that go beyond our analysis of laws.
For both the BBSA and KFRA, we may approach the fundamental laws as
we do the laws of any field. Just as the laws of biology are the laws determined
relative to the interest of biologists, the fundamental laws are the laws relative to the
interests of those scientists seeking fundamental laws. It is this similar treatment
that contributes to the distinction being egalitarian.
The challenge for the BBSA is to identify the set of kinds of interest to fun-
damental science. Similarly, for the KFRA, it will be a matter of identifying the
set of kinds and the set of facts of interest to fundamental science. I argue below
(in Section 3.4.1) that the defining interest of fundamental science is an interest in
systematizing all facts, while special sciences are interested in a proper subset of
the facts. This is apparent from the literature on ceteris paribus laws, as well as
from the often self-described aim of fundamental physicists being a “theory of ev-
erything”. The BBSA, without fact relativity, cannot capture this critical difference
in interests between fundamental and special sciences. But kind relativity is still an
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issue for the KFRA, and so I consider (in Section 3.4.2) a couple of strategies for
picking out the set of kinds to which the fundamental laws are relative.
3.4.1 Fundamental Laws and Fact Relativity
The standard characterization of the distinction between fundamental and spe-
cial science laws is this: Fundamental laws are universal, exceptionless, regularities.
Special science laws are non-universal, exception-having, regularities, characterized
by ceteris paribus (“all else being equal”, “CP” for short) clauses. That special
science laws are so characterized is on display in a recent special issue of Erkenntnis
on CP laws. It is noted in the introduction to that issue that
there seems to be broad agreement that the special sciences include non-
universal generalizations ... The main motivation for accounts of CP
laws seems to lie in the fact that these accounts should also be plausible
for special science laws.
In fact, all authors of the special issue take this motivation as their
starting point for CP laws.
[Reutlinger and Unterhuber, 2014, p. 1708]
While the connection between special science and CP laws is generally agreed
upon, the connection between fundamental and exceptionless laws is more con-
tentious. Led by [Cartwright, 1983], a number of authors have argued that fun-
damental laws do, in fact, have exceptions.14 But such exceptions need not infect
14 See also: [Cartwright, 2002,Pemberton and Cartwright, 2014,Hüttemann, 2014].
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the interests of fundamental science. A common line in contemporary fundamen-
tal physics is that the goal is to find “the theory of everything”, a phrase that
first appears in [Ellis, 1986]. And, as noted earlier, even Cartwright recognizes
the fundamentalist’s “tendency to think that all facts must belong to one grand
scheme” [Cartwright, 1999, p. 25]. Whether or not the fundamental laws actually
are exceptionless may be set aside here. For our purposes it is enough if, insofar as
there are scientists looking for fundamental laws, they are looking for a theory of ev-
erything. Cartwright can be right that the fundamentalist idea of a “grand scheme”
is a bad one. There may be very good reasons for being more interested in the non-
fundamental areas of science than in fundamental science. But fundamental science
is still a part of science, and Cartwright’s characterization of the fundamentalist idea
fits well with a “theory of everything” view of the interests of fundamental science.
This attitude towards the fundamental laws (not Cartwright’s, but the openness to
Cartwright’s) is part and parcel of the distinction between fundamental and special
science laws being egalitarian. The fundamental laws do not have any special status;
they are simply the laws of the system that is best relative to the interests of those
scientists seeking fundamental laws.
So, as far as fact relativity is concerned, the distinction between fundamental
and special science laws is clear. The fundamental laws are those that attempt,
or are intended by their seekers, to be exceptionless. Special science laws are not
exceptionless, do not attempt to be, and are not intended to be by their seekers. To
be more precise for the KFRA: The laws of a system are fundamental only if that
system is the best system relative to the set of all facts F . The laws of a system are
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special science laws if that system is best relative to some F ⊂ F . The question of
to which set of kinds the fundamental laws are relative will be considered later in
this section.
The objection (from Cartwright and others, noted above) to the exception-
lessness of fundamental laws already has a response in the literature on the BSA,
and it seems worthwhile to sketch how what I have just said relates to that work.
Several authors [Braddon-Mitchell, 2001,Schrenk, 2008,Schrenk, 2014,Unterhuber,
2014] argue for various ways that laws (possibly fundamental) with exceptions may
appear in the BSA (or its variants) when the introduction of such laws comes with
gains in simplicity greater than the assured losses in strength. Such exceptions—call
them simple system exceptions—are different from the sort of exceptions on offer by
the fact relativity of the KFRA—call them fact relative exceptions. This difference
is clear from the fact that simple system exceptions are available to any variant of
the BSA, while fact relative exceptions require fact relativity. If there are excep-
tions in the laws sought by those seeking fundamental laws, they may be captured
in the KFRA by simple system exceptions. But, to reiterate, these exceptions need
not undermine the distinction between fundamental—as exceptionless—and special
science—as exception-having—laws, because the fundamental laws are still the laws
of the best system relative to all facts—without exception!—and special science laws
are those relative to only some proper subset of the facts.
The relationship between fact relative laws and CP laws likely warrants atten-
tion beyond what may be provided here. For the moment it is enough that the all
facts strategy is satisfactory as a way to capture an egalitarian distinction between
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fundamental and special science laws with respect to fact relativity. With that in
hand, we may turn to considering how to make the distinction with respect to kind
relativity.
3.4.2 Fundamental Laws and Kind Relativity
If the above is correct—that the defining interest of fundamental science is
an interest in systematizing all facts—then the BBSA cannot properly distinguish
fundamental from special science laws because (according to the BBSA) every law set
is determined relative to the set of all facts. But we must still consider kind relativity
since it is a part of the relativity of the KFRA. At this point for the KFRA we have
it that the laws are special science laws at least if they are (K,F )-relative laws for
any K and any F ⊂ F . This leaves as candidates for the fundamental laws the laws
of systems that are best relative to (K,F) for any K. These are precisely the laws
of the BBSA. Answering completely the egalitarian distinguishing desideratum for
the KFRA involves providing an answer to the desideratum on behalf of the BBSA
(imperfect though it may be compared to the full answer given by the KFRA).
So, how might the BBSA, and the kind-relative part of the KFRA, distinguish
between the kinds of fundamental science and the kinds of the special sciences? Of
course, there are at least as many ways to pick out a set of kinds for the fundamental
laws as there are sets of kinds. But two strategies in particular seem salient.
The first is to follow the BBSA’s treatment of other fields to the letter. Let
the fundamental laws be the laws of the system that is best relative to the kinds
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that are treated as basic in actual fundamental science practice. A consequence of
this strategy is that the fundamental laws become unstable. The kinds treated as
basic in fundamental science one hundred years ago are different from those treated
as basic now, and so the fundamental laws of nature (being identified with the laws
relative to the kinds treated as basic by fundamental science) must have changed
over the past hundred years. This change would be fine if we were talking about laws
as determined directly by a scientific field. Of course the laws of fundamental science
as a field15 have changed. But no one engaged in fundamental science would—and
in the interest of paralleling scientific practice, no philosopher should—think that
the fundamental laws themselves have changed.
The second salient strategy is to follow [Lewis, 1983] and privilege the true fun-
damental kinds. This suffers from the issue that, just like the laws of [Lewis, 1983],
the fundamental laws are made potentially epistemically inaccessible.16 Compared
to the strategy of making the fundamental laws relative to the kinds treated as basic
by fundamental science, I am inclined to go this Lewisian route of privileging the
true fundamental kinds, and bite the bullet with regards to concerns about inac-
cessibility. I suspect that it better parallels the attitude towards fundamental laws
in scientific practice to prioritize (1) constancy in the fundamental laws and the
potentially unsuccessful search for the true fundamental kinds, over (2) inconstancy
15 It might be more natural here to say “physics as a field”, but I want to avoid conflating
physics and fundamental science. Certainly it is the case that fundamental science is carried out
predominantly under the auspices of physics, but it is just as certain that lots of physics is explicitly
not fundamental.
16 For details on this issue, see where it is first raised in Chapter 3 of [van Fraassen, 1989]. It
is also worth mentioning that this is precisely the issue that motivates the epistemic accessibility
desideratum of [Cohen and Callender, 2009] that is mentioned in footnote 6 of this chapter.
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in the fundamental laws and a guarantee of epistemic accessibility.
In the next chapter I will argue that we can and should do without language
relativity. In its place I put a combination of fact relativity—to deal with accommo-
dating special science laws as discussed in this chapter—and any needed competition
relativity—to deal with the issues surrounding language privileging/relativity dis-
cussed in the next chapter. If no competition relativity is needed, then it will be
enough to distinguish fundamental and special science laws on the basis of fact
relativity as discussed earlier. If competition relativity is needed, then we will be
faced with answering the new question of which competition function (comprised
of measures of simplicity, strength, their balance, etc.) are the ones that yield the
fundamental laws and which yield special science laws. Either way, the current ques-
tion of how to distinguish the fundamental from special science kinds will not need
to be answered. It will not, however, be entirely uninteresting. As will be seen,
using a particular competition function is tantamount to privileging a particular
class of languages. If distinguishing between fundamental and special science laws
with regards to competition relativity is needed, it may be best understood in terms
of what kinds/languages different fields are willing to entertain.
3.5 Summary
The BBSA of [Cohen and Callender, 2009] makes a dramatic change to Lewis’
BSA by allowing for a plurality of law sets each relative to the set of kinds treated
as basic in the respective best system competitions. The egalitarian special science
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laws of the BBSA depend, because of the BBSA’s kind relativity, on the law-directed
interests that distinguish different fields of science being captured by what kinds are
treated as basic in the various fields. But the interests (in general) of fields go beyond
what kinds are treated as basic. In particular, some fields may be interested in only
a subset of the facts that are available for study. Accommodating such interests in
a BSA-style view of laws may be done by relativizing laws to subsets of the facts
of the world. While the kind relativity of the BBSA offers a certain degree of fact
relativity on its own, it cannot unproblematically relativize laws to facts with great
precision.
I introduced (in Section 3.2) the KFRA, which extends the BBSA with fact
relativity. With both kind and fact relativity at its disposal, the KFRA can do the
same good work as the BBSA and more beyond that. It was proposed (in Section
3.3) that views like the BBSA and KFRA should be able to make sense of interfield
interactions. In an example of an interfield interaction between physics and biology
concerning insect vision, it was found that the fact relativity of the KFRA was
needed to avoid having laws of common and simple kinds outcompeting the laws
of comparatively rare and complex kinds. Another desideratum was developed (in
Section 3.4) according to which an egalitarian distinction between fundamental and
special science laws should be available. Fact relativity is required to capture the
standard picture of the fundamental laws as being exceptionless parts of a theory of
everything. There does not seem to be a similarly strong strategy for satisfying the
desideratum with respect to kind relativity. Because both the BBSA and KFRA
feature kind relativity, neither satisfies the desideratum without issue, but the KFRA
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benefits from the strength of the distinguishing allowed by fact relativity. Overall,
if one is inclined towards a relative laws view like the BBSA, it seems like it would





Chapter 4: Language Privileging
In the tension between the BSA’s relativity and objectivity, language privileg-
ing seems like it would be a good thing. Shouldn’t having one privileged language
for all competing systems reduce the need for relativity? In principle, perhaps. In
practice, not so much. If we are really only going to privilege one language, then
we are faced with a challenge of saying which language gets privileged. As will be
seen, that challenge has not been met without taking on other substantial burdens.
The challenge may be avoided, as in the BBSA, with the introduction of language
relativity into the laws. There is language privileging in the BBSA, since, in any
given best systems competition, a single privileged language is being used to express
all competing systems. But the challenge of saying which language gets privileged
is avoided because every language is privileged in its own language relativized com-
petition.
There is a non-privileging and non-relativizing way of dealing with language
in the BSA: Let system-language pairs compete in the same competition without
restriction on the choice of language. This is, more or less, the default assumption
about how the BSA works. But it is not how any developed version of the BSA
works. Language privileging is ubiquitous, appearing in various forms in the BSA
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of [Lewis, 1983], the PDA of [Loewer, 2007], and the BBSA of [Cohen and Callender,
2009].1
Why do all of these authors adopt language privileging? The main reason is
what I have called “Trivial Systems Problem” (TSP), according to which, in brief,
allowing for suitably gerrymandered languages can guarantee that the “best” system
will have axioms and theorems undeserving of the name “law”. Language privileg-
ing provides a quick fix to the TSP as long as the privileged language is not of the
sort that gives rise to the TSP. Another reason for adopting language privileging is
suggested by [Cohen and Callender, 2009]. Their “Problem of Immanent Compar-
isons” (PIC) is concerned with there being only “immanent” measures for simplicity,
strength, and their balance—that is, measures defined for only one language. With
language privileging, no two systems ever need to be compared when expressed in
different languages, and so using only immanent measures is not an issue.
Relieving the tension that is the focus of this dissertation has been made a
matter of properly tuning the four parts of the BSA to strike the right balance
between the relativity needed to accommodate scientific practice and limits to that
relativity to respect the metaphysical objectivity the view is supposed to possess.
It is light of that aim to limit relativity that the overarching project of this chapter
is to argue against the use of language relativity in the BSA. The TSP, it will
be seen, can be solved without relying on language privileging. And the PIC is
undermined by the existence of measures that, while still language sensitive, are non-
1 As noted in previous chapters, the BBSA was introduced independently in [Schrenk, 2008]
and [Cohen and Callender, 2009]. I will focus on the version of the BBSA appearing in [Cohen
and Callender, 2009], since it is there that the problems discussed in this chapter receive the most
attention.
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immanent. The TSP and PIC are both reminiscent of, but not quite the same as, the
well known problem of language sensitivity of measures in theory choice, statistical
model selection, evidential favoring relations, prior selection, and so on. That well
known problem does not require us to relativize to single languages, but rather
classes of languages. Single language privileging/relativity also has a disadvantage
in being unable to accommodate the idea that laws and basic kinds/predicates/etc.
are discovered together. Even then, because which class of languages is relevant will
be determined by the measures being used in the best system competition, language
class relativity will prove to be redundant with competition relativity. In the end,
language relativity of either the single or class variety will be unnecessary for the
BSA.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. I begin, in Section 4.1, by laying
out the TSP. I then review the various ways language privileging has been used to
address the TSP by [Lewis, 1983], [Loewer, 2007], [Cohen and Callender, 2009], and
discuss the additional problems that appear because of them, in Sections 4.2, 4.3,
and 4.4, respectively. I mostly conclude the discussion of the TSP in Section 4.5,
where I argue that the TSP can be avoided if we are careful with how we measure
strength. With the TSP largely out of the way, I move on to the PIC in Section 4.6.
There I review the PIC’s introduction by [Cohen and Callender, 2009] and argue
that the problem is weaker than its initial presentation suggests, and that it only
requires us to privilege and relativize to classes of languages as opposed to single
languages. I conclude in Section 4.7 by arguing for the adoption of language-class
privileging over single language privileging, and then showing how language-class
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privileging will be redundant with however much competition relativity is required
for the BSA.
4.1 The Trivial Systems Problem
Prior to the introduction of the TSP, Lewis’ BSA worked as follows. There
are all the deductive systems Si that are true of the world. Some of these are very
strong, and some are very simple. In principle, strength and simplicity trade off.
So, for example, a system that enumerates all the facts of the world is (presumably)
very strong, but it is also (presumably) very complex. A system that only specifies
the location in space and time of a single electron would be very simple, but it is
also very weak. The best system should be one that strikes a balance between these
extremes, with axioms and theorems—which will be named as the laws—yielding
substantial strength without too much loss in simplicity.
The TSP begins with the realization that how simple a system is might vary
depending on the language in which it is expressed. The simple and weak system
mentioned above could be a very complex system if expressed in a language that
does not have ‘electron’ as a basic kind, and instead requires the specification of
numerous properties to pick out an electron as the object of a sentence. This also
works for an incredibly strong system, as Lewis notes:
Given system S, let F be a predicate that applies to all and only things
at worlds where S holds. Take F as primitive, and axiomatize S (or an
equivalent thereof) by the single axiom ∀xFx. If utter simplicity is so
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easily attained, the ideal theory may as well be as strong as possible.
[Lewis, 1983, p. 367]
With such a procedure available to make any system incredibly simple, the
trivial systems problem is this: An analysis of laws should be able to distinguish
between accidental regularities and the lawful regularities. But the theorems of a
maximally strong system will include every regularity that holds in the world, and so
every true regularity will be a law. To avoid this outcome we must find a way to rule
out the possibility of there being such system-language pair. Lewis tells us that “the
remedy, of course, is not to tolerate such a perverse choice of primitive vocabulary”
as F , and so begins the tradition of language privileging in the BSA [Lewis, 1983, p.
367].
4.2 Lewis’ BSA
Lewis’ response to the trivial systems problem is this:
We should ask how candidate systems compare in simplicity when each
is formulated in the simplest eligible way; or, if we count different formu-
lations as different systems, we should dismiss the ineligible ones from
candidacy. An appropriate standard of eligibility is not far to seek: let
the primitive vocabulary that appears in the axioms refer only to per-
fectly natural properties.
[Lewis, 1983, pp. 367–368]
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The problematic predicate F presumably does not correspond to a perfectly natural
property. So, now that no competing system is allowed to be expressed with F , no
competing system will have the trivializing qualities that come with F .2
Problems with Lewis’ solution to the TSP are identified by [van Fraassen,
1989]. These problems, described at length in the remainder of this section, show
how Lewis’ privileging of the ‘perfectly natural properties’ yields laws that are in-
accessible and possibly uninteresting to scientists. Given the commitment of BSA
proponents—myself included—to drawing a connection between the BSA and sci-
entific practice, these problems are decisive against Lewis’ version of language priv-
ileging.
To set up the problems, call the set of possible systematizations of the world
S, the set of languages that those systems may be expressed in L, and C(Si, Lj)
the score the system Si ∈ S receives in the best system competition when it is
evaluated according to its expression in the language Lj ∈ L. The heart of the trivial
systems problem when formulated this way is that there will be law-wise problematic
systems Sbad-i—that is, systems whose associated regularities are undeserving of
the name “law” for some reason (such as failing to distinguish between accidental
and lawful regularities)—for which there exist companion languages Lbad-i that
make C(Sbad-i, Lbad-i) arbitrarily large. Lewis solution, where Lnat ∈ L is the
language of perfectly natural properties, is to evaluate each system according to
2 The possibility remains that F does, in fact, correspond to a perfectly natural property. I
suspect Lewis would say in response to this possibility the same thing he says about the possibility
of very different systems tying as best: “in this unfortunate case there would be no very good
deservers of the name of laws. But what of it? We haven’t the slightest reason to think the case
really arises” [Lewis, 1994, p. 479].
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C(Si, Lnat), rather than allow every system-language pair (Si, Lj) to be entered
into the competition. Let Snat be the best system when all systems are expressed
in the language of perfectly natural properties Lnat.
What van Fraassen asks us to consider is possibility of there being a system-
language pair (Svf, Lvf) such that C(Svf, Lvf) > C(Snat, Lnat). Suppose further
(and just for convenience) that, if there is more than one such system-language
pair satisfying these conditions, (Svf, Lvf) is the best of them. Now, it is certain
that C(Svf, Lnat) is less than C(Snat, Lnat), for otherwise Snat would not be the
Lewisian best system. However, without some outside assurance that Lnat is the
proper language to use when identifying the laws, Svf seems like it may be the
scientifically best system (barring it having any problematic qualities on par with
failing to distinguish between lawful and accidental regularities). The two reasons
for that seeming constitute “van Fraassen’s problems”, so named following [Loewer,
2007] (whose formulations of the problem I loosely follow).
The first of van Fraassen’s problems is concerned with the accessibility of the
laws. Even if scientists are devout Lewisians with access to every matter of fact
in the world, they will never discover the laws as long as they are naive to the
true perfectly natural properties. And we should expect that scientists are naive to
the true perfectly natural properties—the perfectly natural properties aren’t known
prior to the identification of the laws, but rather, as Lewis says, “the laws and
natural properties are discovered together” [Lewis, 1983, p. 368]. That the laws and
properties will go undiscovered is on account of the quality of the pair (Svf, Lvf).
Since C(Svf, Lvf) > C(Snat, Lnat), and C is meant to capture all that may be
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considered in the identification of the laws, there is no basis on which scientists
could ever pick out Lnat over Lvf as the proper language with which to identify the
laws. Lvf, since it is part of the best system-language pair, will be the source of
scientist’s best estimate of the perfectly natural properties, and that best estimate
will be wrong. Even if nature is kind in that there is no pair (Svf, Lvf) better than
the best system as expressed in the language of perfectly natural properties, any
sensibly skeptical scientists will know that they can never be sure about the laws.
The second of van Fraassen’s problems is concerned with how deserving Lewis’
laws are of their title. If (Svf, Lvf) really is the best (unproblematic) system-
language pair, then why is it not the source of the laws? Suppose that scientists
know somehow that Lnat is the language of the perfectly natural properties. Then
there is no issue about the accessibility of the laws. Scientists know that Snat is
the best of the systems when expressed in Lnat. They also know that there is a
simpler and more informative system Svf in the offing if they just abandon Lnat in
favor of Lvf. The only reason to stick with Lnat and Snat in these circumstances
is a question-begging desire to have the laws expressed in the language of perfectly
natural properties. One cannot even appeal to an expectation that laws and natural
properties are discovered together since, by assumption, the natural properties were
identified independently of the laws.
van Fraassen’s problems are strongest when taken together. Take Lewis’ BSA
with its requirement that language of the competing systems be the language of the
perfectly natural properties and the presumption that the perfectly natural proper-
ties are not discoverable independent of the laws. Then the laws are inaccessible—
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since science’s best estimate of the laws will either be wrong or, at best, it will
be unknowable that it is correct—and potentially uninteresting—since there may
be a language other than that of the perfectly natural properties that will yield a
simpler and stronger, by definition better, best system. As van Fraassen puts it:
Lewis’ language privileging “has produced unchartable distances between Lewis’s
best theories—and hence laws—and the theories we could reasonably hope for at
the ideal end of science” [van Fraassen, 1989, p. 55].
4.3 The Package Deal Analysis
The quickest solution to van Fraassen’s problems is to remove the perfectly
natural property language requirement from the the set of systems. But simply re-
moving the requirement reintroduces the trivial systems problem. To compensate,
the BSA must be enriched somewhere else. The strategy pursued by the the “Pack-
age Deal Analysis” (PDA)—so named after its emphasis on evaluating systems and
languages together as a “package deal”—of [Loewer, 2007], is, I think, almost right.
The view focuses on the choice of language for expressing the laws being constrained
by the theoretical virtues that decide which system(-language pair/package) is best;
I will argue for more or less the same thing in Section 4.5. But Loewer is also com-
mitted to language privileging in a way that makes the PDA dependent on subjects
(namely, currently practicing physicists). The PDA and its subjectivity problem are
described below.
The PDA begins by putting constraints on what can count as a candidate
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system in the best system competition. The set of candidate best systems SPDA ⊆
S for a world w is decided by three conditions that must be met by each Si ∈ SPDA:3
1. Si is formulated in L.
2. Si is true of w.
3. (Si, L) is a final theory of w, meaning “(Si, L) is true and best satisfies the
criteria of simplicity, informativeness, comprehensiveness, and whatever other
conditions the scientific tradition places on a final theory for w” [Loewer,
2007, p. 324].
This leaves us with a set of system-language pairs (Si, L). From among those the
best have the greatest value of C(Si, L) and the laws of w come from the best.
The first condition admits of two interpretations. It may simply be a statement
of the fact that there must be some language in which Si is eventually formulated.
In that case no work is done by the first condition to avoid the problem of overly
strong and simple theories. It is the third condition that can then come to the
rescue. In order for (Si, L) to be a final theory, C(Si, L) must be large relative
to other competing pairs, and part of achieving that is meeting “whatever other
conditions the scientific tradition places on a final theory for w”. Loewer writes in
his remarks on the TSP that
from the perspective of the aims of science the obvious trouble with
‘(x)Fx’ is not that ‘Fx’ doesn’t refer to a perfectly natural property but
3 I will follow Loewer’s characterization of a theory as the pair of a system and language it is
expressed in, but while Loewer refers to the system sometimes as a theory, and labels it T , I will
strictly use S to stand for the system and adjust quoted material accordingly for clarity.
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that ‘(x)Fx’ is not a credible scientific theory.
[Loewer, 2007, p. 324]
And so, presumably, the failure of ‘(x)Fx’ to be a credible scientific theory is codified
in the “other conditions” for a final theory.
The second interpretation of “Si is formulated in L” is that it is saying there
is some single privileged language L in which all the considered systems must be
formulated. Loewer appears to be following this interpretation when he writes that
“Lewis’s argument does show that the PDA version of the BSA requires a preferred
language” [Loewer, 2007, p. 325]. And what is that preferred/privileged language?
This is precisely Lewis’ strategy if it is the language of perfectly natural properties
Lnat. But Loewer has a different idea. The privileged language for the PDA must
be the language Lfinal of the final theory because (Si, L) is a final theory by the third
condition and it would fail to be if L was not Lfinal. As to the nature of Lfinal,
we are provided the following working hypothesis: Let Lpresent be the present
language of science. Lfinal is Lpresent or a successor to Lpresent as arrived at by
“the rational development of science” such that “no development of that language
and [the system S employed by science] leads to an increase in the satisfaction of
the scientific virtues” [Loewer, 2007, p. 325].
The first way of interpreting “Si is formulated in L”—as saying simply that
there must be some language L in which Si is expressed—solved the trivial systems
problem by appeal to the scientific credibility, or lack thereof, of theories that have
the negative qualities that come with F . This second interpretation does something
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similar, but instead of appealing to problematic theories, F is ruled out directly as
a predicate that is not employed in the present language of science, and would not
be employed in a successor (particularly, the final) language of science.
The problem with the PDA is that it makes the laws dependent on subjects.
The view features explicit references to things like “the scientific tradition” and “the
present language of science”, and in so doing violates the objectivity of the laws.
Loewer is open about this, writing that “what counts as a final theory depends
on the tradition of fundamental physics”, but adds “I see this as an advantage of
rather than an objection” [Loewer, 2007, p. 325].4 This is an advantage insofar as it
reconnects physics and the laws in a way that answers to van Fraassen’s problems,
but it will be a mark against the PDA if there are any similarly accomplished
competitors that avoid subject dependence.
4.4 The Better Best Systems Analysis
Lewis went too far with the BSA being a metaphysical analysis of laws, priv-
ileged the language of “perfectly natural properties”, and in so doing broke the
connection between the BSA’s metaphysics and the epistemology of the search for
laws in scientific practice. Loewer went too far in the other direction, privileging
the “the present language of science”, and in so doing broke the objectivity of the
4 Loewer has suggested in personal communication that a historical examination of the concept
of laws might reveal that subject independence is not a real desideratum. Such an examination
has yet to be done, but suppose that Loewer is right about what it will reveal. It seems like it
could still be advantageous, if not strictly necessary, for the BSA or its variants to yield subject
independent laws when they are being weighed against competing analyses of laws. The disinterest
of subjects in subject independence will never dissuade those who are already committed to subject
independence. What would be problematic for the purposes of this dissertation is if science is
unequivocally committed to subject dependence, but that strikes me as highly implausible.
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BSA/PDA. In ways that have already been described in the preceding chapters,
the BBSA strikes an elegant balance between the metaphysics and epistemology of
laws. To quickly review:5 The fundamental kinds (the perfectly natural properties,
in Lewis’ parlance) are grouped with all the kinds that supervene on the funda-
mental kinds to make a set K of all kinds. Each subset Ki ⊆ K corresponds to a
language Li whose basic predicates correspond to the kinds of Ki. A best system
competition is run relative to every Ki, with all competing systems expressed in
Li. The victor of each such competition will be the source of the Ki-relative laws.
This gets us objectivity, because there is no explicit reference or dependence on
subjects. And it gets us the connection between the BSA and scientific practice,
because (supposedly) the full breadth of scientific interests (at least as far as the
laws are concerned) may be captured by what variations in what kinds are treated
as basic.
The BBSA, then, seems to avoid the issues that caused trouble for Lewis’ BSA
and the PDA. But does it solve the TSP? Well... not quite. To avoid the subject
dependence that would come from there being laws just and explicitly relative to
the kinds treated as basic by various scientific fields, the BBSA yields laws relative
to every subset of the set of all kinds. Since the trivializing predicate F can be
associated with a supervenient kind, this means that there will be many sets of laws
that suffer from the trivial systems problem as a result of the inclusion of the F kind
among the kinds to which those laws are relative. The response to this concern is
that, since we aren’t interested in F , we’ll never have to worry about being interested
5 See Chapter 3 for the more detailed introduction of the BBSA.
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in the problematic laws that an F -inclusive language yields. “Properties like F and
the ensuing threatened trivialization of [BSA-style views] are ruled out for lack
of interest rather than any intrinsic deficiency” [Cohen and Callender, 2009, p. 23].
But the laws yielded by F are intrinsically deficient—because they fail to distinguish
between lawful and accidental regularities—and they are real laws, of interest or not,
according to the BBSA. I rather like the strategy of appealing to what is of interest
or not, and do not take this near miss of solving the TSP to be a decisive objection
to the BBSA. That said, it is still a deficiency. If another otherwise equal capable
view could avoid it, that other view should be preferred over the BBSA.
The real problem for the BBSA stems from the idea that there is an close
relationship in scientific practice between the discovery of laws and the discovery of
the basic kinds. Lewis claims that language privileging in the BSA
explains [...] why the scientific investigation of laws and of natural prop-
erties is a package deal; why physicists posit natural properties such as
the quark colours in order to posit the laws in which those properties
figure, so that laws and natural properties get discovered together.
[Lewis, 1983, p. 368]
But language privileging does just the opposite. By privileging a language prior
to the best system competition, the discovery of the basic properties/kinds of that
language is divorced from the discovery of the laws. The relationship should be
there, though. From groupings of organisms in biology to classifying particles in
fundamental physics, scientists are constantly reflecting upon and revising their sets
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of basic kinds. And, insofar as these scientists are looking for laws, these revisions
happen in tandem with the identification of the laws; see, for example, the BSA-
friendly analysis in [Schulte, 2008] of (as the paper’s informative title puts it) “the
co-discovery of conservation laws and particle families”. Privileging single languages
prior to running a best system competition prevents this co-discovery feature of laws
and kinds from being captured by the BBSA and any other language privileging
variant of the BSA. The discussion of this issue is extended below in Section 4.7.2.
4.5 Avoiding Trivial Systems
In reassessing the TSP, it is helpful to start with its original setup from Lewis:
Given system S, let F be a predicate that applies to all and only things
at worlds where S holds. Take F as primitive, and axiomatize S (or
an equivalent thereof) by the single axiom ∀xFx. If utter simplicity is
so easily attained, the ideal theory may as well be as strong as possible.
Simplicity and strength needn’t be traded off. Then the ideal theory will
include (its simple axiom will strictly imply) all truths, and a fortiori all
regularities. Then, after all, every regularity will be a law. That must
be wrong.
[Lewis, 1983, p. 367]
The crux of the argument is that ∀xFx is problematic, so it should not be the
best system, but its utter simplicity and strength guarantee that it is the best.
The standard assumption about what makes a system best is that simplicity and
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strength trade off—a simpler system will tend to be weaker, and a stronger system
will tend to be more complex—and the basis of the trivial system problem is a
counter example to this give and take.
All the BSA proponents discussed so far take the trivial systems problem to be
a sort of reductio against the legitimacy of F as a predicate that may be considered
when looking for laws. But there is another standout part of the argument against
which we might apply the reductio, and that is the claim that ∀xFx is utterly simple
and strong.
I will focus here on the purported strength of the trivial system.6 The standard
gloss of strength is that the stronger theory excludes more possibilities (see, for
example: [Woodward, 2013, Loewer, 2012]). In some of Lewis’ more substantial
remarks on the subject, he writes that
the stronger theory may have fewer actual realizations or it may not;
but it must have less risk of multiple realization [...] the stronger theory
must also have more risk of nonrealization.
[Lewis, 1970, p. 434]
The strength of a system, crucially, depends on the space of possible worlds of which
it may (or may not) be true. Roughly, a stronger system is one that has, given a set
of possible worlds, the higher ratio of possible worlds in which it is false to possible
worlds in which it is true. This ratio is surely not all that may be said about
6 A more careful examination of other theoretical virtues might also be able to block the TSP.
For example, in Chapter 5, I show that mutual information will come out to be zero for the trivial
system. When, as in that chapter, mutual information is introduced into the BSA as a measure of
the goodness of the of a system, that score of zero undermines the trivial system’s claim to being
the obvious best.
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strength. For example, it will give us nonsense when there is a countable infinity
or unbounded continuum of possible worlds. But whatever the true measure of
strength is (or measures are, if we want to admit a variety) it should make this
rough characterization true in the appropriate circumstances; namely, when it is
applied to possible worlds that are finite and discrete or bounded continua.7 The
important thing here is getting at what is meant by “less risk of multiple realization”
and “more risk of nonrealization”, which the ratio measure does at least for the the
simple example that is developed below.
To illustrate, consider the space of possible ‘coin flip’ worlds with four flips.
Each such world consists of four ordered positions at which either the property H or
the property T obtains. One of these worlds goes HHHH, another HHHT, HHTH, HHTT,
and so on up to TTTT (as if we were counting from 0 to 15 in binary). Let S2H be
the system that says that two points in the world are H. This is true of six of the
possible sixteen worlds. Let S1H be the system that says that only one point in the
world is H. This system is true in four of the sixteen worlds, and so we might say,
relative to this set of possible worlds, that S1H is stronger than S2H. Now suppose
that there are only four possible worlds, HHTT, TTHH, HTTT, and TTTH. S2H is true in
2 out of the four worlds and S1H is also true in two of the four. So, relative to this
space of possible worlds, the two systems are equally strong. And clearly we could
identify a set of possible worlds in which S2H is stronger.
7 I actually think the true circumstances are likely to be the appropriate circumstances. Science
itself can only attend to bodies of data that are either finite and discrete or bounded continua.
Preserving the connection between the BSA and scientific practice may require being sensitive to
the finitude of that practice and so force the BSA to treat worlds as being either finite and discrete
or bounded continua.
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We can get up to all sorts of mischief by tweaking the space of possible worlds
against which we are measuring strength. This parallels the way that we seem to be
able to mess with measures of simplicity by changing the language used to express
the system. The question then becomes: What determines the space of possible
worlds?
The Lewisian answer is surely to appeal to the true space of possible worlds.
This plays into both Lewis’ realism about possible worlds and his “perfectly natural
properties” response to the trivial systems problem. And, like with privileging the
language of perfectly natural properties, versions of van Fraassen’s problems will
crop up with regards to the privileged space of possible worlds. Scientists do not
have special access to the true space of possible worlds—just as they do not have
special access to the true perfectly natural properties—and so there is a risk that
the laws are epistemically inaccessible and uninteresting.
The PDA and BBSA solution to this problem, following the parallel with
language, is probably to look at the space(s) of possible worlds that is (are) used
in science. This cannot be, though, the space of nomologically possible worlds. If
that’s what we used, then either we are stumped, since this is happening prior to the
identification of the laws, or strength is trivialized if we use the laws of the system
in question, since then every system would be true of exactly all the (nomologically)
possible worlds and have zero strength.
A better set of possible worlds to use is the set of constructed worlds. To
say what the constructed world are, let us follow Lewis’ characterization of the
fundamental nature of the world as a Humean Mosaic (HM). Recall that the HM
130
consists in “the spatiotemporal distribution of local qualities” [Lewis, 1994, p. 473].
If our language contains the predicates for the set of basic kinds K, then a world
is constructed by assigning to each space-time point in it at least one element of
K. Then the constructed (HM-style) worlds correspond to all the ways of assigning
non-empty8 sets of basic kinds to every space-time point.
Let’s revisit the example of the four-flip coin flip worlds. Our language, call
it L4-HT, gives us a four position HM and the properties H and T. The constructed
worlds, then, are the sixteen that were first considered. Befitting the package-
deal aspect of the PDA, and the stated dependence of strength on language choice
in [Cohen and Callender, 2009], the strength of a system depends on the system and
the language in which it is expressed. We thus want to compare the strengths of
the pairs (S2H, L4-HT) and (S1H, L4-HT), and (as was said at first) we will get that
(S1H, L4-HT) is stronger than (S2H, L4-HT) since it is true of a smaller fraction of the
worlds that may be constructed following in L4-HT.
Now we can consider the strength of the trivial system. The system is just
∀xFx. What is the relevant language? In the interest of simplicity, let us require that
we pair systems with “minimal” language(s) that contain no more basic predicates
than the ones required to express the system in that language. I do not mean by
this requirement that every system should be paired with a language that has the
fewest basic predicates. Requiring that would compel us to pair every system with
a language containing a single F -like predicate. Rather, what I intend to prevent
8 It is fair to ask at this point why there can be no part of a constructed world is empty of
any basic kind. I will address that question, and the objection it gives rise to, at the end of this
section.
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is ∀xFx being paired with a language that contains F and some other arbitrary
predicate G. The following, however, is perfectly acceptable: Let Px ∨Qx be true
just in case Fx is true. The system p∀xFxq (with pq denoting that the system
is unpaired with a language) may be expressed as ∀xFx or ∀x(Px ∨ Qx). When
expressed as ∀xFx, it is required that the expressing language have F as its only
predicate. But the system p∀xFxq can also be expressed as ∀x(Px ∨Qx). In that
case, the expressing language should have P and Q as its only predicates.
For ∀xFx, the minimal languages will be ones that have F as their only
predicate—any language that lacks even that will make the system inexpressible. If
F is the only predicate in our language, which we’ll call LF , then ∀xFx will be true
of all LF -constructible worlds. That means that (p∀xFxq, LF ) has zero risk of non-
realization, and so its strength is actually zero. Since the strength of (p∀xFxq, LF )
is zero, it’s not the case that ∀xFx is utterly strong (when joined by LF ).
Let FP,Q be the language containing just the predicates P and Q as defined
above. The strength of (p∀xFxq, LP,Q) is also zero. As long as we pair p∀xFxq
with a minimal language, its strength will always be zero. This is because its
unconditional universality—precisely the quality that makes it fail to distinguish
between accidental and lawful regularities—will always make the system true of
every (minimal language constructible) possible world.
So it is not true, as [Lewis, 1983] thought, that “simplicity and strength needn’t
be traded off”. Simplicity and strength do trade off: Simpler languages yield more
limited spaces of possible worlds. Str-ength depends on a system’s risk of non-
realization relative to the space of possible worlds yielded by the paired language.
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Thus, simpler languages constraint the amount of strength that can be possessed
by a system. Utter simplicity may still be easily achieved by changing our choice
of language. But utter simplicity cannot be so easily achieved simultaneously with
utter strength, and thus the TSP is blocked.
The objection could be made that this is just one way of measuring strength,
and other ways might not be so helpful in addressing the TSP. For example, suppose
that we give up the requirement that space-time points in constructible worlds be
non-empty. If, say, worlds have fixed size of n space-time points, then there will be
2n possible worlds of which ∀xFx will be true of exactly one. Against this particular
proposal, I might try to argue that emptiness seems like the sort of thing that might
itself be a basic kind.9 But there is a more general counter to the object that the
preceding solution to the TSP depends on the specific measure of strength: To start,
of course the solution depends on the specific measure of strength that is used. If
some other measures are to be used in the best system competition, it is quite
possible that they too might block the TSP. Indeed, if some measures are proposed
for the best system competition that do not block the TSP, I would think that is a
mark against them when there are measures in the offing that do. The broad point
is that there is at least one measure that can block the TSP, and that should give
us pause when we try to infer from the existence of the TSP to a need for single
language privileging in the BSA.
9 You could say that at each spatio-temporal point that either Fx or ¬Fx is true. But maybe
¬Fx is better understood as making a positive claim that ∅x is true. I think this is plausible, but
do not intend to pursue such a counterargument.
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4.6 The Problem of Immanent Comparisons
The “Problem of Immanent Comparisons” (PIC) begins with an appeal in [Co-
hen and Callender, 2009] to a distinction in Quine between immanent and transcen-
dent notions. Quine writes: “A notion is immanent when defined for a particular
language; transcendent when directed to languages generally” [Quine, 1970, p. 19].
Measurements of simplicity, since they depend on the language in which a system
is expressed, are taken by Cohen and Callender to be immanent in this Quinean
sense. Strength is similarly immanent, since it is assumed to depend on the expres-
sive power of the language in which a system is expressed. And, to finish out the
set, balance is said to be immanent as well, since it will be a measure dependent on
immanent measures of simplicity and strength. If two systems are competing to be
the best and are expressed in different languages, then we would need transcendent
measures of simplicity, strength, and balance, in order to implement the best system
competition. But “there are too few (viz. no) transcendent measures” of simplicity,
strength, and balance [Cohen and Callender, 2009, p. 8]. Cohen and Callender write
that
Prima facie, the realization that simplicity, strength, and balance are
immanent rather than transcendent—what we’ll call the problem of im-
manent comparisons—is a devastating blow to the [BSA and its vari-
ants]. For what counts as a law according to that view depends on what
is a Best System; but the immanence of simplicity and strength undercut
the possibility of intersystem comparisons, and therefore the very idea
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of something’s being a Best System.
[Cohen and Callender, 2009, p. 6, emphasis in original]
The only solution to the PIC, since systems can only be compared when they are
expressed in the same language, is to adopt language privileging.
My objection to the PIC is that it ignores the existence of a large middle
ground of measures that are neither immanent nor transcendent. At the PIC’s core
are the well known problems of language dependence that crop up in many guises—
as gruesome predicates spoiling evidential favoring relations, reparameterizations
that recommend conflicting priors or statistical models, and so on—in epistemology
and philosophy of science. After illustrating the existence of the middle ground
measures that undermine the force of the PIC, I will discuss what remains of the
PIC as a result of the better known problems of language dependence.
To start, let us examine the central claim of the PIC: that simplicity, strength,
and balance must be immanent measures. In defense of the idea that simplicity is
immanent, [Cohen and Callender, 2009, p. 5] defer to [Goodman, 1954] by way of
Loewer, who writes: “Simplicity, being partly syntactical, is sensitive to the language
in which a theory is formulated” [Loewer, 1996, p. 109]. Loewer (and Goodman)
are exactly right. Simplicity is language sensitive. For example, let us adopt a naive
version of simplicity, SimpC(−), that is measured by the number of characters
it takes to express a sentence (including spaces and punctuation). Consider the
following sentence.
This sentence is simple.
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Its SimpC-simplicity is 24 characters. The same sentence in Dutch is
Deze zin is eenvoudig.
The sentence’s SimpC-simplicity now is 22 characters. So the SimpC-simplicity of
a sentence depends or is sensitive to the language in which the sentence is expressed.
Does that language sensitivity mean that SimpC is immanent? It depends on what
is meant by being “defined for a particular language”.
SimpC is, in some sense, “defined for a particular language”. Insofar as the
measure gives conflicting results for a sentence expressed in different languages, it
would be ill-defined if we took it to be directed at sentences irrespective of the
language in which they are expressed. One way of dealing with this would be to
think that we have a multitude of distinct simplicity measures SimpCEnglish(−),
SimpCDutch(−), and so on. But doing that disguises an important fact; each
of these measures of simplicity is the same measure, just relativized to particular
languages. Drawing our inspiration from the “package deal” of the PDA, we could
just as easily deal with the language sensitivity of SimpC by saying it is defined for
sentence-language pairs. We don’t need, then, different measures of simplicity. Just
the one will do:
SimpC(pThis sentence is simple.q,English) = 24 char.
SimpC(pThis sentence is simple.q,Dutch) = 22 char.
In this way, SimpC is better understood as transcendent, and not immanent, be-
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cause it is, as Quine put it, “directed to languages generally”.
Of course, SimpC can’t be directed to all languages, since it will be undefined
for any languages that don’t have a written form with discrete characters. This sug-
gest that there is an important middle ground between immanent and transcendent
measures. When a measure falls in that middle, as SimpC seems to, I will say that
it is a “non-immanent measure”.
So which conception of SimpC is the right one? The “devastating blow” that
immanence deals to the BSA and its variants is that it “undercut[s] the possibility of
intersystem comparisons” [Cohen and Callender, 2009, p. 6]. In our naive example,
SimpCEnglish(pThis sentence is simple.q)
is—if SimpC is immanent—incomparable to
SimpCDutch(pThis sentence is simple.q).
But obviously it’s not. pThis sentence is simple.q is SimpC-simpler in Dutch than
in English (when being SimpC-simpler means having a lower value of SimpC).
Nothing prevents a transcendent or non-immanent measure from taking a lan-
guage as one of its arguments. Such a measure is transcendent (or non-immanent),
but language sensitive, and, importantly, it allows for comparisons even when a va-
riety of languages are involved. That being the case, the mere language sensitivity
of simplicity, strength, and their balance is not enough to guarantee that they are
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immanent, nor is it enough to guarantee the incomparability of systems expressed
in different languages.
In response to the existence of a measure like SimpC, Cohen has suggested10
that there may well be transcendent (or non-immanent) measures plausibly named
“simplicity” (etc.), but these are not the ones relevant to the BSA; the measures
that do appear in BSA will be immanent. Cohen is absolutely right to question the
plausibility of a measure as naive as SimpC having a role to play in the BSA. I
certainly do not intend to defend SimpC as the right measure of simplicity for the
BSA.
But I do not think it is clear why we should follow [Cohen and Callender,
2009] in assuming that the right measures are immanent. Cohen suggests that the
burden falls on the defender of transcendent (or non-immanent) measures to show
that the measures of the BSA will be such. Given the dearth of proposed measures
for the BSA on either side, I imagine that one could argue that the burden falls the
other way. But that is not what I intend to do. Rather, I think I have just shown
in the preceding section that the BSA is likely to include non-immanent measures.
Strength, I concluded, depends on a system’s risk of non-realization relative to the
space of possible worlds yielded by the paired language. There is language sensitivity,
but, like with SimpC, it is language sensitivity that can be captured by treating
strength as a non-immanent measure of system-language pairs. The case for non-
immanent measures will be made stronger (implicitly) in the next chapter when I
argue for including mutual information in the best system competition of the BSA.
10 In personal communication.
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Non-immanent measures are, if anything, the norm, and an example may be
found in the selection of statistical models. Following [Forster and Sober, 1994],
statistical model selection has standardly been associated in philosophy with the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC):
AIC(M) = 2[number of parameters of M ]
−2[maximum log-likelihood of M ]
The full details of AIC are not terribly important for our purposes here; it is enough
to point out that that first term is concerned with the number of parameters of M .
Forster and Sober note that the number of parameters “is not a merely linguistic fea-
ture” of models [Forster and Sober, 1994, p. 9, fn. 13]. But the number of parameters
is a linguistic feature of a model. Since AIC can compare models with different num-
bers of parameters, it can—if we think of statistical models as the system-language
pairs of the BSA and AIC as central to the best system competition11—compare
systems expressed in different languages. AIC is thus a non-immanent measure.
It is important to note, however, that AIC is also not a transcendent measure.
[Kieseppä, 2001] offers a response to critics of AIC who are concerned that the
measure is sensitive to changing the number of parameters of a model by changing
the model’s linguistic representation. The response turns on the justification of
11 To make the connection between AIC and the BSA even stronger, it it worth noting that
[Forster and Sober, 1994] take the “number of parameters” term to be tracking the simplicity of
a model. This is not unlike (though also not the same as) in the previous section when, in the
interest of simplicity, we required systems to be paired with languages that contained a minimal
number of basic predicates.
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“Rule-AIC”, which says to pick the model with the smallest value of AIC, on the
grounds that the predictive accuracy of model M is approximately the expected
value of the maximum log-likelihood of M minus the number of parameters of M .
Crucially,
the theoretical justification of using (Rule-AIC) is valid when the consid-
ered models are such that the approximation [just mentioned] is a good
one.
[Kieseppä, 2001, p. 775]
Let M be parameterized to have either k or k′ parameters. Then there are two
claims that are relevant to the justification of Rule-AIC:
predictive accuracy of M ≈ E[(maximum log-likelihood of M)− k]
predictive accuracy of M ≈ E[(maximum log-likelihood of M)− k′]
The predictive accuracy of M is independent of the number of parameters used to
express M .12 But the right side of the approximation in each claim does depend
on the number of parameters. In general, both of these claims will not be true.
Since Rule-AIC is only justified by the truth of these approximations, it will only
be applicable to whichever parameterization of M makes the approximation true.
The only time when both claims are true, and thus when AIC is applicable to
both parameterizations, is when the difference between E[(maximum log-likelihood
12 This is, of course, intuitively true. It is also true in the formal definition of predictive accuracy
given in [Kieseppä, 1997] and used in this argument from [Kieseppä, 2001].
140
of M) − k] and E[(maximum log-likelihood of M) − k′] is negligible. Kieseppä
concludes:
This simple argument shows once and for all that the fact that the
number of the parameters of a model can be changed with a reparame-
terisation does not in any interesting sense make the results yielded by
(Rule-AIC) dependent on the linguistic representation of the considered
models.
[Kieseppä, 2001, p. 776]
From the epistemic perspective that is Kieseppä’s concern, I can find room
to agree that there is no “interesting sense” in which Rule-AIC is language depen-
dent. This is because, if we are looking to employ Rule-AIC in statistical model
selection, what is available to us is a procedure to check if the given parameteriza-
tion is one that can support the justification of Rule-AIC. If the justification will
work, then Rule-AIC applies, and if not, not. Rule-AIC isn’t language dependent
“in any interesting sense” insofar as it simply doesn’t apply to the problematic
languages/parameterizations that undermine its justification.
However, from the perspective of the BSA and the PIC, these failures of Rule-
AIC are interesting. AIC (the measure) is not immanent, but it is also not transcen-
dent; it is merely non-immanent. Some reparameterizations of considered models
will lead to the inapplicability of Rule-AIC. If Rule-AIC was how we were deciding
which system was best, the existence of these problematic reparamterizations would
be, as Cohen and Callender put it, a prima facie devastating blow to the BSA.
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Towards the end of their introducing the PIC, Cohen and Callender write that
What is needed to solve the problem is a transcendent simplicity/strength/balance
comparison of each axiomatization against others. The problem is not
that there are too many immanent measures and nothing to choose be-
tween them, but that there are too few (viz., no) transcendent measures.
[Cohen and Callender, 2009, p. 8, emphasis in original]
Cohen and Callender are probably right that there are “too few (viz., no) tran-
scendent measures”. In response to this, PIC says that measuring the goodness
of a system must be done with immanent measures, and so no systems expressed
in different languages may be compared in the best system competition. But non-
transcendence is not a guarantee of immanence. We might call the problem that
remains the Problem of Transcendent Comparisons (PTC). It is the PTC that gets at
the well known problems of language sensitivity found outside of the literature on the
BSA. Measures like AIC are not immanent, but they are problematically language
sensitive, and that may be understood as a symptom of their non-transcendence.
I do not deny that language relativity of the BBSA is good a strategy for
dealing with the PIC. But we have at our disposal many non-immanent (and si-
multaneously non-transcendent) measures. In the face of the non-transcendence of
these measures—that is, in the face of the PTC—the BBSA’s strategy of language
relativity is still a good one. Our language relativity does not, however, have to
involve privileging single languages. The alternative is to relativize to classes of




We have just concluded that the PIC should be replaced with the PTC, which
will not require us to relativize to single languages because of the immanence of
measures in the best system competition. Rather, we can relativize to classes of
languages constructed to include only languages that may be unproblematically
compared using the measures that appear in the best system competition. At the
start of this chapter I said that the goal was to rid the BSA of language relativity
entirely. That goal is achieved here in three steps. First, in Section 4.7.1, I consider
the role of single language privileging in accommodating special science laws in the
BSA. There I revisit the discussion from Chapter 3 about the relationship between
kind relativity (which we have been thinking of in this chapter as single language
relativity) and fact relativity, and argue that fact relativity alone is enough for the
accommodation of special science laws. Next, in Section 4.7.2, I develop what I take
to be the greatest problem with single language privileging—that it fails to make
sense of the idea that laws and kinds are discovered together—and argue that it
may be solved by replacing single language privileging with language-class relativity.
Finally, in Section 4.7.3, I propose a way of constructing classes of languages that
will make language-class relativity depend on—and thus be redundant with—any
competition relativity that is included in the BSA.
143
4.7.1 Special Science Laws
One of the most compelling features of the BBSA is its ability to accommodate
special science laws in the BSA. This is accomplished through the view’s single
language privileging/relativity. A particular scientific field X is interested in the
kinds KX , so the laws of X come from the best system to emerge from a competition
run with every system expressed in the language that treats the KX kinds as basic.
It does not seem plausible that scientific fields are interested in particular language
classes,13 and so the value of replacing single language relativity for language-class
relativity will depend in part on being able to provide an alternative account of
accommodating special science laws in the BSA.
Most of what is needed to do this has already been presented in the Chapter 3.
It was noted there that there is a very close relationship between what set of kinds
is treated as basic and what facts are to be systematized. In one example the fields
of “Coffee Chemistry” and “Pencil Chemistry” were considered and contrasted. If
coffee chemists are interested in the kind ‘caffeine’, then they are also interested in
all the caffeine related matters of fact. Coffee chemists will also be interested, at
least implicitly, in all the facts that subvene the caffeine facts, such as facts relating
to the various atoms that comprise caffeine molecules. Pencil chemists, in contrast,
are interested in the ‘graphite’ kind, graphite related matters of fact, and (at least
implicitly) all the facts that subvene graphite related matters of fact. Coffee and
13 At least not explicitly. Economists are explicitly interested in the set of kinds that contains
things like “market” and “currency”. It is not yet clear how we could characterize the class of
languages that is of particular interest to economists. It is even less clear that doing so would be
sufficient to distinguish economics (and its laws) from any other field.
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pencil chemists are going to both be interested in the kind ‘carbon’ and carbon
related matters facts. But the are not interested in all of the same carbon related
matters of fact. Coffee chemists will only be interested in the subset of carbon facts
related to carbon atoms appearing in caffeine molecules, while pencil chemists will
only be interested in the subset of carbon facts related to carbon atoms appearing
in graphite molecules. Fact relativity has a finer grain than kind relativity—this is
precisely what made its introduction so useful.
When we give up single language relativity, fact relativity can become the way
(and not merely additional insurance) to individuate fields. Being interested in a
particular set of kinds K is the same, in practice, as being interested in the set of
facts related to those kinds. We already are committed to including fact relativity in
the BSA. And any two fields that may be individuated by their kinds of interest may
also be individuated by the facts that they intend to systematize (i.e., the facts that
correspond to the individuating kinds). Replacing single language relativity with
language-class relativity will not, then, spoil our ability to accommodate special
science laws in the BSA. The burden of individuating fields and their respective
laws will simply fall to the fact relativity that was argued for in Chapter 3.
4.7.2 Discovering Laws and Kinds Together
One concern that we might have with letting fact relativity do the heavy lifting
of individuating scientific fields is this: In conjunction with language-class relativity,
we lose the guarantee offered by single language relativity that the kinds treated as
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basic in the laws of a field will be the same as the kinds that are explicitly of interest
to a field. The guarantee is certainly appealing. Of course there should be a match
between the kinds of interest in a field and the kinds in the field’s laws. But the way
in which such a match is guaranteed by single language relativity fails to capture
the interplay in scientific practice between the discovery of the basic kinds and the
discovery of the laws.
This problem has already been discussed with respect to single language privi-
leging (which is essential to single language relativity). Lew-is claims that his variant
of single language privileging has the virtue of “explaining” why “laws and natural
properties get discovered together” [Lewis, 1983, p. 368].
For Loewer’s PDA, the idea that laws and kinds are discovered together is
central to the view. Indeed, the phrase “package deal” has its roots in Lewis, who
says just before the “discovered together” remark that “the scientific investigation of
laws and of natural properties is a package deal” [Lewis, 1983, p. 368]. While Loewer
ultimately endorses a version of single language privileging, it is accompanied with
a rough account of how a “final theory”—i.e., a candidate system-language pair—is
arrived at:
a final theory is evaluated with respect to, among the other virtues,
the extent to which it is informative and explanatory about truths of
scientific interest as formulated in [the present language of science] SL
or any language SL+ that may succeed SL in the rational development
of the sciences. By ‘rational development’ I mean developments that are
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considered within the scientific community to increase the simplicity,
coherence, informativeness, explanatoriness, and other scientific virtues
of a theory.
[Loewer, 2007, p. 325]
If the practice of science parallels the PDA, then the processes of discovering the
laws and basic kinds are the one and the same.
And it seems Cohen and Callender are also on board with laws and kinds being
discovered together when they offer this nice example of the phenomenon:
historical disputes between theorists favoring very different choices of
kinds seem to us to be disputes between two different sets of laws [...]
it has happened in the history of science that people have objected to
particular carvings—most famously, consider the outrage inspired by
Newton’s category of gravity. But given the link between laws and kinds,
this outrage is probably best seen as an expression of the view that
another System is Best, one without the offending category. If that other
system doesn’t in fact fare so well in the best system competition—as in
the case of the systems proposed by Newton’s foes—then the predictive
strength and explanatory power of a putative Best System typically will
win people over to the categorization employed. While it’s true that some
choices of [kinds] may strike us as odd, no one would accuse science—the
enterprise that gives us entropy, dark energy, and charm—as conforming
to pre-theoretic intuitions about the natural kinds of the world. Yet these
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odd kinds are all embedded in systematizations that would produce what
we would consider laws.
[Cohen and Callender, 2009, pp. 17–18]
With everyone in agreement, what is the problem? Language privileging, es-
sentially, happens before the identification (in the BSA and its variants) or discovery
(in scientific practice) of the laws. As van Fraassen’s problems made clear for Lewis’
BSA, the natural properties would have to be discovered prior to the discovery of the
laws in order to ensure the accessibility of the laws. Though Cohen and Callender
will not “accuse science” of “conforming to pre-theoretic intuitions about the natu-
ral kinds of the world”, that is exactly what the BBSA does when it privileges sets
of kinds prior to a best system competition. Furthermore, PIC makes it such that
“the predictive strength and explanatory power of a putative Best System” cannot
“win people over to the categorization employed” because comparing two putative
Best Systems expressed in different languages (with different “categorizations”) is
supposed to be impossible.14
Relativizing to classes of languages (and embracing PTC) solves this problem.
Scientists are able to approach the discovery of laws and kinds with pre-theoretic
intuitions about how to systematize the world, the language to use when doing
that, and the best system competition. As we will see below, the intuitions re-
garding language and the best system competition will locate them in a particular
language class. Scientists will move away from their intuitions about language (and
14 At least, it is impossible according to PIC for the BSA and its variants. If it is possible for
scientists, then it is wholly unclear why it would be impossible for the BSA.
148
systematizing) when, much as Loewer describes above, there are languages in the
relevant language class that may be paired with systems to yield a system-language
pair that is scored better by the best system competition than the pre-theoretic
system-language pair. Even without single language privileging, there will still be
a guaranteed match between the kinds that are of interest to a field and the kinds
that appear in the laws: The movement away from pre-theoretic intuitions about
the kinds is constrained by the relevant language class and only pursued when it is
accompanied by gains in the goodness of the best candidate system-language pair.15
Thus, by a field’s own lights, the new sets of kinds will be the kinds of interest to
the field.
4.7.3 Limiting Language(-Class) Relativity
Let us begin addressing how language-class relativity can work by looking
again at the single language relativity of the BBSA. In the BBSA, there are the
fundamental kinds Kfund. The set of all kinds K is the set including Kfund closed
with respect to supervenience relations—that is, K includes every kind that can be
defined as supervening on the arrangement of the Kfund kinds in the actual world.
16
A language L is determined by the set of kinds for which it has basic predicates,
15 This movement is only metaphorical for the BSA, where all the possibilities are considered and
judged simultaneously. It is helpful, though, to think in the more methodical terms—of considering
particular transitions from one system-language pair to another, the benefits that they might bring,
and then adopting them or not—because that is what will happen in actual scientific practice.
16 It would be more proper to say of K’s closure that it includes every kind that can be defined as
supervening on the kinds in K (and their arrangement in the world), which of course includes the
kinds of Kfund. Since supervenience is transitive—that is, if B supervenes on A, and C supervenes
on B, then C supervenes on A—we can say that every kind in K supervenes on Kfund (and the
world). And it is convenient to say that because it highlights the supervenience base that is shared
all kinds .
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and there is a language Li for every Ki ⊆ K. For any two languages L and L′,
the supervenience relations between the kinds of the languages and Kfund can be
thought of as schemes for translation between L and L′. The set of all languages Lall
can be thought of as the set of languages that includes Lfund closed with respect to
all translations. A class of languages Li is a set of languages including Lfund closed
with respect to some acceptable (all, in the case of Lall) translations.
To illustrate, let us return to the ‘coin flip’ worlds from earlier in the chapter.
Such a world is a (finite) string of Hs and Ts, which we will assume are the only
two fundamental kinds. Another set of kinds might be Kex = {a, b, c, d}, where
the translation that gets us to the corresponding language Lex from Lfund maps
the pairs HH, HT, TH, and TT, to a through d, respectively. An example of a class of
languages that includes Lex could be Ln-tuple: Let an acceptable translation for
L
n-tuple be one that, for a given n takes the set of all n-tuples of H and T, and maps
them to a set of kinds Kn = {kn,1, kn,2, ...kn,2n}. Lfund, then, is just L1. When a
through d are k2,1 through k2,4, our Kex and Lex are precisely K2 and L2. All, and
only, the languages that may be formed through this procedure will be members of
the class Ln-tuple.
A language-class relative variant of the BSA will run a best system competition
for every class of languages Li. Then S is the set of all systematizations of the
world, the set of all competing system-language pairs for the Li-relative best system
competition is given by S × Li.
We can apply this conception of language-class relativity to our other running
example of statistical model selection with AIC. Recall that some reparameteriza-
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tions of statistical models would prove problematic for the use of AIC. To repa-
rameterize a model is akin to translating it from one language to another. We can
understand, then, the problem of language sensitivity for AIC as being related to
some set of problematic translations. If we subtract these problematic translations
from the set of all translations, then we have a set of acceptable translations which
defines a class of languages that we can call LAIC . LAIC is precisely the set of all
languages such that a systems expressed in any one of them will be comparable to
a system expressed in any other using AIC. As long as the non-immanent measures
used in the best system competition have clearly problematic and/or acceptable
translations associated with them, then the class of languages that may be used
to express competing systems will be determined by the measures used in the best
system competition.
This will have one of two effects on the extent to which the BSA must be
relativized to classes of languages: Either the BSA will be committed to competition
relativity or not. Suppose that it is not. For convenience, suppose further that Rule-
AIC is all that there is to the best system competition. In that case, the BSA will
always be run using the LAIC class of languages. Language-class relativity is not
required since there is only one language class that will ever be relevant to the
BSA—namely LAIC , as determined by the best system competition. Now suppose
that there is competition relativity. A different best system competition must be
run for every competition function Ci in the set of all possible competition functions
C. In principle we will need to run best systems competitions for every pair in
C × L, where L is the set of all language classes. Let Lj be the class of languages
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constructed according to the translations that are acceptable for the measures that
comprise Ci when i = j. In practice, however, it will only make sense to run
a competition once for each Ci ∈ C, since the pairs Ci,Lj will be unproblematic
only when i = j. Language-class relativity in this situation will be redundant with
competition relativity.
We also have it that, in either case, single language relativity remains unnec-
essary for all the same reasons that recommended language-class relativity. This
means that there is no apparent need for any language relativity in the BSA. Its
role in the accommodation special science laws will be redundant with fact relativ-
ity. Its role in solving the TSP will be redundant with more careful choices of the
measures used in the best system competition. And, finally, its role in solving the
PIC will be unnecessary (if a single non-immanent best system competition can be
identified) or redundant with competition relativity.
4.8 Summary
Two problems have made it standard among contemporary defenders of the
BSA and its variants to adopt single language privileging. The trivial systems
problem (TSP), introduced in Section 4.1, is concerned with the existence of system-
language pairs that are utterly strong and simple, guaranteeing their being the best,
but whose axioms and theorems include all true universal generalizations, making
them undeserving of the name “law”. The problem of immanent comparisons (PIC),
introduced in Section 4.6, is concerned with the inexistence of transcendental mea-
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sures of simplicity and strength. Both of these problems seem to be solved by
privileging a single language as the one in which all systems competing to be the
best are expressed. The TSP is solved as long as the privileged language does not
include the predicates that give rise to the problem. The PIC is solved because
the measures used in such a competition need only be defined immanently for the
privileged language.
While single language privileging might solve these problems, it brings with
it new problems depending on how it is implemented. The version of single lan-
guage privileging adopted by [Lewis, 1983] (discussed in Section 4.2), in which the
privileged language is that of the “perfectly natural properties”, made the laws po-
tentially inaccessible and uninteresting to scientists. The PDA (discussed in Section
4.3) privileged the language of actual practicing scientists, and in doing so it appears
to have made the laws dependent on subjects. The BBSA (discussed in Section 4.4)
lets there be competitions run with privileged languages for every set of kinds that
might be treated as basic, which means that there will still be some sets of laws that
are still subject to the TSP. Lewis’ BSA and the BBSA also suffer from breaking
the intimate connection in scientific practice between the discovery of the laws and
the discovery of the basic kinds of nature.
One of the main things that I argued for in this chapter was that single lan-
guage privileging is not required to solve the trivial systems and immanent com-
parisons problems. In Section 4.5, I show how the TSP can solved by employing
a suitable measure of strength. After its introduction in 4.6, I argued that the
PIC is mistaken in assuming that, in the absence of transcendent measures for
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the best system competition, only immanent measures may be used. There are, I
argued and illustrated with the Akaike Information Criterion, non-immanent and
non-transcendent measures. PIC, then, should be replaced with the slightly weaker
problem of transcendent measures (PTC), which does not require single language
privileging, but only privileging to classes of languages. Finally, in Section 4.7, I
developed the idea of language-class relativity. There I showed how its adoption
over single language privileging does not undermine the ability of the BSA to ac-
commodate special science laws, and how it can respect the idea that laws and
kinds are discovered together. With all of that done, I was able to argue that lan-
guage relativity will, in general, be unnecessary for the BSA, because what it has so
far accomplished will be addressed through a combination of fact and competition
realtivity.
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Chapter 5: Induction Friendliness
What does it mean in the BSA for a system(-language pair) to be the titular
best? The standard line—that the best system is the simplest and strongest on
balance—is not without its issues. As Armstrong writes:
even granted that [our standards of simplicity] are shared by all rational
mankind, [they] may not be shared by other rational creatures. The
same point seems to hold for standards of strength. Lewis also refers
to ‘our way of balancing’ simplicity and strength. May there not be
irresoluble conflicts about the exact point of balance?
[Armstrong, 1983, p. 67]
Not only might we disagree about how simplicity and strength are actually measured,
we may disagree about their relative importance. Part of my aim in this chapter is
to step back from simplicity and strength to ask, more or less from scratch, what
makes a system-language pair the best. A result of stepping back in this way is to
focus on the role of induction in scientific practice, and to argue for including in the
best system competition a notion of “induction friendliness”
In our four-part model of the BSA there is the world, the systems, and the
languages, and all of those are fed into the competition function, which outputs the
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best system-language pair. So what should our competition function look like? The
only real guide we have for saying something about the competition function is the
practice of science itself (that is, after all, where simplicity and strength are supposed
to come from). One strategy for dealing with the potential variety highlighted by
Armstrong might be to add competition relativity into our version of the BSA by
allowing for any competition function that is or might be used in scientific practice
and letting there be distinct sets of laws for every choice of competition function.
This is certainly what it looked like we might have to do at the end of Chapter
2. However, in the interest of objectivity (and reducing relativity), we should look
closer at scientific practice to see if there are any universal features that might
constrain competition relativity.
One candidate for being a universal feature of scientific practice is induction.
Armstrong’s “other rational creatures” might have tremendous brains or computing
power at their disposal, and so be unconcerned with simplicity. But what if they were
not in the business of making inductive inferences? What if they were unconcerned
with generalizing from their limited data to regularities that are supposed to apply
to the rest of the world? In such a case, we would say they are not doing science.
At least, they are not doing any kind of science that is relevant to the BSA. Picking
out regularities—namely, lawful regularities—is the whole point of the BSA. So,
perhaps, induction has a role to play in constraining the relativity that might be
required of our competition function(s).
What I argue in this chapter is that the competition functions of the BSA are
concerned with “induction friendliness”, which is, roughly, the extent to which the
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world and competing system-language pairs are conducive to induction. I further
argue that the induction friendliness of a system-language pair and world may be
quantified by the mutual information (relative to the system-language pair) that is
available between different parts of the world. Developing the relationships between
“induction friendliness”, the best system competition of the BSA, and mutual in-
formation (MI), may be divided into three parts:1 First, in Section 5.1, I argue that
induction friendliness must play a role in the BSA. Second, in Section 5.2, I propose
that induction friendliness may be quantified by mutual information. Third, Section
5.3, the various connections between mutual information and the BSA are sketched
to highlight the potential benefits of adding induction friendliness as quantified by
mutual information to the BSA. I conclude in Section 5.4 with a brief summary of
the chapter.
5.1 Induction Friendliness and the BSA
Before arguing for a connection between the BSA and induction friendliness,
it will be helpful to say something about what is meant by “induction friendliness”.
(The BSA, at this point, needs no introduction.)
Part of what is meant by induction friendliness is best understood by say-
ing what would make things induction unfriendly. Ready examples of induction
unfriendliness may be found in the circumstances that give rise to the standard
problems of induction. Hume’s classic worry highlights the potential for induction
1 To explore the connection between these three further, I reconstruct in Appendix A a classic
theorem of information theory from [Shannon, 1948] with the requisite assumptions being moti-
vated as suiting a search in a toy model of the BSA for a measure of induction friendliness.
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unfriendliness.
Thus not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate con-
nexion of causes and effects, but even after experience has inform’d us of
their constant conjunction, ’tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by
our reason, why we shou’d extend that experience beyond those particu-
lar instances, which have fallen under our observation. We suppose, but
are never able to prove, that there must be a resemblance betwixt those
objects, of which we have had experience, and those which lie beyond
the reach of our discovery.
[Hume, 1896, Book 1, Part 3, Section 6]
The world around us is not guaranteed to respect the results of our inductive prac-
tices. Our circumstances are induction unfriendly if we have been led to suppose
that there is some regularity in the world, but then that regularity fails.
Induction friendliness need not be concerned just with failures of our inductive
practices (or a lack thereof). Successful inductive inferences may be made more or
less quickly, and circumstances will be comparably more or less induction friendly.
Suppose that there is a factory that produces biased coins for philosophers and
statisticians who want their thought experiments to be more grounded in reality.
Half of the factory’s operating days are spent making coins that are balanced to
come up heads 70% of the time and tails 30% of the time. The other half are spent
making coins where the heads/tails split is 30%/70%. Suppose further that we have
a coin that we know to be from this factory, but we do not know that it is a heads
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biased coin. We start flipping the coin in order to test what kind of bias it has.
Each time the coin comes up heads, we raise our degree of belief in it being a heads
biased coin. Each time it comes up tails, we raise our degree of belief in a tails bias.
A long run of heads at the start of our test flips would be very induction friendly
because that would quickly lead us to adopt the true belief that the coin is heads
biased. Our circumstances will be less induction friendly the more that tails come
up during our test flips, since each tail detracts from our (right) confidence that the
coin is heads biased. It is entirely possible (albeit not terribly likely), that our first
100 test flips of the coin might have tails come up 70 times and heads 30. In such
an event, we would have good reason to believe that they coin is tails biased, but
since that is not the truth, we, unknowingly, are in circumstances with low induction
friendliness.
Like with this coin testing example, the progress of science by any measure—its
rate, its accuracy, its practical implications, etc.—will be constrained (or bolstered)
by the induction friendliness of our circumstances. Take the following remark from
a physicist at the CERN particle accelerator:
I would consider us lucky if we discovered new phenomena or a new state
of matter in two or three years [...] It would mean nature has been kind
to us, but nature might be more subtle.
(Dr. Tiziano Camporesi, in [Overbye, 2016])
The kindness or subtlety of nature is precisely the sort of thing that I intend for
induction friendliness to track. If “nature has been kind” to our scientific—read:
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inductive—practices, then our circumstances have been induction friendly. If nature
is “more subtle”, then our circumstances are less induction friendly.
A concern with induction friendliness is ever present in science, but not much
can be done about it. However kind or friendly nature is to our inductive practices
is out of our hands. But scientist can hope that their circumstances are induc-
tion friendly. More than that, absent countervailing evidence, scientist do—and,
in an important sense, must, if they think their work is going to accomplish any-
thing beyond merely describing their data—assume their circumstances are broadly
induction friendly.
Given the importance of induction friendliness to science, it might seem obvi-
ous that it will have a role to play in the best system competition of the BSA. The
standard argument for including some measure of system goodness in the BSA is
something like the following argument from interest.
1. Scientists are interested in laws that are X.
2. An account of laws must respect scientific practice. (RSP)
3. (From 1 and 2:) The BSA should produce laws that are X.
We can see this argument at work in the background of Lewis’ first presentation of
the BSA.
Of these true deductive systems, some can be axiomatized more simply
than others. Also, some of them have more strength, or information
content, than others. [...] What we value in a deductive system is a
properly balanced combination of simplicity and strength.
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[Lewis, 1973, p. 73, emphasis in original]
It is just a fact that about systems that they can be simpler or stronger. But there
are also lots of other features of systems that we could track. The reason that we
think simplicity and strength are the relevant ones for the BSA is that they are the
ones that are of value or interest to science.2
So, since science is interested in induction friendliness, do we have it—by
RSP and the argument from interest—that the BSA should produce laws that are
induction friendly? It’s not quite that simple. Scientists are interested in laws (or
system-language pairs) that are simple and strong. But their interest in induction
friendliness is not directed at laws and system language pairs. From the perspective
of scientists, it is the world itself that is more or less induction friendly. Once
their best inductive practices have made an estimate of what the laws are, they are
interested in the world being induction friendly. As the term has been developed
here, to say that laws or some system-language pair is induction friendly is a category
mistake. Worlds are more or less induction friendly with respect to a given system-
language pair, and we may only say that a system-language pair is induction friendly
insofar as it makes some pre-defined world (e.g., the actual world) induction friendly
. Induction friendliness, it seems, is something that matters only after the events—
namely, the estimation/discovery of the laws—that fall under the BSA’s purview.
This puts an effort to combine induction friendliness and the BSA in an awkward
2 It is important to note that the argument from interest, like the argument given later in this
section, is only an argument for why we should think that X is relevant to the BSA. The BSA has
what ever best system competition(s) it has independent of the interests of any scientists—this is
the “brute metaphysics” point from Chapter 2. The role of scientific interests is to guide our best
estimates of how the BSA works (not to dictate how the BSA works directly).
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position.
The trick to avoiding that awkwardness is to appreciate that induction friend-
liness is not a property of either the world alone or a given system-language pair, but
of those things combined—the “circumstances” that have been mentioned already
in this chapter. If S, L is the system language pair believed to be the best by science,
then scientists will prefer that the actual world be the one among the set of possible
worlds W that maximizes the measure of induction friendliness, IF (S, L, w).
Now adopt the perspective of the BSA. The BSA’s competition function C
takes as arguments the actual world wactual, the set S of all competing systems,
and the set L of all competing languages, and outputs a best system-language pair,
Sbest, Lbest. Once Sbest, Lbest is in hand, we can ask: Which possible world
w ∈ W maximizes IF (Sbest, Lbest, w)? If the answer is not the actual world
wactual, then we have violated the interests/preferences of science as they pertain
to induction friendliness (we will worry about considering interests in simplicity and
strength later in this section).
To see that this is the case, recall the story of the scientist who dies and
appears before God. When asked by God if the scientist would like anything, the
scientist says “I would like to know how the world works”. God accepts the request
and begins “At time and position t1, p1 such-and-such properties obtained, and at
t1, p2 such-and-such other properties obtained, and—” at which point the scientist
interrupts and says “Sorry, if that is how things actually work that is all well and
good, but is there a pithy version?”. God’s reply to that question is to provide the
scientist with the BSA-style laws of nature.
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God is beholden to provide the scientist with the laws that best suit the
scientist’s interests—not because God is good, but because God is a stand-in here
for the BSA, and RSP binds the BSA to the interests of scientists. Prior to this
chapter, we have characterized those interests in a variety of ways. We’ve noted
that the scientist might have particular interests in what language(s) can be used
in expressing the laws, what particular facts should contribute to determining the
laws, and what kinds of systems should be considered. The scientist is interested
explicitly in the laws being “pithy”—i.e., simple and strong—but that is something
that we have set aside in this chapter in favor of looking at an interest in induction
friendliness. The scientist’s interest in induction friendliness means that, when God
recommends Sbest, Lbest as the source of the laws, the scientist will be interested
in the world being such that it maximizes IF (Sbest, Lbest, w). Since God knows
what the actual world is it must be that IF (Sbest, Lbest, wactual) is maximal with
respect to the set of possible worldsW . Otherwise, God would be knowingly setting
up the scientist for disappointment, and that goes against RSP.
We thus have the following constraint on the BSA’s best system competition:
Induction Friendliness (strong): The best system competition C must be such that,
if C(S,L, wactual) = Sbest, Lbest, then the induction friendliness
IF (Sbest, Lbest, wactual) is maximal with respect to the set of possible worlds
W .
At least, that should be the case if we are ignoring (or letting induction friendli-
ness supersede) other factors in the best system competition like the simplicity and
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[ Draft last updated March 20, 2017. ]
Figure 5.1: Comparing worlds and system-language pairs: The dashed curve sitting
on the wactual horizontal represents the goodness of every system-language pair
with respect to the actual world. The dotted curves set against the S1, L1 and S2, L2
verticals represent the induction friendliness of every world inW on the assumption
that the particular system-language pair is best.
Look at Figure 5.1 for an illustration of how induction friendliness might inter-
act with other measures of the goodness of a system-lang-uage pair. The standard
picture for the BSA is captured by just the dashed curve sitting on the horizontal
labeled wactual. There is the actual world wactual, and every system-language pair
in S ×L is good—that is, strikes some balance between simplicity and strength—to
some degree with respect to wactual. S2, L2 has the highest goodness, and so it will
be the best system. The induction friendliness of every world in W with respect to
S2, L2 is represented by the dotted curve set against the S2, L2 vertical. If scien-
tists think that S2, L2 is the best system-language pair, if it is the output of their
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best inductive practices, then scientists will want to be in w1 since that is the most
induction friendly world with respect to S2, L2. In contrast, wactual is the most
induction friendly world with respect to S1, L1 (as may be seen from the dotted
curve set against the S1, L1 vertical).
If we consider just induction friendliness, then S1, L1 will be preferable to
S2, L2 since it makes the actual world the most induction friendly. But we will
not, in general, be interested in just induction friendliness. S1, L1 is a very poor
system with respect to wactual. And wactual isn’t far from the peak of induction
friendliness with respect to S2, L2. It seems like we will prefer S2, L2 to S1, L1 because
it strikes the better balance between the standard measures of system goodness and
the induction friendliness of the actual world with respect to it.
Considering the simplicity and strength of a system-language pair may weaken
the constraint above to be something like the following:
Induction Friendliness (weak): If two system language pairs S1, L1 and S2, L2 strike
an equally good balance between simplicity and strength, then the best sys-
tem competition should prefer S1, L1 over S2, L2 if IF (S1, L1, wactual), the
induction friendliness of S1, L1, is closer to maxw∈W IF (S1, L1, w) than
IF (S2, L2, wactual) is to maxw∈W IF (S2, L2, w).
This is the weakest constraint that might be imposed on the competition function;
it makes induction friendliness a mere tie-breaker after system-language pairs have
been evaluated for their balance of simplicity and strength. Stronger constraints
are possible. Simplicity and strength may be the mere tie-breakers after induction
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friendliness is considered, as they would be under the strong induction friendliness
constraint given at first. In general, the best system competition might look for a
balance between simplicity, strength, and induction friendliness to various degrees.
5.2 Induction Friendliness and Mutual Information
One way that we might fill in the formal details of induction friendliness is
with mutual information (MI). In this section, I show how that can done. The case
for associating the two will be bolstered more by a survey in the next section of
some of benefits that may be had from combining MI, via induction friendliness,
with the BSA.
We have a good idea of what induction friendliness is after the work of the
previous section. What about MI? Formally, MI is a measure I(−) of two random
variables X and Y given by








where k is an arbitrary constant that determines the units of the measure, p(x) is
the probability of some value x obtaining in X, p(y) the probability of some value y
obtaining in Y , and p(x, y) the joint probability of x and y obtaining simultaneously
in X and Y (respectively).
The measure has its roots in information theory. Using the most casual in-
formation theoretic terms, MI is the “amount of information” that is available on
average about the values of X and Y together. When “amount of information” is
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associated, as it is in the original development of information theory in [Shannon,
1948], with minimum lengths of codes for representing values of random variables,
I(X;Y ) is a measure of the difference between (1) the average amount of space it
takes to write down the value of X and (2) the average amount of space it takes to
write down the value of X if the value of Y is already known. (Or, since MI is sym-
metric, it is the difference between the space required two write down Y ’s value and
the space required to write down Y ’s value when X’s is known.) This “code length”
interpretation of MI is, for our purposes at least, superior for a number of reasons.
For one, it lets us avoid any complications associated with whether or not informa-
tion theory provides a good analysis of “information”—a highly contentious issue
among philosophers (see, for example, [Floridi, 2011] or, for an excellent overview of
the use of “information” specifically in biology, [Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny, 2016]).
The code length interpretation is of great practical importance because of its role in
making information theory a theory of efficient data storage and exchange, and thus
part of the theoretical foundation of modern computing and telecommunications.3
3 It is also a helpful way of understanding the relationship between MI and two other important





which may be interpreted following (1) above as the average amount of space it takes to write
down the value of X. The entropy of X is the most basic measure in information theory. Its value
is the minimum average length of codes for values of X that can be achieved when encoding the
values of X in a language with a number of character types b when k = 1/ log b. If b = 2, then the
units of H (and I) are bits, like in the zeros and ones that make up computer memory, with eight
bits to a byte, and oh-so-many bytes—kilo-, mega-, giga-, tera-, etc.—in any digital storage you
possess. The other measure is the conditional entropy between X and Y , given by





p(x, y) log p(x|y).
Fitting (2) above, the conditional entropy is a measure of the average amount of space it takes to
write down the value of X if the value of Y is already known. It can be seen after some rearranging
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Another helpful interpretation of MI takes it to be a measure of the corre-
lation of X and Y . I(X;Y ) is the average over pairs of values of X and Y of
log[p(x, y)/p(x)p(y)]. If X and Y are wholly independent, then, for all x, y ∈ X, Y ,
p(x, y) = p(x)p(y). Then p(x, y)/p(x)p(y) = 1, the logarithm of 1 is 0, and so
I(X;Y ) = 0. As the joint probability p(x, y) goes up relative to p(x)p(y), the value
of log[p(x, y)/p(x)p(y)] gets a higher positive value, and so the pair x, y contributes
ever more to the mutual information between X and Y . Less independent, more
correlated, pairs x, y contribute more to I(X;Y ), and always in proportion to the
joint probability of the pair. Thus, I(X;Y ) is a measure of the correlation of X and
Y in that it is a measure of the average correlation between the possible values of
X and Y .
An argument for the connection between induction friendliness and MI may be
found in the interpretation of MI as a measure of correlation. Suppose that X and Y
are the states of the world just slightly temporally offset, so that the present value of
X represents the present state of the world, and the present value of Y represent the
immediate future state of the world. If I(X;Y ) is high, that means that the present
is highly correlated with the future on average. In such circumstances, our inductive
practices should (on average) be more successful. If the present is more correlated
with the future, then we can expect that what we know of the present will allow us
to make better predictions about the future. Because MI is symmetric, knowledge
of the future will also allow for more accurate predictions about the present; or, to
put it in a way that is more relevant to the practice of science, knowledge of the
that I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ).
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present will allow for more accurate retrodictions about the the past.
This simple picture of MI being measured between temporally adjacent states
of the world will not generally be how we want to measure induction friendliness.
Our inductive practices do not consist entirely of using just the present to make
predictions about the immediate future. Rather, extended regions of space and
time, of various sizes and shapes, are used to make predictions about similarly
complex regions. How we carve the world up into these regions, and how we expect
them to relate and make predictions about each other, will be determined by the
system-language pair with respect to which the induction friendliness of the world is
being calculated. A given system-language pair will carve the world up into related
parts, and the induction friendliness of the world with respect to that pair will be
the MI measured between those parts.
The simple picture above can still be interesting as a toy example to explore,
and I do just that in Appendix A. I illustrate there the connection between the
BSA, induction friendliness, and MI, through a reconstruction of the derivation
in [Shannon, 1948] of entropy as a measure of uncertainty. This is done in the
context of a toy model of the BSA, with the assumptions of Shannon’s theorem
being newly motivated as a part of a search for a measure of induction unfriendliness
that is concerned with predictive success. From that we are able to derive a measure
of induction friendliness that is approximately the MI between different parts of the
world.
Importantly, MI does not tell us how to make predictions. Rather, whatever
predictions we might be led to make based on our inductive practices, our predictive
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accuracy faces an upper bound measurable by MI. It is in this way that we can
see MI as a measure of induction friendliness: The average success of our best
possible inductive practices will be greater or lesser in concert with higher and lower
values of the MI between different parts of the world. Speaking loosely in terms of
“information”, a world with higher MI with respect to some system-language pair
will be one whose various parts carry more information about each other on average.
5.3 Mutual Information and the BSA
It has just been argued that MI is a way of dealing with induction friendliness.
My interest in this section is to sketch how that inclusion may benefit the BSA in
a number of ways that do not have direct connections to induction friendliness. In
each case, MI is shown to be a way of dealing with the relevant idea. We could
choose to deal with each one, induction friendliness included, with the use of other
measures. But I think MI’s applicability for each should give us pause. Maybe
some unificationist leanings should make us think that in MI we are getting at the
measure to use in the BSA. Absent such leanings, it must be left to future work to
make a decisive argument in favor of MI’s role in the BSA.
So what are the various ways (independent of induction friendliness) for MI to
play a role in the BSA? In Section 5.3.1, I discuss the connections between MI and
the virtues of simplicity and strength that are standardly associated with the BSA.
In Section 5.3.2, I highlight extant discussion in philosophy that imply a connection
between MI and the BSA would improve the explanatory power of the laws yielded
170
by the BSA. In Section 5.3.3, I draw on the code length interpretation of MI and
information theory to argue that MI reflects some of the “insurmountable practical
challenges” mentioned briefly in Chapter 2. Finally, in Section 5.3.4, I show how the
incredibly strong and simple systems-language pairs of the trivial systems problem
discussed in the preceding chapter score minimally on MI, a fact which will help
block the trivial systems problem.
5.3.1 Simplicity and Strength
This chapter began with the idea that we should set aside our thinking about
simplicity and strength in favor of starting from scratch in a search for measures to
be used in the best system competition. We have done that, and identified induction
friendliness, plausibly quantified by MI, as having a role to play in the BSA. But
simplicity and strength haven’t just been abandoned. We have every reason to
think that they still have a role to play in the BSA alongside induction friendliness,
and that means we should still be asking “What does it mean to be ‘simple’ and
‘strong’?”. MI may play a role in addressing that question.
MI’s relationship with predictive accuracy is one way that we might connect
it with simplicity. Predictive accuracy is the ultimate justification given in [Forster
and Sober, 1994] for the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) method of statistical
model selection and, in the context of that method, it is also the basis for defending
the pursuit of simplicity and unification in science. [Kieseppä, 2001] notes that pre-
dictive accuracy in the AIC formally corresponds to the Kullback-Leibler divergence
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between two probability distributions. And Kullback-Leibler divergence is equal to
MI when it is measuring the divergence between the distributions given by p(x, y)
and p(x)p(y) for the random variables X and Y that are the concern of MI.
MI has further connection to simplicity by way of the two broad classes of
simplicity—simplicity in formulation and simplicity in derivation—that [Frigg and
Hoefer, 2010] distinguish. With respect to simplicity in formulation, they write that
a linear relation between two variables is simpler than a polynomial of
order 325, a homogenous first order differential equation is simpler than a
non-linear integro-differ-ential equation, etc. It is not easy to pin down
what general rule drives these judgments, but this does not represent
a serious obstacle to us because nothing in what follows depends on
simplicity judgments of this kind. Another component of simplicity in
formulation is how many distinct probability rules a system contains.
Ceteris paribus, the fewer rules a system has in it, the simpler it is.
[Frigg and Hoefer, 2010, p. 359]
One general rule that might drive these judgments is that all the given examples of
something being simpler involve something that standardly takes less space to write
down. In this way, simplicity in formulation may be related to MI through the code
length interpretation of information theoretic measures.
[Frigg and Hoefer, 2010] describe simplicity in derivation as having to do with
“the computational costs incurred in deriving a desired result”, and recommend
quantifying this with Kolmogorov complexity [Frigg and Hoefer, 2010, p. 359]. Im-
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portantly, Kolmogorov complexity is not a computable function. This means that,
if it were to play a role in the BSA, the laws of nature may turn out to be epistemi-
cally inaccessible just because the simplicity of competing systems, as measured by
Kolmogorov complexity, cannot be calculated. Epistemic accessibility is typically
a desideratum for an analysis of laws, so this incalculability is not something that
we want in the BSA. There is, however, a definite class of situations where Kol-
mogorov complexity is guaranteed to be computable, and, in all of them, measuring
Kolmogorov complexity is equivalent to measuring entropy as in [Shannon, 1948].
Thus, MI, through its connections to related information theoretic measures, has
connections to simplicity in derivation as well as simplicity in formulation.
MI might also have close ties to strength. Many authors— [Lewis, 1973],
[Loewer, 2007], [Cohen and Callender, 2009], and [Woodward, 2013], among others—
refer to strength as “informativeness”. Though I have so far preferred the code
length interpretation of information theoretic measures over the “information” in-
terpretation, it cannot be denied that information theory is the most prominent
quantification (as opposed to qualitative analysis) of “information”. Thus, if “in-
formativeness” is how we are to understand strength, MI is well placed to be a
quantification of strength. Circumstances with higher MI are ones where the world




Explanatory power has been related to MI in the work of [Hanna, 1969] and
[Greeno, 1970]. I will focus in the discussion below on [Greeno, 1970], which has
garnered greater attention as part of the introduction of the Statistical-Relevance
model of explanation in [Salmon, 1971]. Specifically, I will show here how the role for
MI in Greeno’s analysis of explanatory power fits with the way MI has been deployed
above on behalf of induction friendliness as being measured between different parts
of the world.
To begin, Greeno is concerned with the relevance of possible explanantia that
are statistically related to some explanandum. The motivating example involves
trying to explain why Albert stole a car. Part of the explanation might be that
Albert lives in San Fransisco, where there is a high delinquency rate. But Albert’s
father earns more than $40,000 per year, and the children of such high earners have
a low delinquency rate. It seems clear that a good explanation of Albert’s theft
should not exclude Albert’s father’s high earnings, but also that an explanation
will be worse for its inclusion since it makes the explanandum less likely. Greeno’s
solution to this paradox involves looking at “general explanatory systems, rather
than single explanations” and, in the context of those systems, using MI to identify
those potential explanantia that are most relevant [Greeno, 1970, p. 280].
Greeno’s application of information theoretic ideas begins by carving the do-
main of a theory into two partitions M and E4, with M meant to be interpreted as
4 Greeno uses S instead of E. I introduce the substitution to avoid using S in a way other
than as standing for a system. For clarity and consistency, I will make other minor adjustments
174
the set of variables whose values are to be explained, and E the set of variables that
may contribute to any such explanations. MI measured between M and E can be
thought of as the difference between the entropy of M and the conditional entropy
of M given E. This gives us (when the arbitrary constant k is set to 1):











Greeno notes that I(E;M) has the nice feature of giving “an indication of the
extent to which the theory is ‘close’ to the goal of nomological deductive explanatory
power” [Greeno, 1970, p. 283]. The reasoning behind this claims is that concerns
about statistical explanation will give way to the deterministic explanations of the
deductive-nomological model in the special case where p(m|e) is either 0 or 1 for
all m, e ∈ M,E. I(E;M) ranges in value from 0, when H(M) = H(M |E), to
H(M), when H(M |E) = 0. The maximum value will be achieved in the deductive-
nomological model’s special case since either p(m|e) = 0 or log p(m|e) = 0, zeroing
out every value in the sums of H(M |E).
This is just one of a number ways Greeno relates MI to explanatory power.
The paper goes on to show that MI approximates “the usefulness of the theory in
improving the accuracy of predictions about the explananda”, that theories with
higher MI will be more testable under certain conditions, and how gains (or lack
to notation in any quotations from Greeno.
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thereof) in the MI of a theory when new variables are added to the theory can
illuminate the development of new hypotheses in scientific practice [Greeno, 1970, p.
286]. I will not go into any of the details of these here.
What is important to see is that Greeno’s partitions M and E are of a kind with
the way I have been talking about MI being measured between parts of the world.
Extending the example of Albert’s auto theft to a general theory of delinquency,
Greeno suggests that
the domain might be American males between 12 and 18 years old. The
variables of the theory might be degrees of delinquency D, the kind of
neighborhood a boy lives in B, and the income of the boy’s family C.
[Greeno, 1970, p. 280]
These variables that can make up M and E are like the basic kinds or quantities
picked out by the language of a system-language pair. How the statistics associated
with these variables and the domain are like the relationship between a system and
a world. Following these associations, Greeno’s calculation of MI as a measure of
explanatory power is carried out in the same way as mine for MI as a measure of
induction friendliness. Insofar as we are right to use MI in these ways (or, rather,
this way), then it may be said that circumstances—the triple w, S, L of a world,
system, and language—will present with a more induction friendly world precisely
when the world makes the given system-language pair more explanatorily powerful.
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5.3.3 Compression
Back in Chapter 2, it was suggested that the relativity of the BSA may be
limited by “insurmountable practical challenges”. Two such challenges were men-
tioned. The first was that the best system competition must be computable, on pain
of leaving the laws incalculable—and this already came up earlier in this section in
the context of using Kolmogorov or Shannon-style approaches to information theory
in measuring simplicity. The second challenge had to do with writing things down
in the practice of science, and how, every time we do, “we incur physical space and
energy costs”.
To develop this second challenge more, think again of the story of a scientist
appearing before God and receiving the laws of nature. It does a lot to illuminate
the nature of BSA laws, but it gets an important feature of actual scientific practice
wrong: Science is done in the world. The results of experiments must be written
down in the same space that is (broadly speaking) the subject of the experiments.
The systematic calculations of practicing scientists must be done in a way that
comports with the very collection of facts that are to be systematized. As with
a concern for induction friendliness, any limits to relativity imposed by the fact
that science is done in the world are going to be universal—nobody has an eternity
outside of space and time in the audience of a boundless intellect.
When, in our story, God starts listing all the facts, the scientist asks for the
pithy version. But what if we set aside the desire for the pithy version of the facts?
Suppose that scientists were content to collect every fact they can without a care
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for simplicity (or distinguishing lawful from accidental regularities, or any other
consideration that might speak against this list as the aim of science). We may ask
naively: How much space would it take to write down all the facts? How big, in the
actual world, is “God’s big book of facts”, as [Beebee, 2000] calls it?
Consider the question first with our current technology. Suppose we tried to
write down just 1 byte worth of data for each of the estimated 1080 atoms in the
known universe, and that we can store 1 TB (107 bytes) on a drive 5× 10−5 m3 in
volume and 100g in mass (typical for a commercially available external hard drive).
To do that we would need a storage device whose size is comparable to a stack of
100 Milky Way galaxies (which in the grand scheme of things isn’t that big) and
whose mass is 1014 times greater the mass of the known universe (a galaxy is mostly
empty space, but this would be a very dense cube). And that impossible to achieve
feat is just trying to get 1 byte’s worth of data on each atom at one point in time.
If we were to try and record every fact of the universe with perfect accuracy
throughout all of space and time we would need, in essence, a perfect duplicate
universe to serve as our big book of facts. Since the big book must be located in
the actual universe, the best we could ever hope to do is get one half of the universe
(the big book region) to look exactly like the other half (the to-be-written-down
fact region). In getting the book region to match the fact region, we effectively
prevent ourselves from writing down the facts of the book region of the universe.
Still more of the universe would have to be abandoned for inclusion in the book to
provide the energy required to arrange the book region of the universe to match the
arrangement in the facts region (with each region now only being sized to half of
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what is left in the world after extracting the needed energy for the rearrangement).
Writing anything down on the scale of God’s big book will incur enormous costs in
the form of abandoning as never-to-be-written-down some fraction of all the facts
in the world
But this isn’t quite right. Suppose we do want to be able to record every fact
of the universe with perfect accuracy throughout all of space and time. Doing so
would require a perfect duplicate universe to serve as our big book of facts, but
only if we deny ourselves any means of compression—in some sense, only if we are
uninterested in the pithy version of the big book. But, of course, we are interested
in the pithy version of the big book. The whole point of the BSA is to pick out
the regularities of the universe, and in doing so it frees us up from having to write
everything down. If we know, or have a law saying, for example, that As always
precede Bs, then we don’t need to write down every instance of an A in the world.
It will be enough to write down the regularity and let it be implicit whenever we
write down an instance of a B that it was preceded by an A.
Including MI in the BSA puts us on track to address all of this by way of the
code length interpretation of information theory. Indeed, this problem of efficiently
writing things down was precisely what led to the development of information theory
in [Shannon, 1948]. Shannon was working for Bell Labs, still owned by AT&T
at the time, and they were very much concerned with the practical problem of
efficiently writing things down (in the form of electrical impulses propagating across
telecommunications wires) as a part of the telephone and telegraph business that is
the company’s namesake. Preferring system-language pairs that have higher MI will
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lead to sets of laws that allow for greater compression of God’s big book of facts,
thus avoiding more of the physical costs associated with writing down every fact.
5.3.4 Triviality
The last reason that I will give for adding MI to the BSA is that it seems
to offer a solution a longstanding problem for the BSA—our much discussed trivial
systems problem.
To quickly review: [Lewis, 1983] notices that how good a system is depends
on the language in which it is expressed. The dependency between the goodness
of a system and the language in which it is expressed leads to the trivial systems
problem for the BSA: Let F be a predicate true of all and only things in the actual
world. Then the system “∀xFx” seems to be both incredibly strong and incredibly
simple, making it the best system. But ∀xFx would make every true regularity of
the world a law (since the laws are the axioms and theorems of the best system),
and that violates the desideratum that there be a distinction between lawful and
accidental regularities. The standard solutions to this problem—offered in [Lewis,
1983], [Loewer, 2007], and [Cohen and Callender, 2009]—all involve blocking F in
various ways from being a legitimate predicate in whatever language is paired with a
system. In Chapter 4 it was argued that an alternative solution to the problem may
be found by properly defining the best system competition, and specific attention
was paid to how strength is measured.
Adding MI to the best system competition does similar work. Even if ∀xFx
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is incredibly strong and simple, its MI is exactly zero. Consider our simple example
of systems that treat the world as Markovian with degree one (though, in this case,
the degree doesn’t matter). The world w, described in the language of F , is just a
long string of F s. On its face, one might think that such a world has high MI. But
remember that MI is concerned with how much less has to be written down about
the random variables of interest. This is most clear when MI, I(X;Y ), is measured
as the difference between the entropy H(X) and conditional entropy H(X|Y ) (see
fn. 3 of this chapter). In the circumstances of the trivial system, there is zero
conditional entropy; that is, if you know the present state of the world (Y ), then
nothing more needs to be written down in order for the immediate future state of
the world (X) to be communicated to you. And the non-conditional entropy is also
zero; it doesn’t take any space to write down the immediate future state of the world
because it is guaranteed to be F , and we don’t need to waste space writing things
down about outcomes that are guaranteed.





when x = F , p(F ) = 1—since F always occurs—then log p(F ) = 0, and so 0 is
contributed to the value of H(X). And, since F always occurs, H(X) = 0. Similarly
for the conditional entropy





p(x, y) log p(x|y).
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Since F always occurs, the only relevant term is when x, y = F, F . And so it goes:
p(F(x)|F(y)) = 1, log 1 = 0, and so H(X|Y ) = 0.
MI is the difference between these two measures, and the difference between
zeros is zero. So, even if ∀xFx is overwhelmingly simple and strong, it has minimal
MI. The TSP depends on the trivial system being overwhelmingly the best, and
that is unlikely to be the case when MI is a part of the best system competition.
Notably, unlike the strength measure in Chapter 4, the success of MI in undermining
the TSP does not depend on how we construct the space of possible worlds.
5.4 Summary
I have argued in this chapter that the role of induction in scientific prac-
tice should be taken very seriously in the BSA—specifically, induction friendliness
should be a part of the measure of the goodness of a system-language pair. Further-
more, I recommended that induction friendliness be quantified by mutual informa-
tion, and pointed to a number of additional benefits that that might have for the
BSA.
I began, in Section 5.1, by arguing that the BSA must be concerned with induc-
tion friendliness. After saying a bit about what is meant by ‘induction friendliness’,
I pointed out that the usual argument from interest that supports the inclusion of
simplicity and strength in the BSA does not easily apply to induction friendliness.
Despite that, science’s interest in induction friendliness does place a requirement
on the BSA according to which the best system system-language pair must make
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the the actual world the most induction friendly among all the possible worlds.
In Section 5.2, I recommended that induction friendliness be quantified by mutual
information. This was argued for on the basis of being able to construe mutual
information as a measure of the correlation between past, present, and future states
of the world. Finally, in Section 5.3, I argued that mutual information might bring a
number additional of benefits to the BSA that are independent from its connection
to induction friendliness. Specifically, I noted that mutual information has extant
connections to measures of simplicity, strength, and explanatory power, that it will
help to minimize the physical costs of doing science through its connection to data




Let us return to the question that prompts all the work that has just been
done: What is it to be a law of nature? The rough answer offered by the BSA is that
the laws are the regularities that appear in the best systematization of the world.
As we quickly saw, this rough answer raises many new questions. What counts as
a system? What is being systematized? What makes a system best? The rough
answer to these questions is to say that what counts as a system, what makes a
system best, etc., will be determined by scientific practice. Laws of nature have a
role to play in scientific practice, and a good account of laws will respect that.
The quickest way to respect scientific practice is to build it into your theory.
For example, if scientists prefer simple and strong theories, then the BSA should
say that the best systems are the simplest and strongest. But it better not be that
within the BSA what makes it true that the best theory is the simplest and strongest
is the preferences of scientists. If that were the case, then what it is to be a law
of nature would depend on subjects (namely, scientists), in conflict with a widely
held expectation that the laws of nature should be objective. This issue, dubbed
‘Armstrong’s objection’ and discussed at length in Chapter 2, admits (at first) of a
rather straightforward solution. The ‘brute metaphysics’ response to Armstrong’s
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objection says that there is just a metaphysical fact of the matter about what makes
a system the best. Insofar as the laws have a role to play in scientific practice, we
can and should look to that practice to make our best philosophical guess as to
what “best” means. But that does not make scientific practice the determiner of
the meaning of “best” in the BSA, and so the laws (as described by the BSA) are
not in violation of the expectation that they be objective.
If that is the end of the story, then there is a lot of work to do for the BSA
in the form of going through scientific practice and finding precise answers to the
questions like “What makes a system best?”. But things are not quite that simple.
As soon as we set out to search for answers to such questions in scientific practice,
what we find are a multitude of incompatible answers. The sorts of systems con-
sidered in physics just aren’t the same as those considered in biology (at least not
in general). Maybe physics and economics consider similar systems (insofar as they
employ similar formal tools), but the basic kinds of those systems, and generally the
languages use to express them, are wildly different. We likewise don’t find physics,
biology, or economics to be interested in systematizing the same things. Nothing
could happen in the realm of economics that would count as evidence for or against
the Standard Model of particle physics. Maybe we could learn something about the
inner workings of black holes that will be relevant to biology, but barring (say) some
revelation about the prevalence of micro black holes in the primordial soup in which
life on Earth started, biologists can safely ignore the latest advances in the physics
of black holes.
So what does this do to our response to Armstrong’s objection? The practice
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of science taken as a whole disagrees with itself on the answers to those questions
which are important to the details of the BSA. RSP, the principle that an account
of laws must respect scientific practice, tells against privileging one set of answers
available in scientific practice over others. The alternative is to relativize the laws,
letting there be different sets of laws for every way you could fill in the details of
the BSA corresponding to every way scientific practice could answer the relevant
questions. This could be done on a very large scale, with every detail of the BSA
being allowed to vary without constraint. But, I argued in Section 2.2, Armstrong’s
objection has a good alternative reading as being opposed to the profligate sets
of laws relativity and accommodating scientific diversity would bring. This anti-
relativity reading of Armstrong’s objection is compatible with the anti-subjectivity
reading, and, I claimed, the objection is best understood as the combination of both
readings. Once it was sorted out how there can be relativity in the laws without
succumbing to subjectivity (in Section 2.2.1), responding to Armstrong’s objection
became a matter of identifying just what relativity is required to accommodate
differences (actual and potential) in the interests of scientists. If you don’t include
enough relativity, then you will break (at least some of) the BSA’s laws’ connection
to scientific practice in violation of RSP. If you include more relativity than what
is needed to satisfy RSP, then you do harm to the expectation that the laws are
objective in the sense of being absolute (as opposed to non-subjective).
Properly answering Armstrong’s objection requires striking a balance between
relativity and objectivity in the BSA. That has been (give or take some additional
concerns) the project of this dissertation following the general framework of the BSA
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offered in Chapter 1 and the setup of the challenge posed by Armstrong’s objection
in Chapter 2. The project of the remainder of this concluding chapter is to continue
reviewing the results of this dissertation and spell out how they come together into
a coherent variant of the BSA. In reference to the tension that is the overarching
theme of this dissertation, I will call my BSA variant the Relative and Objective on
Balance Analysis, or ROBA for short.
Before getting into the details of the ROBA, it will be helpful to review all
the moving parts of the BSA whose details need to be filled in. In Chapter 1, the
four-part model of the BSA was introduced. The four parts are:
1. The facts of the world to be systematized.
2. The candidate systems from which the laws will be drawn.
3. The languages in which the facts and systems may be expressed.
4. The competition function that determines the best system language pair.
A relativized variant of the BSA will have it that there are multiple sets of laws
each relative to different ways of filling in the details of these four parts. Such a
relativized BSA variant will be more or less relative depending on it having fewer
or more constraints on the ways to fill in the details.
Much of what has happened in this dissertation played on relationships be-
tween these parts. In Chapter 3, the relationship between facts and languages was
explored in some detail. The languages of the BSA, following [Cohen and Callender,
2009], are individuated by the kinds that they treat as basic, with the set of all kinds
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K being the set of fundamental kinds Kfund closed under supervenience relations.
The most straightforward way kinds and facts are related is that some facts will be
unable to be systematized if we deny ourselves access to the languages that are able
to express those facts. Going in the other direction, we can make it unlikely that
certain kinds will be part of the best system if we do not attempt to systematize the
relevant facts. What came out in Chapter 3 is that fact relativity has a finer grain
than kind relativity. In the example of insect vision from Section 3.3.1, it became
apparent that biologists cared about photons, but not all photons. Capturing the
particular interests of biologists depended on being able to sort some (namely, the
biologically interesting) photon related facts from others, and not just on picking
out the biological kinds. Properly accommodating special science laws, the second
(after Armstrong’s objection) of the three major topics highlighted in Chapter 1,
thus turned out to depend on the relationship between facts and language in the
four parts of the BSA.
The third major topic, discussed at length in Chapter 4, was the trivial systems
problem (TSP), the central concern of which is the relationship between language
and the competition function. The TSP points out that a system can be made
overwhelmingly simple by choosing a suitably gerrymandered language, and so you
can find very strong and problematic systems and seemingly guarantee that they will
be the best despite their problems. There is also the related problem of transcendent
comparisons (PTC), which tells us that there are no measures of system goodness
that are ‘transcendent’ in the sense that they can compare two systems expressed
in any two different languages. There are, however, ‘non-immanent’ measures of
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system goodness—contra the problem of immanent comparisons (PIC)—that can
compare systems expressed in different languages (just not any different languages).
A competition function defined by a non-immanent measure of system goodness has
an associated class of languages. A non-immanent competition function C1 may
be associated with a class of languages L1 that includes Lfund (the language of the
fundamental kinds) and every language Li such that there exists a language Lj ∈ L1
and C1 can compare two systems where one is expressed in Li and the other in Lj.
That is, C1 is associated with a language class L1 comprised of all the languages
that allow systems expressed in them to be compared using C1. Pairing C1 with
any other language class would make it possible to have two system-language pairs
competing to be the best that are incomparable.
What is most interesting about these relationships between the parts of the
BSA is that relativizing laws to one part can eliminate the need to relativize to
other parts. The language relativity that is the hallmark of the BBSA must be
supplemented by fact relativity (as per the arguments of Chapter 3). Indeed, lan-
guage relativity, insofar as it is being used to ensure the existence of sets of laws
for each special science, may be wholly replaced by fact relativity. It was argued in
Chapter 4 that language relativity (or the related language privileging) is also not
required to address the TSP, PIC, or PTC. In place of language relativity, we can
have a combination of fact relativity and, if needed, competition relativity. Elimi-
nating language relativity in this way has two advantages. First, it gives the BSA a
way to make sense of the idea, developed in Section 4.7.2, that laws and kinds are
discovered together. Second, it should make the BSA no more relative than when
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language relativity is included, and, insofar as we can constrain the set of acceptable
competition functions, it should make the BSA less relative (which serves to assuage
the concern with relativity in Armstrong’s objection).
The question we might now ask is “Can the set of acceptable competition
functions be constrained?”. The answer, I think, is yes. I argued in Chapter 5
that, while scientists may be more or less interested in simplicity and strength,
they will always care, albeit to possibly greater or lesser degrees, about ‘induction
friendliness’. However significant the role of induction friendliness in a best system
competition will be, the ability to compare systems with respect to their induction
friendliness is an all-or-nothing affair. If, as I recommend Section 5.2, we quantify
induction friendliness with mutual information (MI), then, in terms of language
relativity, the only language classes to which we can (effectively) relativize are those
that are subsets of the class associated with MI.
So, with all that done, what does the ROBA say? How does it fill in the details
of the four-part model of the BSA? To start, I will be bold with respect the more
speculative parts of Chapter 5, and say that MI is all that is needed to capture what
is meant by “best”—induction friendliness of course, but also the other components
discussed in Section 5.3 like simplicity and strength—without need for competition
relativity. This means that the set of all languages to be considered, LROBA, is the
set of all and only the languages that allow for comparisons between systems using
MI. With LROBA in hand, we can define the set of all facts FROBA as being all the
atomic sentences true of the actual world expressible by any language L ∈ LROBA.
It is now helpful to note that the ROBA is fact relative, and runs a separate
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best system competition for each F ⊆ FROBA. Entering into each such competition
are the facts F , the possible systematizations of those facts SF , and the languages
LROBA. (Note that SF may not include every system true of the world, and may
include some systems that, while they must be true of F , are not be true of the
world as a whole.) The F -relative laws, then, are the regularities drawn from the
system deemed best by the competition C(F,SF ,LROBA).
A complication crops up at this point with respect to induction friendliness
and fact relativity. Induction friendliness, it was said in Section 5.1, is a feature
of a world with respect to some system language pair. A preference for induction
friendliness was understood there as a desire for the world to be maximally induction
friendly (or close to it) with respect to a space of possible worlds. The complication
is that, when we relativize to a subset of the facts in the actual world, it is not clear
what subset of facts are to be considered when we move to some possible world.
The most straightforward way of dealing with this may be to note that the actual
world (or some subset of it) will be more or less induction friendly depending on
the considered system-language pair. It seems plausible that scientists will prefer,
absent an ability to ensure that they are in the most induction friendly of the possible
worlds, that they describe the world they are stuck with (or some subset of it) in a
way that makes it as induction friendly as they can. Thus, C(F,SF ,LROBA) will
pick a system-language pair Sbest, Lbest as the best if it maximizes (with respect
to all S, L ∈ SF ×LROBA) MI measured between the parts of F (as they are carved
up by the respective pairs S, L).
In total, we have the following.
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ROBA. A regularity is an F -law of nature just in case it appears in, and is expressed
according to, any system-language pair Sbest, Lbest such that:
(1) F ⊆ FROBA, where FROBA is the set of atomic propositions expressible
by any language in LROBA.
(2) Sbest ∈ SF , where SF is the set of systems that are true of F .
(3) Lbest ∈ LROBA, where LROBA is the set of languages that allow for
inter-system-language pair comparisons using MI.
(4) The MI of F is maximized with respect to all S, L ∈ SF × LROBA when
F is divided into related parts according to Sbest, Lbest.
There is, of course, a lot of work left to be done. The ROBA is by no means
a complete analysis of laws of nature. Much more needs to be said about dividing
sets of facts into parts following a given system-language pair, about just what the
structure of LROBA is, in defense of using MI exclusively, etc. But in these respects,
it is a no less complete analysis than any other BSA variant that casually appeals
to, for example, “the best balance of simplicity and strength”.
It is also important to note that I do not take the ROBA to be the ultimate
accomplishment of this dissertation. It is just one way of applying the lessons
learned in each chapter. Those lessons—about the general structure of the BSA
(introduced in Chapter 1), constraints on that structure, and how they relate to
subjects such as (in Chapter 2) the variable interests of scientists, (in Chapter 3)
interfield interactions and distinguishing special and fundamental laws, (in Chapter
4) the relationship between the languages used in science and the measures used to
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choose best systems, and (in Chapter 5) the significance of the problems of induction
to system choice—are where the value of this dissertation lies. My hope is that those





Chapter A: Shannon’s BSA
In this appendix, I provide a reconstruction of a classic theorem from [Shannon,
1948], but newly motivated to be about induction friendliness and the BSA. The
theorem and its setup is worthy of being included here in full.1
We have represented a discrete information source as a Markoff process.
Can we define a quantity which will measure, in some sense, how much
information is “produced” by such a process, or better, at what rate
information is produced?
Suppose we have a set of possible events whose probabilities of occurrence
are p1, p2, ..., pn. These probabilities are known but that is all we know
concerning which event will occur. Can we find a measure of how much
“choice” is involved in the selection of the event or of how uncertain we
are of the outcome?
If there is such a measure, say H(p1, p2, ..., pn), it is reasonable to require
of it the following properties:
1. H should be continuous in the pi.
1 The proof, however, I leave for the most committed of readers to find in the second appendix
to [Shannon, 1948].
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2. If all the pi are equal, pi = 1/n, then H should be a monotonic
increasing function of n. With equally likely events there is more
choice, or uncertainty, when there are more possible events.
3. If a choice be broken down into two successive choices, the original
H should be the weighted sum of the individual values of H. The














Figure A.1: Decomposition of a choice from three possibilities.










On the right we first choose between two possibilities each with
probability 1
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. The final results have the same probabilities as




























is the weighting factor introduced because this
second choice only occurs half the time.
In Appendix 2, the following result is established:







where K is a positive constant.
[Shannon, 1948, p. 10]
This is what gives rise to the “uncertainty” interpretation of entropy. Shannon
himself notes that this theorem is unnecessary to the minimum average code length
interpretation of entropy that is the primary concern of information theory (at least
as far as Shannon was concerned in that paper). But it is illuminating.
And it is that illuminating quality that prompts the remaining work of this
appendix. I reconstruct this theorem in the context of the BSA, leading to an inter-
pretation of entropy as, roughly, “induction unfriendliness when the present state of
the world is known”. More importantly, from there we can derive (approximately)
MI as a measure of induction friendliness.
I begin by introducing a toy model of the BSA (Section A.1) that parallels
Shannon’s toy model of a communication system. In the context of that toy model,
I qualitatively develop the idea that different worlds may be more or less induction
friendly (Section A.2). Instead of directly looking for the induction friendliness of
the world, we will start by asking about the induction unfriendliness of a world,
and doing that requires quite a bit of setup. First, in Section A.3, I introduce toy
frequencies that are like, but just not quite, the probabilities of individual (or com-
binations of) states in our toy worlds. The next, and crucial, step is to begin by
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considering the induction unfriendliness of a world in just the simple situation of
focusing on just the regularities in the given system have the same antecedent kind.
It is this situation that most closely parallels Shannon’s theorem, and I re-motivate
Shannon’s three assumptions for the purpose of quantifying induction unfriendliness
in Sections A.4, A.5, and A.6, respectively. In Section A.7, I derive the induction
unfriendliness of a world when the given system is allowed to include regularities
with differing antecedent kinds as being the conditional entropy of consequent states
in the world on antecedent states. Finally, in Section A.8, I show how the induc-
tion friendliness of a world is approximately the MI between the antecedent and
consequent states of the world.
As in Shannon, the success of the work in this section is not required for suc-
cessfully arguing that induction friendliness, MI, and the BSA, should be brought
together. The preceding sections should stand on their own. But I do think this
exercise in reconstructing one of the original results of information theory is worth-
while. For one, it illustrates in significant detail how induction friendliness, MI,
and the BSA, can be brought together. I also think it is emblematic of how the
sorting out of the details of the best system competition should be done—namely,
by carefully going through the needs and interests of scientific practice, and seeing
what emerges from that.
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A.1 The Toy BSA
To begin, there are the local qualities, the basic kinds, that are distributed
throughout the world. The toy-ness of our model appears most strongly in the
assumption that the world is a discrete and finite string of the basic kinds. Any toy
world may be described as a ‘coin flip’ world where there are only two kinds 0 and
1 (or heads and tails or H and T or whatever one prefers). Here is an example of
a coin flip world:
we = 10100101001010101111100101
By default I assume that a toy world is a coin flip world. I will refer to any position
in the world where a kind obtains a “state”, as in “the first two states of we are 1
and 0, respectively”. When we are interested in more than two kinds I will say that
the world is what it is “as expressed in L”, where L consists in a set of kinds K and
a function T (−) from binary sequences to K. So, for an example language Le, if
Ke = {a, b, c, d}, and Te maps 10 to a, 01 to b, 00 to c, and 11 to d, we may say
of our example world from above that
we =Le aabbcaaaddabb.
That is, the world we as expressed in Le—or, with kinds Ke according to the
translation Te—is “aabbcaaaddabb”.
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To accompany our toy worlds is a toy conception of the BSA and induction.
A system S, always to be paired with a language L, is characterized by a set of
regularities of the form “If antecedent kind a obtains at any time t in the world,
then the consequent kind c obtains at t + 1” for any a, c ∈ K. I will just write
“a→ c” when there will be no loss of clarity. A best system competition for a world
w scores pairs Si, Li ∈ S × L according to (usually) the balance of simplicity and
strength Si has with respect to w when both are expressed in Li. The laws of world
w are the regularities that appear in Sbest, where Sbest, Lbest is the highest scored
of the competing system-language pairs.
Epistemologically, the talk of simplicity and strength is providing a particular,
if rather vague, story about the inductive practices of scientists. To say that S, L
is the (epistemologically) best system-language pair—whatever regularities appear
in our best estimates of the laws and however we generalize from what limited data
we have to the whole world—is to say that it is the product of our best inductive
practices. Part of the aim of Chapter 5 was to step back from the standard picture
of the best system being the simplest and strongest on balance. In the place of
simplicity and strength, we would like to install induction friendliness, but that
cannot be done without the arguments to come. For now, we will suppose for any
S, L that it has been given to science from on high as the conclusion of some ideal
inductive practice.
In the context of the BSA, we normally think of S, L as being better or worse
for a particular world w. But for the moment we are being neutral on what makes
S, L better or worse; all we know is that it is the best. It is helpful, then, to flip our
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usual thinking around to consider, for a given S, L, “How good is the world w?”.
Or, since S, L is the product of an ideal inductive practice: “How induction friendly
is w?”
A.2 Degrees of Induction (Un)Friendliness
We can start looking for an answer to the question of “How induction friendly
is w?” by illustrating Hume’s worry about the failure of constant conjunction in our
toy worlds. The worry, at least on the surface, is that we see constant conjunction
until some time at which there is a failure of the pattern. Such a possible world
would be like wh below.
2
wh = 01|t00...
In wh we see a repetition of 0 followed by 1 until the step from t to t + 1 when the
constant conjunction fails and a 0 is followed by another 0 instead of a 1. Hume
is not really concerned about what happens after that (hence the ellipsis)—what
matters is just that the constant conjunction did fail, and nothing that happened
prior to t assures us that we aren’t in a world with such a failure.
We can motivate the possibility of there being more or less inductively friendly
worlds by going beyond Hume and considering what the world looks like after that
2 The subscript of vertical bar names the following point in time. An ellipsis indicates an
indefinite but finite arbitrary string. An over-line indicates indefinite but finite repetitions of the
over-lined sequence, or, when followed by a superscript, that superscript’s number of repetitions.
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Each of the wi×00 worlds is consistent with wh.
3 In w1×00 the violation of
the 01 pattern occurs only once. As failures of induction go, this presumably is not
a bad one—yes there was a failure, but it is just the one and everywhere else our
adoption of the 0 → 1 regularity will work so well. Similarly for w2×00—clearly
it is a 01 world with just a small wrinkle in the middle—but things are bit worse
than they were in w1×00 since the dominant regularity isn’t quite as dominant. The
inductive inference that we presumably would make from observing the world prior
to t to thinking that 0 is always followed by 1 seems less and less successful as the
period in which that regularity fails to apply gets larger.
So it seems as though the world looks less induction friendly as i becomes
larger. But things shouldn’t be quite so simple. As i grows to make the 00 pattern
a significant fraction of the world, we might stop thinking that we’re looking at a
01 patterned world with some failure in the middle, but rather a world with a 01
regime, followed by a 00 regime, and then another 01 regime, and perhaps there is
3 Note that wh actually describes a set of possible worlds on account of the openness of the
ellipsis and number of initial repeated 01 pairs, and included in that set are the wi×00 worlds.
That is what I mean here by “consistent”.
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some threshold where that makes for a more induction friendly world than the one
in the series of worlds before it. Further still, as i becomes large relative to the total
size of the world, what we will see is not a 01 world with some mess in the middle,
or a 01 to 00 to 01 world, but rather a 00 world with some mess on the ends, and
that may present another inflection point in the plot (against i) of the induction
friendliness of the wi×00 worlds.
We may also consider the problem of gruesome predicates, the titular “new
riddle of induction”, raised in [Goodman, 1954]: “Grue” is a predicate that “applies
to all things examined before t just in case they are green [in appearance] but to
other things just in case they are blue” in appearance [Goodman, 1954, p. 74].
Similarly, “bleen” applies to a thing just in case it appears blue when examined
prior to t and green after that. Notably, anything that we can say about green and
blue can also be said in terms of grue and bleen, and vice versa. Prior to time t,
all the emeralds we have examined have appeared green, but, prior to t, appearing
green is indistinguishable from appearing grue. While we might like to generalize
from our examinations of emeralds to the conclusion that all emeralds are green,
the evidence is just as good in favor of the incompatible alternative conclusion that
all emeralds are grue.
The obvious appeal of treating this problem in the context of the (toy) BSA is
that either (1) t is at or after the end of our finite world, and so green and grue are
effectively indistinguishable, or (2) we have access to the facts after t, and so can say
with confidence whether emeralds are actually green or grue (depending on whether
they appear green or blue after t, respectively). In the case of (1), generalizing
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to all emeralds are green is not incompatible with generalizing to all emeralds are
grue—the two regularities will either both be true or both be false in every possible
world that ends at or before t—and so the problem goes away. In the case of
(2): If emeralds do, in fact, persist in appearing green, then the employer of grue
(and bleen) will be confronted with a world in which there is an abrupt shift from
emeralds appearing grue to emeralds appearing bleen. When described using the
language of grue and bleen, such a world seems less friendly to induction, but when
described using the language of green and blue it seems perfectly induction friendly
(with respect to emeralds) since emeralds persist in their greenness. Similarly, if
the world is such that emeralds do change appearance from green to blue, then the
world will seem more induction friendly if we describe it in terms of grue and bleen
as opposed to green and blue.
The toy worlds that I have described cannot quite capture what is happening in
Goodman’s grue emerald thought experiment because the time-stamped translations
from green and blue to grue and bleen (or vice versa) cannot straightforwardly be
done with the time invariant translation functions T (−). We can, though, appreciate
that there should be a difference in induction friendliness between a world in which
the same predicate always applies (as when the emerald always appears green) and
a world with an initial segment of one kind occurring followed by some other kind
occurring in the rest of the world (as when we find the emerald switches appearance
from green to blue). We can likewise appreciate that the difference in induction
friendliness should be perfectly reversed if we were to redescribe each world in such
a way as to make the first world switch the prevailing kind (as when the emerald
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switches from grue to bleen) and the second world have a single prevailing kind (as
when the emerald is always grue).
The time-stamping involved in the translations from green and blue to grue
and bleen is not necessary for the induction friendliness of a world to change under
redescription. Consider the following worlds (with some spacing added for clarity):
wa = 10 01 10 01 10 01 10 01 10 01
wb = 110 011 110 001 110 001 100 011 100 001
The world wa is clearly quite regular, but not in a way that can be captured by
our restricted conception of what regularities may appear in a system because we
can use just those concerned with what single state follows another single state. To
correct this issue we could expand the sort of regularities that we allow for to include
what pairs of states follow other pairs, but that is unnecessary. All we need to do
is redescribe the world. Using the same language Le introduced earlier—according
to which each each 10 goes to a and 01 goes to b—we get that
wa =Le a b a b a b a b a b.
Now we can say that wa, redescribed using L, is perfectly regular; a is always
followed by b, and b is always followed by a (at least if we ignore the end of the
world not having any consequent state).
In contrast to wa, wb does not seem particularly regular. But what if we
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care about only the end points of triplets of states? Let L′e be like Le except that
whenever the Te of Le takes a pair of states to some element of Ke, T
′
e takes two
triplets to the same element of Ke where the first and last states of the triplet and
pair are the same, and one triplet as has a center state of 0 and the other a center
state of 1. For example, while Te maps 10 to a, T
′
e maps both 100 and 110 to a.
Expressing wb in L
′
e gets us that
wb =L′e a b a b a b a b a b
So wb is regular, at least when described in the right sort of way. This should come
as no surprise. How induction friendly a world is depends on the language we use to
describe the world. We could try to privilege as the “true” induction friendliness of
the world whatever value is yielded by the “true” language for expressing the world,
but in our toy worlds there is no such true language.
A.3 Toy Frequencies
Let us return to our first example world
we =Le aabbcaaaddabb.
There are, straightforwardly, some actual relative frequencies for this world. Namely,
there are the frequencies with which kinds obtain in the world. In we, expressed
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For convenience, I will drop the subscripts on f when they are clear in context.
There are also frequencies associated with seeing pairs of kinds obtaining.





and so on for all 16 possible pairs. These frequencies are interesting in our toy
worlds since they measure the frequency with which a corresponding regularity is
the correct one to apply. For example, f(ab) = 1/6 indicates that the regularity
a → b correctly characterizes a sixth of all transitions from one state to the next.
With this point in mind, I will call these “significance” frequencies.
In addition to the significance frequencies, it will be helpful to consider the
frequency with which a regularity will be deployed successfully by someone with
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knowledge of the antecedent state but not the consequent state. For some a, c ∈ K,
the “success” frequency fw,L(c|a) is the frequency with which c is the second kind






These frequencies behave almost like regular probabilities. The sum over all
k ∈ K of f(k) will equal one, as a regular probability would. We also have it that
f(c|a) ≈ f(ac)
f(a)
where the failure to achieve equality of the two sides is due to the first and last states
in a world not having antecedent or consequent states (respectively). However, as
worlds become large, the difference from equality goes to zero. This near equality
is reminiscent of the standard definition of conditional probability—the conditional
probability p(x|y) is the joint probability p(x, y) divided by the probability p(y)—
suggesting that success frequencies are analogous to conditional probabilities and
significance frequencies to joint probabilities. The biggest failure of this analogy will
be due to the fact that f(ac) 6= f(ca) but p(x, y) = p(y, x), and the rest will be due
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to the end effects already mentioned that become smaller as worlds become larger.
A.4 Continuity
Suppose we have observed that some kind a (∈ K) obtains at t. We would
like to know what happens at t + 1. If our given system S contains just the single
regularity a → c, then we at least know what to expect. It of course could fail to
be the case that in this particular instance c is what obtains at t + 1; S may be
the best system, but that doesn’t guarantee that the regularity will hold in every
situation in which it is applicable (where a regularity is “applicable” at a time t just
in case its antecedent kind obtains at t).4 What is at issue is the success frequency
associated with the regularity: If f(c|a) = 1, then every a is followed by a c and the
regularity a→ c holds everywhere it is applicable. If f(c|a) < 1, then the regularity
fails with a frequency of 1− f(c|a) among the points in time when it is applicable.
In general (for all a, c ∈ K), the use (when it is applicable) of a regularity a→ c will
be successful with frequency f(c|a)—this is precisely the conditional-probability-like
“success” frequency introduced above.
Situated in this world where our best inductive practices recommend the adop-
tion of the a → c regularity, what would we like to be true of f(c|a)? Clearly we
would do best if f(c|a) = 1, as then every time we see an a we would correctly
4 This is in conflict with the idea that laws should be universal. We can assume that the non-
universal nature of these regularities is just part of the toy-ness of the toy model. It might also be
that laws are not—and should not be expected to be—universal. This is the position of [Braddon-
Mitchell, 2001] and [Schrenk, 2008,Schrenk, 2014], and, if correct, the non-universality of of these
regularities is not a problem at all. In Chapter 3, I discuss these violations of universality and
refer to them as “simple system exceptions”.
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predict the appearance of a c. As the value of f(c|a) falls away from 1, its successful
use becomes less frequent, and, presumably, the induction friendliness of a world
where a→ c is truly the single best regularity to adopt goes down proportionally.
Of course, a→ c need not be the only regularity that has been recommended
by our best inductive practices. Continuing to restrict ourselves to the case where we
have observed a, the set of applicable regularities (adopted on the recommendation
of our best inductive practices or not) is comprised of the regularities a → ci for
all ci ∈ K. Compare two worlds using the same language. If f(ci|a)—which, since
a is fixed for the time being, I will write as fa(ci) for convenience and clarity—is
lower in the first world than the second, then necessarily the success frequency of
at least one of the other applicable regularities will be lower in the second world
than in the first. In other words, if fa,w,L(ci) < fa,w′,L(ci) there exists a cj ∈ K
such that j 6= i and fa,w,L(cj) > fa,w′,L(cj)). It is thus not immediately obvious
how strongly, when considering the full set of applicable regularities, deviation from
a success frequency of 1 impacts the induction friendliness of a world, since being
further from 1 is less friendly, but ensures that there is at least one other regularity
that is more successful.
Let H be the function that is meant to quantify the induction unfriendliness
of a world with respect to the best system whose regularities all feature a as their
antecedent kind. It seems clear, at the very least, that H is a function of the fa(c) for
all c ∈ K. I will assume something slightly stronger (and make all the dependencies
explicit in subscripts):
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Continuity. Ha,w,L is a continuous function of just the frequencies fa,w,L(c) for all
c ∈ K.
continuity is stronger than what is immediately apparent in light of the preceding
discussion on account of insisting that (1) H is continuous, and that (2) H is a
function of just the success frequencies.
Defending (2) is a matter or reemphasizing the simplifying assumptions sur-
rounding our toy model and what we are trying to quantify. To say that H is
a function of just the success frequencies is a bit disingenuous since the success
frequencies themselves depend on the world and choice of language. The only infor-
mation about the world that is not contained in the success frequencies has to do
with the ordering and number of states (and even then there is some information
since success frequencies are concerned with pairs). We should not worry about H
not exploiting that information because such large scale ordering information is not
generally available to someone trying to exploit regularities arrived at by induction.
In defense of (1), the continuity of H: Suppose we have two worlds w and
w′. Without loss of generality, suppose further that we have left them as being
described in the basic coin-flip form—this allows us the convenient fact that in each
world fa(1) = 1 − fa(0), so there is no question when there is a difference in the
success frequencies between the two worlds about how the difference is distributed
across the relevant regularities. Let fa,w(1) = fa,w′(1) + ∆. We should take H to
be continuous if, for every possible value of fa,w(1), in the limit as ∆ goes to 0, the
difference between Hw and Hw′ also goes to zero.
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Now consider an arbitrary value of fw,a(1). Say, fa,w(1) = .75. Since the
relevant success frequency is close to, but not, 1, this world w isn’t ideal, but it’s
also not terrible. Similarly, for some small positive value of ∆, the world w′ won’t be
too bad. With respect to just the a → 1 regularity, w′ is definitely more induction
unfriendly than w (since fa,w(1) > fa,w′(1))—note though that continuity makes
no demands on the direction of the difference. There will be some mitigation of the
difference between the induction unfriendliness of the two worlds when we consider
all the applicable regularities because fa,w(0) < fa,w′(0), and so, with respect to just
the a → 0 regularity, w′ is better than w. As fa,w′(1) gets closer to .75 (i.e., as ∆
goes to zero), the induction unfriendliness of the two worlds should also converge as
they become more and more alike. And so it should be in general for any value of
fa,w(1).
There are two salient values of fa,w(1) where one might reasonably have in-
tuitions against the continuity of H. At fa,w(1) = .5, any difference in the success
frequencies would make w′ better. At fa,w(1) = 1, any difference in the success
frequencies would make w′ worse. We might take the salience of these points to
indicate their possessing very—i.e., discontinuously—high and low values of H, re-
spectively. This is question begging, but perhaps not more so than the above appeals
to intuition in favor of the continuity of H. Here then is an indirect argument for
continuity via an attack on discontinuity. Discontinuity has the prima facie disad-
vantage of leaving us with a measure H that is not mathematically well behaved.
Its advantage is that, as long as we are using H to quantify a cardinal ranking of
induction unfriendliness, the discontinuity might better reflect the ranking we are
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trying to quantify. But this is only an apparent advantage. If there is discontinuity
to be found in relation to induction unfriendliness, it will be ambiguous whether it
is discontinuity in H or discontinuity in our response to H. As a parallel example,
think of a full belief threshold in our degrees of belief. Our degrees of belief can
take values in the continuum from 0 to 1, but the move from partial or no belief
to full belief, if thresholded, will be discontinuous (as in, once my degree of belief
in P passes .95 I will say that I have a full belief in P ). Things may be similar
for induction unfriendliness. H itself can be continuous (with all the mathematical
advantages that brings), and any apparent discontinuity may be pushed from H
itself to how we respond to H.
A.5 Monotonicity
To motivate the second assumption that we will make about H, consider the
following scenario: You can choose to be a scientist in either world w or w′. L is
the language of the best system-language pair in w, and L′ the best in w′. The
antecedent kind a that is the concern of H appears in and is treated the same way
by both L and L′. No kind in K or K ′ fails to obtain in the respective worlds, and
|K| < |K ′|. Lastly, the L and L′ are such that
(1) for all ci, cj ∈ K, fa,w,L(ci) = fa,w,L(cj), and
(2) for all c′i, c
′
j ∈ K ′, fa,w′,L′(c′i) = fa,w′,L′(c′j).
Stated less formally: In two worlds w and w′ where you have just observed a,
the consequent kinds are all equally likely, and there are more possible consequent
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kinds in w′ (as described by L′), than w (as described by L). In which world would
you rather be? We’ve assumed that, relative to a particular regularity a → c, a
world is more friendly, or less induction unfriendly, the closer fa(c) is to 1. When
we move to considering all the applicable regularities the issue is confused because,
as the success frequency of one regularity goes down, the success frequency of at least
one other must go up. In this case we know exactly how all the success frequencies
compare. Since the fa,w,L(c) are all equal, each is equal to 1/|K|. Similarly in w′
we have it that, for all c′ ∈ K ′, fa,w′,L′(c′) = 1/|K ′|. Thus the success frequency
of every applicable regularity in w is strictly closer to 1 than the success frequency
of any applicable regularity in w′. So w is preferable to—that is, more induction
friendly than—w′. When the success frequencies of the applicable regularities are
all equal, a world is less preferable—that is, more induction unfriendly—when there
are more applicable regularities to consider.
We make the above explicit in our second assumption about H:
Monotonicity. Ha,w,L is a a monotonically increasing function of |K| when, for all
ci, cj ∈ K, fa,w,L(ci) = fa,w,S,T (cj).
Of the assumptions that we have made (and will make) about H, monotonicity is
the only one that influences the direction of changes in H relative to changes in the
relevant success frequencies. It is also worth noting that monotonicity makes H a
tracker of a kind of ontological simplicity5 (or lack thereof) by counting a world and
5 [Schulte, 2008] employs “ontological simplicity” in an analysis of the discovery of particle
families. He characterizes ontological simplicity as encouraging the use of “as few ontological
categories as possible”—for our purposes, this means having fewer kinds—and “as many particle
families as possible that are disjoint, that is, categories whose boundaries do not overlap” [Schulte,
2008, p. 307]
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associated system-language pair as being less friendly to induction precisely when
more kinds are being used.
A.6 Decomposition
Consider a particular relation between two languages for a world that I will
call decomposition. L′ is a decomposition of L in w iff
(D1) K = K ′ except that there are n ≥ 2 kinds c1, c2, ..., cn ∈ K that do not appear






n ∈ K ′ that do not appear in K, and
(D2) T and T ′ are such that wL = wL′ except, for each of the ci among the
c1, c2, ..., cn ∈ K, wherever ci obtains in wL, the ordered pair (c′0, c′i) obtains in
wL′ .
In our running example with language Le and world we: The language L
′
e is a
decomposition of Le in we when Ke = {a, b, c, d}, K ′e = {c, d, x, y, z}, and, with
spacing for clarity,
we=Le a a b b c a a a d d a b b
we=L′e xy xy xz xz c xy xy xy d d xy xz xz.
It will be convenient to be able to characterize a decomposition relation by saying
what states decompose into what pairs of states. In our example we can characterize
the decomposition relation by saying that “a decomposes to xy and b decomposes
to xz” (in w, from Le to L
′
e).
Changing the language being used also changes how our given system S is
expressed. If S, L contained the regularities a→ a and a→ b, S, L′e should contain
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We can quickly say some things about the frequencies involving a, b, x, y, and
z:
fa(z) = fa(a) + fa(b)
fa(a) = fa(y|x)fa(x)
fa(b) = fa(z|x)fa(x).
The success frequencies associated with the Le kinds a and b are no different from
chained success frequencies in L′e of going from a to x and then from x to y or z.
Effectively all that has happened is that we changed the names of the a and b kinds
to xy and xz, respectively. It thus seems fair to assume that our move from Le to
L′e makes no difference to the inductive unfriendliness of the world. In particular,
the contribution to induction friendliness made by having the kinds a, b, and their
associated regularities, in S, Le should be the same as the contributions made by
having x, y, z, and their associated regularities in S, L′e. Similarly, the contributions
made by the kinds c and d should be the same because they were unaffected by the
decomposition.
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The tricky part with this is that the measure of unfriendliness H that we have
been building up is only defined for collections of regularities that have the same
antecedent state, which is a rule we want to break when considering the unfriendli-
ness of S, L′. To get around this, we can decompose the regularities in S, L′e: First
we look at the H of the regularities taking us from a to x, c, and d. Then to that
we add the H associated with the regularities taking us from x to y and z, but
weighted by the frequency with which those regularities are applicable (conditional
on a having preceded the x). This is our third assumption about H:
Decomposition. If L′ is a decomposition of L in w where the kinds k1, ..., kn ∈ K






n) and the kinds a and
kn+1, ..., kn+m appear in both K and K
′. Then
Hw,S,L(w(c|a)) = Hw,S,L′(w(c|a)) + fa,w,L′(k
′
0)×Hw,S,L′(w(c|a,k′0))
In the above, w(c|a) stands for the sequence of states in the world that are consequent
to a and, similarly, w(c|a,k′0) stands for the states consequent to the ordered pair of
states a, k′0.
Expanding on this to make the relevant (non-zero valued) frequencies explicit,
we get
Hw,S,L(fa(k1), ..., fa(kn+m)) = Hw,S,L′(fa(c
′





And, spelled out in our running example, we get that
Hw,S,Le(fa(a), ..., fa(d)) = Hw,S,L′e(fa(x), fa(c), fa(d))
+ fa,w,L′e(x)×Hw,S,L′e(fa(y|x), fa(z|x)).
A.7 Induction Unfriendliness
Our three assumptions about H—continuity, monotonicity, and decom-





where k is an arbitrary constant that determines the units of H (e.g. k = 1/ log(2)
gives units of bits). For a variety of reasons—most notably, its formal resemblance
to the concept from statistical physics—H is sometimes called the entropy of w(c|a).
The entropy of w(c|a) is the amount of induction unfriendliness for a world
associated with the regularities in the best system that have a as their antecedent
kind. In our running example, a could be any of a, b, c, or d. The best system
S of world w expressed in L presumably contains regularities that feature all four
kinds in the antecedent state position, and so we have all of H(w(c|a)), H(w(c|b)),
H(w(c|c)), and H(w(c|d)), as relevant to the total unfriendliness of the world. Let
each contribute in proportion to how frequently their respective regularities are
applicable; that is, let the total unfriendliness of the world be the average over
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Noting that fa(c) = f(c|a), and that f(ac) = f(c|a)f(a), we can rewrite the above








If one is inclined to adopt some of the terminology of information theory,
then this result has a very sensible reading: The induction unfriendliness of a world
is equivalent to our uncertainty about the immediate future when we know the
immediate past. If you are not so inclined, then the preceding argument can stand
on its own, and perhaps offer a more palatable alternative reading for some other
uses of information theoretic language.
A.8 Induction Friendliness
Let us pause to take quick stock of what has been done so far. We are assured
that S, L is the best system-language pair of world w, and have set out to answer
the question “How induction friendly is w?”. We have gotten as far as saying that
the induction unfriendliness of w is H(w(c)|w(a)), the conditional entropy of w’s
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consequent states given the antecedent states.
One way of thinking about our measure of induction unfriendliness is that
it tells us how bad things still are even after we are given the best system and
the current (antecedent) state of the world. This suggests that there is a sort of
induction unfriendliness to the world before we are given the best system. I say
“sort of” here because there is no induction involved at that point—without the
best system in hand, there are no generalizations around that have been made
based on past experience—just raw guessing about what kind is about to obtain.
Conveniently, we already know how to measure this. Recall that the induction





When we were looking for the total induction unfriendliness of the world above,
we were going to know the antecedent state, we just didn’t know which one it
would be and so we took the average for all a ∈ K. In the current situation,
anything we know about the antecedent state is irrelevant since we do not have a
system on hand to exploit that knowledge. Thus the only applicable frequencies are
the raw unconditional frequencies of the consequent states, and we get an “initial







Now what of induction friendliness? The system language pair S, L is assumed
to be the best because it is the output of best inductive practices. We have worked
out that H(w(c)|w(a)) is a measure of how unfriendly the world is after the best
inductive practices recommend adopting S, L. And we have just determined that
Hw,S,L(w(c)) is a measure of how unfriendly the world is before the best inductive
practices recommend adopting S, L. Let the induction friendliness of the world
be how much less the world is unfriendly after implementing the best inductive
practices. That is, let the induction friendliness for a world w given the best system-
language pair S, L, be
Iw,S,L(w(a), w(c)) = Hw,S,L(w(c))−H(w(c)|w(a)).
This is almost the MI between the antecedent and consequent states of w because,
while MI is symmetric—i.e. it would be that I(w(a), w(c)) = I(w(c), w(a))—this
will not generally be true for us because of the asymmetry of f(ac). However, we
can see that it is formally similar by exploiting the fact that f(ac) = f(c|a)f(a)
and f(c) =
∑
a f(c|a)f(a) are approximately true (with only edge effects violating
equality):





































while the MI of two random variables X and Y is









Why should we think that there is more than mere formal similarity between
these two measures? The kinds of systems that we allow for has an effect on what our
measure of induction friendliness will look like. If we restrict ourselves to asymmetric
regularities in our systems—as we have—then we should expect an asymmetric
measure of induction friendliness. If, for example, we allow for symmetric systems
that can treat w(a) and w(c) as random variables running alongside each other, and
not just as slightly offset fragments of the same sequence, then it makes perfect
sense to equate f(ac) and p(a, c) since there will no longer be a privileged ordering
between the states of w(a) and w(c). In general, something like the following should
be true:
Induction Friendliness. The induction friendliness of a world w and given system-
language pair S, L is the mutual information between w’s parts, where what
“w’s parts” are is determined by S, L.
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[Dupré, 1993] Dupré, J. (1993). The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations
of the Disunity of Science. Harvard University Press.
[Ellis, 1986] Ellis, J. (1986). The superstring-theory of everything, or of nothing?
Nature, 323:595–598.
[Floridi, 2011] Floridi, L. (2011). The philosophy of information. Oxford University
Press.
[Forster and Sober, 1994] Forster, M. and Sober, E. (1994). How to tell when sim-
pler, more unified, or less ad hoc theories will provide more accurate predictions.
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45(1):1–35.
[Frigg and Hoefer, 2010] Frigg, R. and Hoefer, C. (2010). Determinism and chance
from a humean perspective. In Dieks, D., Gonzalez, W., Hartmann, S., Weber,
M., Stadler, F., and Uebel, T., editors, The Present Situation in the Philosophy
of Science, pages 351–372. Berlin and New York: Springer.
[Frisch, 2011] Frisch, M. (2011). From arbuthnot to boltzmann: The past hypothe-
sis, the best system, and the special sciences. Philosophy of Science, 78(5):1001–
1011.
[Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny, 2016] Godfrey-Smith, P. and Sterelny, K. (2016). Bi-
ological information. In Zalta, E. N., editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, summer 2016 edition.
[Goodman, 1954] Goodman, N. (1954). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
[Greeno, 1970] Greeno, J. G. (1970). Evaluation of statistical hypotheses using
information transmitted. Philosophy of Science, 37(2):279–294.
[Hanna, 1969] Hanna, J. F. (1969). Explanation, prediction, description, and infor-
mation theory. Synthese, 20(3):308–334.
[Hoefer, 2007] Hoefer, C. (2007). The third way on objective probability: A sceptic’s
guide to objective chance. Mind, 116(463):549–596.
[Hume, 1896] Hume, D. (1896). A treatise of human nature by david hume,
reprinted from the original edition in three volumes and edited, with an ana-
lytical index, by l.a. selby-bigge, m.a.
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